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This dissertation examines experimental Victorian fantasy novels in order to 
provide an alternate history for the Victorian era, one traditionally associated with the 
realist novel. Texts are discussed using fantasy theory, reader-response criticism, and 
rhetorical philosophy in order to demonstrate how literary belief influences the moral 
project of experimental Victorian novelists. First, a review of literature introduces the 
reader to the major ideas and problems of fantasy texts. Then, Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s 
poem “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” is used to exemplify the relationship between 
the fantastic author and her reader. The first few chapters, then, explain the theory of 
reading fantasy that will be examined in the rest of the project. The following three 
chapters discuss the experimental nature of Sara Coleridge’s Phantasmion: Prince of 
Palmland (1837); George MacDonald’s Phantastes (1858); and Jean Ingelow’s Mopsa, 
the Fairy (1869). The focus is on how these authors manipulated readers’ expectations 
for a fairy tale in order to use the trope of childlike wonder as a reading strategy that 
would encourage interpretive inquiry about the unity of the fantastic and the material. 
The primary thesis is that these authors use theories about literary belief (derived from 
Romantic influences) to structure their texts and to guide readers in how to read 
experimental fantasy work. The dissertation concludes with a chapter that explains how 
critics could understand further the intersection of fantasy and realism during the 
nineteenth century and could begin to view them as part of a unified Victorian tradition 
rather than as incommensurable modes.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Critical studies of Victorian novels typically focus on realist texts, often 
marginalizing experimental literary fantasy as important only to the development of 
children’s literature. I believe an historical gap exists in the study of nineteenth-century 
novels, one created by a critical preference for texts that uphold the mimetic tradition, for 
texts that privilege the depiction of knowable truth rather than the unreal. Though fantasy 
criticism has thoroughly addressed this disparity, this field still lacks many in-depth 
examinations of the philosophical, rhetorical, and experimental aspects of Victorian 
literary fantasy novels. My project explains how unexamined literary fantasies can offer 
critics an alternative history to the dominance of the realist mode during the Victorian 
era. 
I believe the rise of the literary fantasy novel marks a unique historical time in 
which fantasy authors anticipate contemporary debates within rhetorical and reader-
response philosophy. By depicting impossible circumstances, unreal worlds, and fantastic 
characters, fantasy novels expose the artifice of language and force the reader to confront 
the problems of belief inherent in any act of interpretation and communication.  
In this project I define the literary fantasy novel as a genre that draws on 
Romantic poetic philosophy and foregrounds problems of literary interpretation and 
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belief. Therefore, I begin my project with an examination of the problem of literary belief 
expounded in the work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Coleridge’s discussion of the 
“willing suspension of disbelief” needed to properly read a fantastic text affected the 
development of the literary fantasy novel through his modeling of belief in “The Rime of 
the Ancient Mariner.” He also influenced his daughter Sara Coleridge, who wrote one of 
the first Victorian literary fantasy novels, Phantasmion: Prince of Palmland (1837). This 
novel develops the philosophical problems of belief and interpretation that become 
central to experimental Victorian novels by George MacDonald (Phantastes 1858) and 
Jean Ingelow (Mopsa, the Fairy 1869).  
The texts I have chosen trace an engagement with and a development of the 
problem of literary belief through the use of the fantastic, though, of course, not all 
Victorian literary fantasies are part of this tradition. These experimental texts demonstrate 
the interesting position the reader occupies as she attempts to “make sense” out of a genre 
that revels in defying the very narrative structures and expectations we typically use to 
decipher a text. As we will see, these novels employ different techniques to direct 
readers’ desire for textual meaning. Taken as a group, they provide us with a variety of 
interpretive models for the fantasy reader; and they also reveal the way in which 
Victorian authors who worked outside the mimetic tradition imagined their experimental 
novels as part of the Victorian concern with the reader’s moral consciousness. 
Because these writers often addressed children in their work, my project closely 
examines the development of children’s literature, and I also discuss the separation of 
fantastic and realist literature in order to demonstrate why experimental novels had not 
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been successful with the average Victorian reader. I focus on how authors manipulated 
readers’ expectations for a fairy tale in order to use the trope of childlike wonder as a 
reading strategy that would encourage interpretive inquiry about the unity of the fantastic 
and the material. My primary thesis is that these authors used theories about literary 
belief (derived from Romantic influences) to structure their texts and to guide readers in 
how to read experimental fantasy work. The failure of these texts (seen in contemporary 
reviews) indicates much about the reading preferences for the nineteenth century, both 
for readers of realist and fantasy literature. 
I also combine rhetorical, reader-response, and fantasy criticism in order to 
elucidate the way nineteenth-century literary fantasies anticipate contemporary 
discussions on the interpretive and communicative problems that exist between author, 
reader, and text. I hope to expose a critical fallacy that divides nineteenth-century fantasy 
into extremes of either allegorical didacticism or escapist nonsense, for the literary 
fantasy novels I examine exist in the undefined area of Tzevtan Todorov’s fantastique, 
provoking readers to interpretation through the rejection of generic expectations. These 
texts, then, demonstrate the problem of literary belief for the nineteenth-century fantasy 
author and her readers by modeling readership through complicated rhetorical techniques. 
I begin this study by examining the differences and similarities in the mimetic and 
fantastic genres. Chapter Two gives a brief history of fantasy’s development, which 
should provide context for the rest of my project. In it I distinguish between closed 
allegorical fantasy and the open literary fantasies I have chosen to examine in this 
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project. This chapter also gives theoretical background for my discussion of fantasy and 
reader-response criticism.  
In Chapter Three, I examine the problems of literary belief with more specific 
textual and theoretical analysis by exploring the Romantic philosophies of the fantastic 
developed by Samuel Taylor Coleridge. This chapter discusses Coleridge’s idea that the 
reader must willingly suspend disbelief in order to experience a fantastic text. I 
incorporate an historical overview of this philosophy, including its connection to 
Coleridge’s understanding of the dramatic probability and textual unity needed to achieve 
this belief. Through Coleridge’s work I develop background for a discussion of fantasy 
literature, which blossoms during the Victorian era due to the increased emphasis on 
imagination and changing perceptions of childhood fostered during the early nineteenth 
century. I use “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” to propose a model for the reader of a 
fantastic text, and I argue that the relationship between the Ancient Mariner and the 
Wedding Guest mirrors that of the fantasy author and her reader. Finally, this poem 
allows me to introduce Todorov’s theory of the fantastique, anticipated by both Coleridge 
and his daughter Sara. 
Chapter Four transitions from Romantic poetic theory to the development of the 
Victorian literary fantasy by focusing on Sara Coleridge’s novel Phantasmion: Prince of 
Palmland. I show how Coleridge incorporates her father’s poetic theory into a longer 
narrative, one that subverts typical reading conventions up to that point in history. I use 
Coleridge’s letters and essays to connect her ideas on allegory and imagination both to 
those her father used and to those that would come after her during the development of a 
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more specifically identifiable fantasy novel in the later nineteenth-century. This chapter, 
then, provides a bridge between Romantic theory to its development in fiction during the 
Victorian era. Additionally, I demonstrate how the genre of the literary fantasy novel 
necessitates a model for readership because it is thoroughly engaged with problems of 
literary belief and communication. In Coleridge’s case, I claim that the hero, 
Phantasmion, acts as model for readers through his reaction to his fantastic experiences. 
This chapter also contrasts the typically didactic use of fantasy with the new literary 
fantasy novel that will emphasize imagination over traditional allegory. The rhetorical 
strategies needed to reveal truth, rather than overtly to teach it, also influence the use of 
modeling readership in later Victorian literary fantasies.  
Chapter Five discusses George MacDonald’s Phantastes. I argue that Phantastes 
focuses on the problem of communicating the unreal through the arbitrary system of 
language as MacDonald uses a confessional mode to address readers in a metatextual 
novel. MacDonald employs a confessional mode through a first-person narrative and 
attempts to affect readers’ moral consciousness through a non-allegorical text. 
Specifically, he has the hero Anodos write the text we read using this confessional mode, 
which results in a novel that simultaneously disrupts readers’ typical expectations while it 
also asks them to believe that the fantasy they encounter might have ramifications for 
them after they complete the novel, even if fantasy affects each reader differently due to 
the problems inherent in communication. Unlike later fantasy writers (Lewis Carroll, 
William Makepeace Thackeray, or Oscar Wilde, for example), MacDonald still envisions 
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an affective purpose for the fantastic, even as he acknowledges the complications and 
pluralism produced by a fantasy text. 
Finally, I conclude by discussing Jean Ingelow’s Mopsa, the Fairy in Chapter Six. 
I argue that this novel adds yet another layer of complexity to the project of interpretation 
and belief that lies at the heart of the literary fantasy. I claim that Ingelow’s seemingly 
closed genre fantasy novel has been misread by critics. Ingelow uses intertextual 
strategies, specifically linking the novel to “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” in order 
to model readership through irony. Where previous literary fantasy novels have shown 
how to correctly interpret themselves, this text shows what not to do through the figure of 
Jack, a hero who cannot interpret his experiences because he fails to recognize the unity 
of the fantastic and the material. Jack, as a bad reader, ironically indicates the importance 
of belief and perception, two themes key to all literary fantasies I discuss. The conclusion 
of Ingelow’s novel ironically provokes readers to interpret the importance of stories 
through the example of Jack’s failure. 
These novels use a variety of rhetorical strategies to communicate with readers 
and to discuss the problem of interpretation and belief foregrounded by the depiction of 
the unreal. Each text also offers specific models for readers, who may look to the text for 
guidance on how to interpret what they read. In doing so, they reveal much about the 
reading expectations for nineteenth-century readers, both of fantasy and of more realistic 
texts. I hope that this study will both elucidate some of the historical influences that 
contribute to the development of the Victorian literary fantasy and also provide an 
analysis of the rhetorical techniques writers found useful to communicate with their 
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readers. Additionally, these novels provide a connection from Romantic poetic theory to 
the late-Victorian aesthetic movement of the 1890s, in which the affect of the work on the 
reader outweighed a text’s moral importance. Victorian literary fantasy novels still 
assume important moral work for readers, though in a non-traditional manner, yet their 
emphasis on experiencing, rather than understanding, a text anticipates aesthetic theories 
that eventually led to twentieth-century Modernist texts. 
While I do seek to fill an historical gap in Victorian studies, I also ultimately hope 
to question the ways in which preference for the mimetic tradition has limited critical 
study, marginalizing important experimental texts. I want to interrogate those reading 
conventions we take for granted when determining which Victorian texts should be 
taught and studied. While my project is historically focused on nineteenth-century texts, 
then, I also view it as an investigation of the way in which we, as critics who are first 
readers, determine the value of literary texts through biases about what literature should 
be and how it should be read. 
Throughout this project I will use the word “belief” to indicate a literary belief 
that the reader must possess during the reading process. When I speak of belief, I mean 
the reader must assume a certain attitude while reading the fantastic, one in which the 
reader accepts the fantastic elements of the narrative as plausible, for the moment, in 
order to engage with the text. The writers I examine are specifically Victorian in their 
aims, for they propose that reading fantasy will be morally productive for readers. They 
expect their texts to awaken the reader’s moral consciousness through a fantastic 
encounter with the Fairy world. Whether the reader accepts this role and perceives the 
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moral qualities of a fantastic story will not depend on the story’s allegorical qualities. 
Rather, authors rely on the reader’s willing suspension of disbelief in the fantastic, which 
manifests as a childlike wonder in the text’s events. This wonder may affect readers 
aesthetically, as they marvel at the text’s depiction of the fantastique. But, for these 
Victorians, this aesthetic encounter will also be morally productive, as readers should 
turn from the text to the world in order to recognize the way the world of Fairy fuses with 
material reality. Literary belief in the text, then, becomes belief about the presence of the 
fantastic within the material. 
Readers may disagree with these writers’ ideology, and they may reject a morally 
productive view of fantasy. Yet, as I will show, these fantasists resist allegorical and 
didactic lessons. Instead, they hope only to use fantasy’s aesthetic encounter to awaken 
readers’ perceptions of the fantastic; how this manifests from reader to reader does not 
concern these authors. For this reason they anticipate the late-Victorian aesthetic 
movement, though they have not fully abandoned a moral purpose for their books. 
These writers try to communicate to readers, yet they recognize the fragile nature 
of this process. Since they choose to write a fantastic text, they must confront the 
problems of communication that we now acknowledge as central to rhetorical studies and 
literary criticism. However, they face additional challenges by working in a mode that 
does not purport to depict the world realistically. How can fantasy authors persuade a 
reader that fantasy is productive if their texts depend on elements that are not real? How 
would readers believe in the texts’ fantastic elements if they saw fantasy as something 
separate from their own experiences? Contemporary rhetorical theorists now recognize 
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the causal nature of language, how we cannot separate language from its effects in the 
material world. Victorian literary fantasists understood this as well, and they wrote texts 
in which they fuse the theoretical with the material, proposing a worldview in which 
dualism collapses. Ultimately, as I will show, perception of this unity between the 
fantastic and the material depends on the reader’s belief. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
OF OTHER WORLDS 
 
 
 Because the study of fantasy literature remains outside of the canonical tradition, 
any examination of fantasy literature begins with an explanation of why the critic has 
chosen fantastic, rather than mimetic, texts for consideration. Though fantasy critics have 
a sustained dialogue, both within their own journals and peripherally in the field of 
children’s literature, mimetic texts continue to dominate mainstream critical inquiry, 
particularly that of Victorian texts. 
My project begins, then, with a journey from one world into another. Like the 
heroes of fantasy novels, the fantasy critic leaves the known world for the borderlands, 
the other world of fantasy studies that intersects with the dominant tradition while still 
remaining, somehow, outside it. As any traveler into Fairyland quickly learns, however, 
the worlds of fantasy and reality closely intertwine and often contain few differences. 
Throughout this chapter I hope to show that these separate worlds are in fact an illusion, 
that only one world exists, in which fantastic and realist texts address the same issues, 
only using different situations to do so. In my one world of literature, we should read 
fantasy with Donald Davidson’s idea of charity – by suspending disbelief, with a 
willingness to understand what may, at first, appear unfamiliar.1  
Fantasy literature seems especially suited for a discussion of texts and their 
readers, for as most fantasy critics agree, this genre epitomizes the nature of reading as it
12 
calls attention to its own construction. As the relationship between signifier and signified 
breaks down (for there can be no true Jabberwocky, no real Wonderland), fantasy 
literature ultimately points back from its narrative action to the words with which it has 
been written. In doing so, it becomes highly rhetorical. Thus, as a genre very much 
concerned with the process of its own telling, its reception, and its ability to transcend the 
real, whether to evoke consolation or lack, fantasy inherently addresses the relationship 
of reader to text. 
 Because of fantasy’s elusiveness, many critical studies examine what, exactly, 
constitutes fantasy literature in terms of genre. These studies often depend on establishing 
boundaries, both between the mimetic and fantastic traditions, as well as between the 
variety of sub-genres within fantasy itself. Much of the sub-genre classifications depend 
on separating texts based on plot structure and theme, but they also address the different 
rhetorical devices and structural elements authors use to depict the fantastic.  
 My study differs in that I will not argue for what a literary fantasy novel is, since 
this definition has been given in various studies (see below). Instead, I want to explore 
what a literary fantasy novel does. How does an author create the disruptive impulses 
critics claim as the defining feature of the fantastic? How does the literary fantasy novel, 
in particular, indicate to readers ways to interpret it, while still remaining unconventional 
in its defiance of typical reading expectations? How does the literary fantasy novel 
demonstrate the problems of belief and communication that have always been central to 
the study of rhetoric and literature?  
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As indicated in my introduction, I will focus on the development of the Victorian 
literary fantasy, which I claim as a descendent of the Romantic poetic tradition. As the 
literary fantasy novel develops, authors’ concerns about the reception of texts that 
significantly depart from realistic conventions cause them to create models for readership 
within their texts. These models, I will argue, instruct the reader in a very pragmatic way, 
for they expose how readers should read the fantastic in a way that affects material 
reality.  
Literary fantasies demonstrate the perilous position the reader occupies as she 
attempts to make sense out of a genre that revels in defying the very narrative structures 
and reader expectations typically used in deciphering a text. Yet these experimental texts 
all engage the problem of literary belief necessary in order to correctly experience the 
fantastic, an experience in which meaning becomes obscure or, even, impossible. In 
doing so, literary fantasies anticipate the late-Victorian aesthetic movement in their 
emphasis on the elusiveness of textual meaning. Later literary theorists thoroughly 
explored the problems of language, belief, communication, and representation, and an 
examination of these experimental Victorian texts, ones rarely given critical treatment, 
enriches the literary tradition by acknowledging authors who worked in an 
unconventional genre in which they grappled with complex philosophies about the 
problems of communication between reader and text.  
Before I examine these important texts in greater detail, I want to provide readers 
with background needed to contextualize these novels within their own tradition so that 
their importance to the broader critical conversation becomes apparent. This Chapter 
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gives a review of current fantasy criticism in order to bring readers up to date on critical 
issues within this field. I then situate fantasy criticism alongside the more well-known 
mimetic tradition. Finally, I examine fantastic literature historically, by explaining how it 
connects to children’s literature, and rhetorically, by explaining how it anticipates 
contemporary reader-response criticism. This chapter, then, serves as an overview of 
relevant criticism and theory that readers will need for the remainder of my project. 
 
Fantasy vs. The Fantastic: Definitions of Fantasy Literature 
Before we look at literary fantasies in detail, we must start by asking what 
distinguishes the literary fantasy novel from other fantasy literature, because one’s 
reading expectations for fantasy directly determine the success or failure of a fantasist’s 
work. The broad term “fantasy” has most frequently been used as the antithesis of 
realism, though fantasy has also been used to categorize a disparate array of literature. 
Rosemary Jackson explains that “[Fantasy's] association with imagination and with desire 
has made it an area difficult to articulate or to define” (1). Even contemporary fantasy 
critics often use the term “fantasy” as a catch-all word to encompass a variety of sub-
genres, including “utopia, allegory, fable, myth, science fiction, the ghost story, space 
opera, travelogue, the Gothic, cyberpunk, [and] magic realism” (Armitt, Fantasy Fiction, 
1).2 One quickly understands that, while these types of literature may have certain 
elements in common, to class them all as fantasy, merely because they allude to the 
supernatural; provide a sense of mystery, suspense, or fear; or seem to defy realistic 
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literary convention, only results in confusion about what fantasy means and what its 
criticism entails. 
For Jackson, a psychoanalytic critic, fantasy is “a literature of desire, which seeks 
that which is experienced as absence or loss” (3). Jackson believes “the fantastic traces 
the unsaid and the unseen of a culture: that which has been silenced, made invisible, 
covered over and made ‘absent’” (4). Though fantastic texts tell of things that do not 
exist, Jackson believes an emphasis on desire structures the text at the level of language, 
where “Fantasy becomes a literature of separation, of discourse without an object, 
foreshadowing that explicit focus upon problems of literature’s signifying activity found 
in modern anti-realist texts” (40). Fantasy is therefore subversive by nature, for it focuses 
on breaking boundaries, representing the unspeakable, and, eventually, “attempting to 
transform the relations of the imaginary and the symbolic” (91). 
Lucie Armitt critiques Jackson’s interchangeable use of “fantasy” and “fantastic,” 
arguing that these two terms refer to different things. “Fantasy,” she argues, is genre 
fiction, bound by the rules of genre, while the “fantastic” is a disruptive impulse that 
causes hesitancy in the reader. Fantasy relies on fixed reader expectations, but when our 
expectations are broken, then we experience the fantastic (Armitt, Theorising, 35). Eric S. 
Rabkin agrees, noting that “The truly fantastic occurs when the ground rules of a 
narrative are forced to make a 180 degree reversal, when prevailing perspectives are 
directly contradicted” (12). Rabkin believes the fantastic occurs when a reversal in the 
text introduces the unexpected. "We enter a narrative world with the preconceptions of 
our armchair world intact,” he writes, “and these preconceptions only change as the 
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narrative reconfigures them….When the anti-expected happens, we are in the presence of 
the fantastic” (10). For this reason, he argues that the presence of the supernatural cannot 
be the only defining feature of the fantastic, for fairy tales, in particular, are not true 
“fantasy” (i.e., “fantastic”) since they are so predictable (Rabkin 32-33; 54-55).  
To distinguish more generally between sub-genres, one usually encounters terms 
like “genre fantasy,” which indicates the fairy tale, science fiction, the fable, and 
allegory. Critics compare these to the “literary fantasy,” a term that indicates longer 
stories that use magical realism or supernatural/ghost narratives (Armitt, Fantasy Fiction 
7). The difference between these categories, Armitt explains, lies in two points made 
explicit in the work of Tzevtan Todorov:  
 
First, where genre fantasy deals in enclosed worlds, the literary fantastic  
deals in disruptive impulses. Second, where genre fantasy implies complicity on 
the part of the readers, the literary fantastic actively seeks out reader hesitancy as 
a means of building in competing readings of the text, typically revolving around 
two choices, the psychological or the supernatural (Fantasy Fiction 7-8, emphasis 
mine). 
 
 
Todorov’s distinctions between genre and literary fantasies (and by extension, the 
reading experiences of each) are key to understanding the problems of interpretation and 
belief that run through Victorian literary fantasy novels. Todorov distinguishes between 
fantasy and the fantastic by arguing that the fantastique, in the original French, “is that 
hesitation experienced by a person who knows only the laws of nature, confronting an 
apparently supernatural event [within a text]” (25). If the reader discovers the source of 
the “apparently supernatural” is natural, she resolves the tension by turning the text into a 
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work of the uncanny. Conversely, if the source of tension produced by the text actually 
turns out to be supernatural, the text becomes marvelous (Todorov 25).  
The fantastique occurs in the reader’s moment of indecision, one that provokes 
interpretation of the text. Todorov describes this moment as narrative hesitancy that leads 
the reader to attempt belief in the text by testing alternatives for the source of tension. He 
writes, “‘I nearly reached the point of believing’: that is the formula which sums up the 
spirit of the fantastique” (31, emphasis his). Because the fantastique will frustrate 
expected reading patterns, it usually appears in literary fantasies, texts that are not 
generically formulaic and not mimetic, but instead experimentally try to break convention 
in narrative structure.  
I will follow this division between genre fantasy and literary fantasy throughout 
my project. I have chosen literary fantasy novels for this project because I believe these 
texts address the problem of literary belief needed for a reader to interpret the fantastic. In 
doing so, fantasy authors intentionally disrupt the reader’s expectations, seeking out 
hesitancy in the reader that, they hope, will lead to insight about the productive uses of 
fantasy and of the unification of the fantastic and the material world. The Victorian 
literary tradition has many examples of genre fantasy, a predominantly allegorical, closed 
text, typically found in children’s literature.3 Literary fantasies, however, have received 
little critical attention, primarily because they disrupt readers’ sense of convention so 
effectively that they become difficult to discuss or to analyze. Often, critics mistake this 
disruption of convention for a fault in the quality of the literature, but I believe, rather, 
that some experimental texts simply ask us to read and to interpret in an unexpected way.  
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As I will show, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Sara Coleridge, George MacDonald, 
and Jean Ingelow all attempt to leave their narratives in the moment of reader hesitation 
in order to disturb the reader into interpretation that reveals insight, not about the text’s 
meaning, as Todorov suggests, but about how fantasy affects material reality. Though I 
draw on Todorov’s theories to explain how these authors use textual ambiguity to 
aesthetically affect readers, I believe the interpretation provoked by encountering the 
fantastic does not end with the text’s conclusion.4 Rather, the production and dissolution 
of this textual ambiguity allows these authors to experiment with modeling readership 
through characters that use the fantastic productively.  Coleridge’s “The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner,” his daughter Sara’s novel Phantasmion: Prince of Palmland, as well 
as MacDonald’s Phantastes and Ingelow’s Mopsa, the Fairy, all depend on the reader’s 
willingness to suspend disbelief and engage with the text, on the reader’s willingness to 
be an active reader who will see in the literary fantasy novel a communication between 
the unreal world of literature and the real material world. As I will discuss below, not all 
readers may agree to suspend disbelief in order to experience the text in the ways these 
authors imagine. The fact that experimental literary fantasies received poor critical 
reviews and traditionally have not been studied actually demonstrates the way in which 
the reading process relies on suspend disbelief in order for the aesthetic effects to work 
productively on readers.  
Realism has long been acknowledged as an important writing strategy for 
Victorian authors, yet fantastic texts remain somewhat unexamined as serious literature, 
even though both have their Golden Ages during the Victorian era. I believe these 
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different traditions essentially deal with the same issue – the ability of a text to persuade a 
reader to truth by using fiction, which ultimately depends on persuading the reader to 
literary belief in the text. Acknowledging the similar rhetorical goals of realism and 
fantasy will help us understand the way in which fantasists also saw themselves as 
concerned with the way their readers viewed reality. 
 
Mimetic vs. Fantastic: Different Methods for a Common Goal 
Mimetic and fantastic literature have a common goal of persuasion to literary 
belief, one we likely overlook due to the obvious difference in these genres’ content. 
While realist authors use language to, as closely as possible, depict the material world, 
fantasy authors describe what lies beyond the material, the unreal. Based on this contrast, 
it seems that fantasy would naturally be realism’s opposite, yet both genres seek to 
persuade readers through the text. While realist texts could persuade readers to look at the 
mirror of reality, fantastic texts, I argue, needed to establish models for their readers. 
These models provide a way for readers to interpret the texts and to discover the truth the 
texts claim for themselves, even though they depict events and characters that are unreal. 
Realism treats content that traditionally has been accepted as more serious and 
therefore more worthy of critical attention than fantasy’s, though it does not, of course, 
contain any less fiction. Armitt aligns literary realism with literary fantasy by explaining: 
 
There is no more a genuinely direct connection between realism and the real than 
there is between fantasy fiction and the real….all fiction is fantasy, insofar as 
narrative scenarios comprise an interiorised image (one having existence only in 
the author’s head) projected outwards onto a blank page. (Fantasy Fiction 2) 
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Studies like Kathryn Hume’s Fantasy and Mimesis: Responses to Reality in Western 
Literature and Lilian R. Furst’s All is True: The Claims and Strategies of Realist Fiction 
complicate realism by pointing out the way it inherently relies on fictionalization in the 
same way that fantasy does. Fantasy’s difference comes from its apparent rejection of 
realistic codes, yet, it still incorporates an emphasis on rules and boundaries that marks it 
with a realistic structure, even when supernatural or unnatural events occur.5 Realism and 
fantasy are not, therefore, antithetical, but are often posited as opposite extremes in order 
to create a hierarchy of literary value.  
Both realism and fantasy rely on a “belief in the power of representation” 
although their depicted subjects may appear antithetical (Furst 8). Realist authors tried to 
capture truth by reflecting reality in language. Furst explains that realist authors believed 
“in the power of representations which was thought to reside in the referential force of 
the word” (8). Ostensibly, if the reader can turn from the text and can verify its contents 
based on observation or experience, then the realist project has been successful. Thus, 
realism’s test of truth lies primarily in claims for mimesis.6 
Yet, as John Clute and John Grant note, fantasy too seeks to influence its readers’ 
understanding of reality (“Perception” 750). But where realists metaphorically liken 
language to a mirror that reflects reality, fantasists often figure the mirror as a portal, one 
used by the hero (and the reader) to pass beyond the known, where language reveals 
truth, rather than represents it. A project of truth-telling and a drive to convert the 
reader’s perception of reality underlie both genres, regardless of their complex 
outworkings due to how they treat their material. 
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Most fantasy critics object to the critical prioritization of mimetic literature due to 
the hierarchy of value assumed in these different genres. “If one starts with the belief that 
literature consists of mimesis,” Hume explains, “one has an automatic bias against 
manifestations of fantasy. The presence of fantasy is taken to signal a kind of failure” 
(26).7 Fantasy as a creative impulse develops simultaneously with the mimetic, and its 
significance in the creation of literature should not be separated from its more serious 
counterpart (Hume xii).  
Indeed, as Clute and Grant explain, “There is no easy division between realism 
and the fantastical in writers before 1600 or so, and no genre of written literature, before 
about the early 19th century, seems to have been constituted so as deliberately to confront 
or contradict the 'real’” (“Fantasy” 338). Historically, one’s understanding of the 
individual becomes key to how one classes literature as either mimetic or fantastic. Once, 
when people believed in supernatural intervention in everyday life, mythic literature 
would have been thought of as mimetic. History changes our interpretation of the 
fantastic, and our current preference for mimetic literature stems from developments 
during the Enlightenment, especially the ensuing emphasis on the individual as a tabula 
rasa and the increasing interest in human psychology.8  
Hume explains how critical preference for mimesis develops because of the 
Enlightenment-influenced assumption that knowledge is good, and “the experience 
gained by assimilating the story will be meaningful if only because it is new, an 
augmentation of the state the reader enjoyed prior to reading. Much the same validation is 
offered in science by gathering data” (38).9 Because the reader desires to interpret the 
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text, testing it against her own experiences to determine its truth, she finds satisfaction 
and pleasure in reading a mimetic text because it either confirms what she already knows 
or extends her knowledge of the world by “translating an unknown into a known” (Hume 
38). Yet, the project of truth-telling that mimetic literature claims is a rhetorical 
construction, not an accurate presentation of reliable information. As Furst explains, “the 
truthfulness [is] dependent on the artist’s perception, which will vary according to 
circumstances….Once the presence of the artist’s eye and mind as reflecting 
intermediaries is admitted, the notion of truth as an absolute has to be abandoned” (4).  
Realism claims truth for itself by persuading readers to believe in its depictions, 
mainly by establishing a “sound, trusting relationship between narrating voice and 
readers, a secure narrative contract that disposes readers to persuasion by the rhetoric” 
(Furst ix). Furst explains that realist novels persuade readers with claims of truth through 
an interplay between the novel’s textuality and its references to external reality. Thus 
these novels present an illusion in such a way that elicits literary belief through the 
reading process (Furst 12). For Furst, however, realism’s truth-test lies not in its imitation 
of reality, but in the novel’s credibility through "the persuasive powers of [its] created 
illusion” (16-17). As she explains, authors asked for the reader’s belief in their novels, 
but they recognized the problems of claiming truth through fiction. Claims for mimesis 
within the text acted as a sophisticated rhetorical technique that authors used to 
encourage belief in the fictional illusion (Furst 17).  
Significantly, Furst argues that “to read a realist novel is to submit to an act of 
persuasion, the aim of which is to convert readers to the belief that 'all is true’” (26). Yet, 
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she distinguishes between the type of literary belief needed for a realist text and the type 
needed to read a fantasy. Coleridge’s theory of the reader’s “willing suspension of 
disbelief” does not apply, she argues, because the realist novel remains so “close to 
ordinary experience” (29). In Chapter Three I will discuss Coleridge’s theory at length, 
especially as it applies to the fantastic text and the reader’s participation in it. It is useful 
to note here that, though different, both the realist and the fantastic text do actively 
attempt to persuade the reader into a type of belief in the text in order for its meaning to 
be interpreted. In this way, realism and fantasy are not separate traditions but instead use 
different techniques to explore the same problems of illusion, communication, truth, and 
literary belief. 
Several historical developments, however, separate the rise of fantasy literature, 
making it appear distinct from realism. Coleridge, in particular, affects the definition of 
“fantasy” as it emerges, specifically through his exploration of the imagination in 
Biographia Literaria. He distinguishes between phantasia and imaginatio, the first 
translating as “fancy,” the second, “imagination” (Armitt, Fantasy Fiction, 20-21). His 
well-known discussion on the difference between the two, with the preference for the 
latter, need not be repeated here, other than to remind readers that fancy was “‘a mere 
dead arrangement’ of ‘fixities and definites,’” while imagination was “‘a living power’ 
that transformed the elements with which it dealt, shaping them into a new unity” 
(Prickett 9). 
This distinction may confuse matters if we trace “fantasy’s” evolution merely 
etymologically. In doing so, we would translate phantasia to fantasy and then to fancy. 
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This is what Stephen Prickett does in Victorian Fantasy when he notes that many readers 
“understand Victorian fantasy as the underside, or obverse, of the Victorian imagination” 
(11). Yet, as he demonstrates, Victorian fantasy cannot be seen only as the repressed side 
of Victorian culture, for writers were quite self-conscious about their writing and 
understood the symbolism and seemingly repressed allusions in their writings (40-41). 
Though I agree with Prickett overall, I disagree here with his definition of fantasy as a 
descendent of Coleridge’s phantasia, or fancy. The description of fancy as “a mere dead 
arrangement of fixities and definites,” seems aptly applied to genre fantasy, since as a 
closed form it does not ask for readers’ active interpretation. The imagination, by 
contrast, as “a living power that transforms elements” seems well-suited to the literary 
fantastic. Texts that actively disrupt reader expectations draw on the power of the 
imagination (both the writer’s and the reader’s) and therefore cannot be equated with the 
nineteenth-century word “fancy,” even if these texts contain elements that “came to be 
seen as the quality of dreams and reverie,” as Prickett suggests (9).10  
Coleridge’s definitions are part of the growing interest in the imagination at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, a time in which changing ideas about childhood also 
affect the development of fantasy literature. Fantasy does not emerge as a distinct genre 
until the late nineteenth century, yet, as David Sandner notes, “many critical histories of 
the genre begin [with the Romantic era], noting that Coleridge’s influential theories of the 
imagination…reveal a clear desire to employ the fantastic as a literary device” (289). The 
Victorian tradition of fantasy literature draws on these Romantic developments but 
expands and complicates these theories to deal with uniquely Victorian problems 
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(Prickett 12).11 The turn toward new definitions of childhood, in particular, affects 
fantasy’s development by changing the audience for fantasy literature. In fact, the 
frequent alignment of fantasy and children’s literature develops because children were 
eventually considered to be a more appropriate audience for fantasy, while adults were 
expected to read more serious literature, a distinction that still remains today. 
The literary fantasists I examine in this project frequently address children in their 
writing, or ostensibly write for children, for the importance of the childlike perspective in 
gaining the reader’s belief in the fantastic affects the rhetoric of the literary fantasy. The 
childlike perspective, or the author’s emphasis on the childlike reader, demonstrates the 
Romantic inheritance of the literary fantastic. As I seek to show in all of my chapters, 
childhood functions as a rhetorical construct used by the fantasist to elicit wonder, and, 
ideally, to persuade readers to literary belief in the text. For to read with childlike wonder 
implies that one willingly suspends disbelief, as Coleridge suggests. In Chapter Three I 
examine this theory closely and argue that Coleridge models this type of reading in the 
relationship between the Ancient Mariner and the Wedding Guest in “The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner.” Perhaps because of this influence, the connection between childlike 
wonder and belief has led to the close alignment of Victorian fantasy and Victorian 
children’s literature. An examination of this association will elucidate the way in which 
childlike wonder functions as a rhetorical appeal for literary belief in all of the 
experimental Victorian fantasies I examine in this project. 
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Childlike Wonder: The Appropriate Audience for the Fantastic 
The problem of fantasy’s audience directly relates to the issues of belief that 
become central to the Victorian literary fantasy. Since adults primarily read experimental 
novels, they necessarily had to willingly maintain literary belief in a way that a child may 
do naturally. Interestingly, the idea that a child’s perspective was best suited for fantasy 
was a new development in the nineteenth century. Prior to this time, readers did not 
recognize fantasy as a distinct literary tradition. The exploration of audience for fantastic 
literature can be traced back to the publication of John Locke’s Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education, which appeared in 1693. This text profoundly influenced 
conceptions of childhood, especially Locke’s argument that children would learn better if 
they could learn with pleasure. Critics generally credit Locke with the tabula rasa – 
“blank slate” – theory, which proposes that every child begins with a pure, open mind 
that can be written on by parents, teachers, and books (Avery 11).12 However, because 
adults perceived the child’s mind as so vulnerable, they believed fiction would teach 
immorality because it was false, the equivalent of a lie. Other than Aesop’s Fables, adults 
discouraged fantasy in children’s literature, which remained mainly realistic, historical, 
or religious in nature (Avery 12-13; 19-23). The emphasis on didactic children’s 
literature, in particular, lasted throughout the following century, and the introduction of 
fables, fairy tales, and fantasy publications began in adult literature due to this bias. Fairy 
tales had come to England from France in 1729 when Robert Samber translated Histories, 
or Tales of Past Times, Told by Mother Goose into English (Kinnell 28). Yet these texts 
were mainly intended for adult entertainment, and no distinct literary fantasy novel 
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developed (Russell 3-6). These initial fantasy tales, even though written for adults, used 
allegorical interpretive strategies to instruct readers in fantasy’s use, and so these texts 
typically did not require belief in the fantastic events as they used a closed narrative form.  
Jean Jacques Rousseau’s publication of Émile in 1762 resulted in a shift in 
perceptions of childhood and, by extension, towards fantasy literature. Rousseau 
supported the use of adventure stories like Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe in children’s 
education, yet he was against reading fantasy and fairy tales to children since most were 
too provocative, sexual, and violent (Kinnell 43; Avery and Kinnell 65). By the end of 
the eighteenth century, mainly due to the enormous influence of publisher John Newbury, 
children’s literature had become established as a legitimate business, yet fairy tales and 
fantasies were still typically published for adult audiences (Kinnell 34). Ironically, 
children became the Romantic metaphor for imaginative perspective, yet they were not 
encouraged to embrace their imaginations until the Victorian era when authors wrote 
fantasy just for them (Butts 86). Later publications emphasized nonsense and play, 
eschewing the moral didactic tone of earlier centuries. These children’s fantasy titles did 
not need to experiment with problems of belief and communication since they addressed 
a less sophisticated audience. 
The roots of experimental Victorian fantasy can be traced to late eighteenth-
century developments in children’s literature, particularly the decision by several women 
authors to include fiction in children’s education. Hannah More, one of the first women 
to use fiction for religious teaching, wrote a series of tracts using fiction in 1795 to 1797. 
Anna Laetitia Barbauld’s work also began to blend fiction with moral lessons in Evenings 
28 
at Home (1793).  Mary Martha Sherwood, in particular, contributed to the Victorians’ 
sense of fiction in children’s literature when she wrote the History of the Fairchild 
Family during the Romantic era (1818-1847). This text was well-known to young 
Victorians as a work of religious domestic fiction (Avery and Kinnell 46-53). These 
developments, though small, set the stage for the turn to more obvious fantasy because 
they represented a subtle shift in belief about fiction’s purpose. The allegorical fantasy 
often found in Victorian’s children’s literature draws on this tradition.  
However, because of Rosseau’s idea of natural education, writers like Maria 
Edgeworth still focused on “engaging the child in a reasoning dialogue with the teacher 
or parent” in order to teach rationality, which resulted in fiction that contained overtly 
didactic lessons, as in Edgeworth’s Frank (Avery and Kinnell 55-56). Yet writers like 
Harriet Martineau, who wrote Five Years of Youth; or, Sense and Sentiment (1831), and 
Catherine Sinclair, who wrote Holiday House (1839), began to change the overall tone of 
children’s literature. They included fictional situations, mainly realistic, to balance the 
search for reason with the increased interest in the imagination (Butts 83-85). The 
emphasis in these works marks a shift toward fantasy, though it remains didactic. 
Overall, fairy tales continued to dominate the fantasy tradition during the late 
eighteenth century and into the Romantic era (Butts 88-89). Edited collections of fairy 
tales for younger readers eventually resulted in the publication of lighter poetry, like 
Edward Lear’s Book of Nonsense (1846) (Avery and Kinnell 69-71). Even with these 
developments, no distinct literary fantasy novel of the type I have defined above arises. 
The reader watches the closed forms of fairy tales and nonsense verse unfold with little to 
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no active interpretation on her part (nonsense typically does not require interpretation; 
this is one of its pleasures). In fact, the only literary fantasies close to those I will 
examine are the Gothic novels of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
(Avery and Kinnell 71). Yet even these do not fully explore the problems of belief and 
interpretation that I claim as part of the experimental literary fantasy novel because they 
use traditional conventions to structure their narratives and always resolve any tension 
during reading into the uncanny, which provides textual closure and limits interpretive 
inquiry after reading concludes. 
Sara Coleridge’s novel, Phantasmion: Prince of Palmland, published in 1837, 
marks the official beginning of the tradition I trace, that of the experimental literary 
fantasy novel that engages the reader in active interpretation.13 As Dennis Butts remarks, 
Phantasmion is “a remarkable pioneering fantasy, and nothing like it was to appear until 
the work of George MacDonald” (91). As Butts rightly notes, the philosophies of 
Romanticism paved the way for the literary fantasies of Coleridge, MacDonald, and Jean 
Ingelow during the Victorian era (101).14 These novels would use Romantic philosophy 
about the willing suspension of disbelief and the importance of transcendent insight to 
engage readers through the fantastique. As open texts that ask for literary belief and 
interpretation, they contribute to a tradition independent from the typical uses of 
allegorical or nonsensical Victorian fantasy, and we can align them more closely with the 
realist tradition that engages in the problems of representation. 
 Readers will notice that I have intentionally omitted Lewis Carroll’s Alice books 
from my exploration of literary fantasies, though a history of Victorian fantasy literature 
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is not complete without reference to their enormous influence. Carroll’s Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland (1865) typically marks the advent of the Victorian children’s 
fantasy genre; yet, his books do not contain the qualities I have defined as the Victorian 
literary fantasy novel. Even though his stories definitely engage with issues of language 
and belief, especially the arbitrary nature of linguistic systems, Carroll’s narrative 
remains relatively stable for the reader. Alice may experience confusion during her 
journey to Wonderland, but Carroll does not frustrate readers’ sense of literary 
convention in quite the same way as the literary fantasies I discuss. In fact, rather than 
persuading readers to literary belief in the fantastic, Carroll’s texts tend to meta-textually 
refer to themselves as texts in a manner that distances the reader from the experiences of 
the text and disrupts any potential literary belief. The dream endings of these texts, in 
particular, provide closure for readers and do not ask them to interpret their reading 
experiences.15 This closed nature of reading primarily separates Carroll’s books from the 
other literary fantasies I examine, whose meanings, I claim, remain open-ended and 
provoke continual interpretation from readers.  
Interestingly, the open-ended Victorian literary fantasy actually anticipates 
contemporary reader-response theories, in which critics examine the problems of 
interpretation, the indeterminacy of meaning, and how readers participate in the text. 
Reader-response theorists have attempted to define how, exactly, a reader interprets a 
text, when the text contains arbitrary signs that somehow produce meaning – often 
multiple meanings. These theories relate to the study of fantastic literature because of its 
rhetorical nature. Historicist or formalist approaches to the fantastic may neglect the 
31 
necessity of the reader’s willing participation in order for them to mean anything at all, 
and reader-response theory allows us to examine the very problems of interpretation and 
belief that the novels often depict.16 Thus, reader-response and rhetorical theories provide 
grounds for closer examination of how the author engages the reader through the fantastic 
text. 
 
The Fantastic Reader: Interpreting the Unreal 
Few reader-response theorists explicitly address the fantastic in their work, yet we 
benefit from a review of their theories in order to place fantasy theory within the context 
of communication and belief. The following overview addresses a variety of interpretive 
strategies proposed by theorists in order to situate the problems of belief more fully 
within a discussion of the fantastic. In Interpretive Conventions, Steven Mailloux 
discusses many reader-response theories, beginning with a subjectivist model proposed 
by Norman Holland. Holland argues that through reading, we recreate ourselves in the 
text “by creating a meaningful unity” of it in our minds (Mailloux 25). Mailloux explains, 
“For Holland, meaning is the result of this interpretive synthesis, the transformation of 
fantasy into a unity which the reader finds coherent and satisfying” (25). Holland does 
not account for the similarity between subjective readers’ responses, and as Mailloux 
describes, Stanley Fish addresses this problem by introducing the idea of “interpretive 
communities,” a social reading theory that relies on communities of readers who share 
interpretive conventions. For Fish, “all informed readers have the same basic reading 
experience because they shared linguistic and literary competence” (Mailloux 26). In 
both Holland and Fish’s theories, the reader controls the process of interpretation, 
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because “as soon as we read, we interpret; and thus our interpretative strategies create the 
text that we later discuss in critical exchange” (Mailloux 26). These theories become 
problematic when they must account for the way a text produces similar or different 
meanings for a wide variety of readers; one cannot ignore the text and focus only on the 
reader when the text obviously exerts some influence on the number of possible 
interpretations of it. 
 Wolfgang Iser and Jonathan Culler incorporate the text into their models of 
reading due to this problem. Like Fish, Culler argues that we interpret texts socially 
through “a shared system of reading conventions” (Mailloux 42). He differs from Fish in 
that he focuses on the literary conventions available to the author in constructing a text. 
He writes, “A poem presupposes conventions of reading which the author may work 
against, which he can transform, but which are the conditions of possibility of his 
discourse” (Qtd. in Mailloux 42). As Mallioux explains, this means the author will draw 
on these pre-existing conventions as he creates a text, and the reader will also use them in 
interpreting it (42). Now, instead of meaning created only by the reader, the author and 
reader share in the production of meaning(s) the text can produce. Readers create this 
meaning socially, rather than subjectively, through “established [reading] codes or 
cultural forms” (Mailloux 59). These reading conventions limit possible interpretations 
for individual readers. 
 Iser proposes a theory similar to Culler’s. He suggests the text contains strategies, 
or instructions, for the reader, guiding the production of meaning (Mailloux 42). He 
believes “meanings in literary texts are mainly generated in the act of reading; they are 
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the product of a rather difficult interaction between the text and reader and not qualities 
hidden in the text” (Qtd. in Mailloux 44). The reader will interpret the text’s meaning by 
occupying the shifting perspectives (narrator, characters, plot, etc) the author has created, 
and the text’s meaning will “emerge during the reading process” as the reader traces the 
connections between the variety of perspectives the text contains (Mailloux 45). The 
author creates “gaps” or “blanks” in the text for the reader to fill in, so that different 
meanings emerge from the text as individual readers select certain perspectives over 
others in the process of interpretation. Thus the reader produces meaning 
intersubjectively through an interaction of an individual reader’s particular experience 
with the guidance of a text the author has constructed (Mailloux 46).17  
 Interestingly, Iser also argues that “the structure of the text allows for different 
ways of fulfillment” (Qtd. in Mailloux 53). There is no one correct meaning or one 
possible interpretation, yet the text will also be constructed so as to limit the possible 
meanings available (Mailloux 53-54). The text, then, works as a set of instructions for the 
reading process, and as the reader shifts perspectives in the text, she “fills the blanks 
between perspectives,” which leads her to an interpretation of the text’s meaning 
(Mailloux 54).18 
 Significantly, Iser imagines the reading process as “dynamic interaction” with an 
“active reader [who] is constantly responding to the meanings he produces in this 
interaction” with the text (Mailloux 48). As Mailloux explains, the reader does not 
receive passively a text’s meaning but the reading experience affects her after it ends. 
Because the text asks the reader to inhabit a variety of perspectives, it “forces the reader 
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to locate and resolve deficiencies in the reader’s own structuring of experience” 
(Mailloux 48). Thus, “A reader open to the text and its effects will have to reformulate 
his system of norms in order to accommodate the meaning the text has led him to 
assemble,” (Mailloux 48) or, as Iser puts it, reading literature requires the reader to 
“constitute himself by constituting a reality hitherto unfamiliar” (Qtd. in Mailloux 48). In 
doing so, Mailloux concludes, literature can change readers (48).19 
 These theories depend on the reader’s response to a text that draws on her pre-
existing experiences of literature. What happens, then, when she encounters a text that 
asks her to interpret in a completely new way? What happens when, suddenly, the 
fantastic intrudes on the reading experience, and she must actively work to make sense of 
the unfamiliar? If an author purposely composes a text that frustrates conventions (or 
manipulates Iser’s “perspectives”), yet still asks the reader to suspend disbelief while 
reading, then the reader’s response may be confusion and frustration. Perhaps she also 
experiences the text aesthetically, as an emotional reaction to the fantastic, but she may 
not extract a meaning from the text. What happens to belief and meaning, then, when we 
abandon most known literary conventions, or instructions, which means we can no longer 
read intertextually or within our communities? 
 
Conclusion 
 I believe the development of the fantastic engages this problem, first in 
Coleridge’s work, and then later in the experimental Victorian fantasy novel. First, 
authors use unreal or fantastic content in their narratives, which requires a reader’s 
willing suspension of disbelief. Then, they disrupt the reader’s interpretive expectations 
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through experiments with storytelling. Readers experience this disruption as an aesthetic 
effect of the text, which may affect them beyond the reading experience itself. I argue 
that this disruption, in turn, forces readers into interpretive action, which may use their 
literary belief about the text to change beliefs about their material reality. Fantastic texts 
may give us a variety of perspectives as we read, as Iser suggests, but they will be 
different perspectives than we typically encounter. And as we “reconstitute ourselves by 
constituting a reality hitherto unfamiliar” we incorporate the fantastic into the material, 
which changes the way we view reality (Qtd. in Mailloux 48). In this sense, much as 
MacDonald describes, fantastic texts “wake a meaning” in readers. These texts may not 
contain one meaning – or even meanings – about themselves, but they propose to awaken 
the reader’s desire for meaning in the material world.20 
 We may think that interpretive action of such experimental novels ultimately will 
fail. Yet the experimental novels of Coleridge, MacDonald, and Ingelow do contain 
strategies for how to read the fantastic. As Iser says, an author can use a text to guide its 
own interpretation, but in the case of these texts, I believe the authors instruct readers in 
how to encounter the fantastic, rather than how to interpret the actual text. The fantastic 
poem or novel may remain uninterpreted, with no conclusive meaning of the textual 
action; yet the text may still affect readers and provoke them into critical interpretive 
action of reality, rather than specifically literary interpretive activity. Therefore the 
models within experimental literary fantasies function as a set of instructions on what to 
do with the fantastic encounter, rather than as instructions on what to think about the 
text’s meaning. 
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Experimental literary fantasies share many of the same concerns with traditional 
Victorian realist novels. Like realist texts, they were addressed to adults and engaged the 
problems of communication and literary belief through fiction. Literary fantasies differ in 
genre, but they also differ from conventional fantastic literature because they use the 
hesitation of the reader as part of the novel’s structure in order to provoke the reader into 
interpretation about the text’s meaning – which may affect the reader after the novel 
concludes. In doing so, they require the reader’s literary belief, and the novels I examine 
create this belief through a variety of interpretive strategies. Literary fantasies of the 
Victorian era ask readers to participate in the text in order to receive insight, yet they 
simultaneously disrupt the reading experience in order to provoke interpretation. I claim 
this tension as the defining feature of the literary fantasy novel, and its resolution lies in 
the complex experiments found in the novels I will examine at length below.  
The ability of an author to create the willing suspension of disbelief necessary to 
this reading experience relies on an understanding of Coleridge’s philosophies articulated 
during the writing of Lyrical Ballads, which he recorded in Biographia Literaria.21 We 
will best understand the project of the experimental Victorian literary fantasist if we first 
examine Coleridge’s theory in more detail. In the next chapter I discuss the wide variety 
of theories that have attempted to make sense of how we participate in a literary text and 
create this suspension of disbelief. Coleridge, however, did not just write about a general 
literary belief needed in order to understand the fantastic. He provides us with an 
example. The Wedding Guest, after listening to the Ancient Mariner’s fantastic tale, 
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shows us how fantasy can wake a meaning for us, transforming our perspectives of the 
material world. 
38 
WORKS CITED 
 
Armitt, Lucie. Fantasy Fiction: An Introduction. New York: Continuum, 2005. 
 
---. Theorising the Fantastic. New York: Arnold, 1996.  
 
Avery, Gillian. “The Beginnings of Children’s Reading to c. 1700.” Children’s  
Literature: An Illustrated History. Ed. Peter Hunt. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 1-25. 
 
Avery, Gillian and Margaret Kinnell. “Morality and Levity: 1780-1820.” Children’s  
Literature: An Illustrated History. Ed. Peter Hunt. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 46-76. 
 
Briggs, Julia and Dennis Butts. “The Emergence of Form: 1850-1890.” Children’s  
Literature: An Illustrated History. Ed. Peter Hunt. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 130-165. 
 
Brooke-Rose, Christine. A Rhetoric of the Unreal: Studies in Narrative and  
Structure, especially of the Fantastic. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1981. 
 
Butts, Dennis. “The Beginnings of Victorianism: c. 1820-1850.” Children’s Literature:  
An Illustrated History. Ed. Peter Hunt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
77-101. 
 
Clute, John and John Grant. “Fantasy.” The Encyclopedia of Fantasy. New York: St.  
Martin’s Press, 1997. 337-339. 
 
---. “Perception.” The Encyclopedia of Fantasy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.  
750-751. 
 
---. “Taproot Texts.” The Encyclopedia of Fantasy. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.  
921-922. 
 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Volume 7.   
Biographia Literaria. Ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1983.  
 
Davidson, Donald. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 1984. 
 
Furst, Lillian. All is True: The Claims and Strategies of Realist Fiction. Durham: Duke  
39 
University Press, 1995. 
 
Hume, Kathryn. Fantasy and Mimesis: Responses to Reality in Western Literature. New  
York: Methuen, 1984. 
 
Jackson, Rosemary. Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion. New York: Methuen, 1981. 
 
Kinnell, Margaret. “Publishing for Children: 1700-1780.” Children’s Literature: An  
Illustrated History. Ed. Peter Hunt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
26-45. 
 
Levine, George. The Realistic Imagination: English Fiction from Frankenstein to Lady  
Chatterly. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 
 
Mailloux, Steven. Interpretive Conventions: The Reader in the Study of American  
Fiction. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982. 
 
Prickett, Stephen. Victorian Fantasy. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2005. 
 
Rabkin, Eric S. The Fantastic in Literature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,  
1976. 
 
Russell, David L. Literature for Children: A Short Introduction. New York: Longman,  
1991. 
 
Sandner, David. “Theorizing the Fantastic: Editing Fantastic Literature: A Critical  
Reader and the Six Stages of Fantasy Criticism.” Journal of the Fantastic in the 
Arts 16.4 (2006): 277-301. 
 
Todorov, Tzevtan. The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre. Trans.  
Richard Howard. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975. 
 
Tolkien, J.R.R. Tree and Leaf. London: HarperCollins, 2001. 
 
Worth, Sarah E. “Aristotle, Thought, and Mimesis: Our Responses to Fiction.”  
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 58.4 (Autumn 2000): 333-339.
40 
CHAPTER III 
 
ONLY NOT TO DISBELIEVE 
 
 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, fantasy was often criticized as a 
genre of nonsense, pure escapism or entertainment, always juxtaposed with more realistic 
fiction. When authors wrote fantasy with an affective purpose, they typically wrote 
allegorically to convey an idea related to instruction or education. Often they appended 
these lessons as morals in fairy tales. Critics deemed any works of fantasy that did not 
conform to these standards as unfit for audiences, and especially for children. Reviews 
published in 1773 and even as late as 1817 warn against “works of fancy” (Avery and 
Kinnell 69). 
Significantly, Samuel Taylor Coleridge did not share this view of fantasy, and he 
would soon become one of the most prominent influences on a new tradition of fantasy 
literature, one which would have its Golden Age during the Victorian era. Coleridge, and 
other Romantics like William Blake and William Wordsworth, affected the development 
of nineteenth-century fantasy literature through their views on the imagination and the 
importance of childhood. Coleridge’s interest in fantasy can be seen in much of his work, 
for he believed supernatural and fantastic tales opened up the imagination and allowed 
readers to perceive the unity and harmony of the universe; judgment and rationality, he 
felt, focused only on the universe’s parts (Sandner, The Fantastic Sublime, 33). His 
interest in fantasy leads him to examine its theory, specifically that participation in art 
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requires the reader’s “willing suspension of disbelief.” This well-known phrase forms the 
basis of a new theory of fantasy, one that would move beyond the overtly didactic to the 
experimental literary fantasy novels of the Victorian era. 
In Biographia Literaria, Coleridge records that his role in the composition of 
Lyrical Ballads was to explore the supernatural, to “procure for these shadows of 
imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic 
faith” (II.6). Fantasy critics often cite Coleridge’s work as an origin in the development 
of a distinct genre of literature that privileges fantasy over realism (Sander, “Theorising,” 
289). This theory of the willing suspension of disbelief, I argue, ultimately demonstrates 
a crucial tension for the fantasy author, who must work on readers to persuade them to 
suspend disbelief even while readers must meet him halfway and be willing to believe in 
the supernatural tale. Coleridge’s “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” the most famous 
of his fantasy texts, explores this problem through the relationship between the Mariner 
as author and the Wedding Guest as reader. I believe this relationship provides a model of 
readership for fantasy texts, one in which the reader suspends disbelief and allows the 
fantastic to transform the material after the story ends. Working forward from Coleridge, 
I will show that Victorian literary fantasies often incorporate reading models in order to 
instruct readers in how to receive and to interpret the fantastic content they depict. These 
models become necessary as readers navigate the competing projects of interpretation 
(How will I make sense of the unknown?) and literary belief (Will the text produce 
meaning?). 
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 Like the fantastic, a genre that tends to elide one, concrete definition, “The Rime 
of the Ancient Mariner” has become notorious for the variety of its criticism. Writers 
have frequently noted “the impossibility of containing the poem’s meaning in a single 
interpretation” (Davies 259). As Lindsay Davies explains, “From the beginning the poem 
posed difficulties for those who strove to find in it a coherent relation of the parts to the 
whole” (259). This problem has led many critics to discuss the poem in terms of its 
interpretive paradoxes. Yet none have noted the role of the fantastic as it relates to 
fantasy literature and criticism, or how the poem depicts a model for the reader of a 
fantastic text. While the poem obviously demonstrates problems of interpretation, the 
presence of the supernatural in the Ancient Mariner’s tale requires a different type of 
interpretive context. Because Coleridge introduces the fantastic into his poem he 
therefore faces the problem of reconciling the reader’s desire to interpret the unreal and 
the necessary literary belief in the text the reader needs in order to participate in the 
fantastic. I argue that all fantasy authors confront this tension when they write the 
fantastic, and we can read “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” as an early example of this 
tension between interpretation and literary belief.  
 The problem of suspending disbelief is germane to all the experimental literary 
fantasy novels my project addresses, and this chapter primarily focuses on the viability of 
this theory in regard to reading fantasy. Since I interpret “The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner” as a model for the fantastic reader, I am primarily concerned with how 
Coleridge’s theory of the willing suspension of disbelief engages in problems of reading. 
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This chapter explores the implications of this theory, though I do examine the poem and 
tie it both to its criticism and to later Victorian literary fantasy novels.  
 
The Affective Fantastic: The Wedding Guest as Fantastic Reader 
 Since I want to propose a theory for the experimental literary fantasy novel, 
history will not be my sole focus, yet it may interest readers to know the background of 
Coleridge’s love of the fantastic, one that does affect his writing of “The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner.” Before he collaborated with Wordsworth on Lyrical Ballads, he had 
developed this interest particularly through reading fairy tales during his youth. As David 
Sandner explains, these early fantastic influences “had a profound effect on him and his 
work” (The Fantastic Sublime 32).22 At the end of the eighteenth century both Coleridge 
and Wordsworth supported the emerging genre of fairy tales, arguing for them in their 
letters. Jeannie Watson writes that for Coleridge, the Faery realm 
 
becomes a symbolic metaphor for Spirit/God/the One Life, and the tale of Faery 
shows forth that Reality. Within this context, the tale of Faery may be more 
profoundly ‘moral’ than the moral tale because it leads to the spiritual truths upon 
which morality is based. (15) 
 
 
The world of Faery was central to Coleridge’s aesthetic, and it “also makes a strong 
contribution to [his] other well-known poems,” like “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” 
(Watson 14). This interest in fantasy appears in much of Coleridge’s later work, both 
through his exploration of fantastic elements in poetry (“Kubla Khan” and “Christabel,” 
in particular), but also in his discussion of how the imagination functions. Most 
importantly, he concludes that a fairy tale can hold spiritual truth – one not allegorically 
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conveyed (Watson 15). In doing so, he distinguishes between a literary fantasy and a 
typical didactic tale. This new type of literary fantasy may provide a moral for readers but 
does not pointedly ask them to examine the source of that morality. 
Importantly for the reader of fantasy, if the world of Faery could reveal truth, then 
the fantastic has transformative potential available through the reading process. Later 
fantasy critics agree, for as Sandner explains, “Fantastic stories, in and of themselves, fail 
unless they suggest something more, something greater beyond the text” (36). Accessing 
this world of Faery depends on the reader’s ability to suspend disbelief in the text when 
encountering events that contradict material reality, for yielding to the world of fantasy 
opens doors both to pleasure and to transformation. But the goal of the fantasy writer 
takes on new complexity when he makes claims for truth through a typically subjective 
genre. Here, the fantastic writer abandons allegory or overt didacticism and instead must 
transform the reader through the imagination. By forgetting the rational self, the reader 
opens possibilities for spiritual encounters that reveal imaginative, moral truth – moral 
truth that moves the spirit, not the mind. This type of affective project differs 
significantly from that of the traditional moralist, for writers must discard logical 
rationalism and claims to absolute truth in the fantastic world of supernatural experience.  
Authors of experimental literary fantasies must contend with two conflicting 
projects: the choice to write in the subjective fantastic genre and the desire to reveal some 
type of truth that transcends the text and affects the material world. “The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner” enacts this problem through the Wedding Guest’s behavior as he hears 
the Mariner’s tale. The Mariner, portrayed as an author, transmits his fantastic story to 
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the Wedding Guest, who, as reader, must suspend disbelief in order to be affected by it. 
Of course, later versions of the poem also introduce another reader into the text through 
the figure of the gloss. As I will show below, the presence of the gloss as an example of 
the rational reader who has not suspended disbelief reinforces the importance of the 
Wedding Guest’s response to the fantastic. For now I will focus primarily on the 1798 
version of the poem, without the gloss, since I am most interested in the affective nature 
of the fantastic modeled in the relationship between the Mariner and the Wedding Guest. 
The poem begins with the Mariner, as author, actively working to gain the 
Wedding Guest’s attention. He disputes for it in several places, for he must persuade the 
Guest to listen rather than to attend the wedding banquet. The Guest, much like the 
rational reader, initially resists hearing the Mariner’s tale. For example, when the Mariner 
approaches the Guest, the latter quickly demands, “‘By thy long grey beard and thy 
glittering eye / Now wherefore stoppest me?’” (l. 2-3).23 The Mariner twice tries to begin 
his tale, but each time the Guest refuses to listen. Next, the narrator mentions that the 
Mariner’s “glittering eye” holds the Guest, and the eye will function throughout the poem 
as a symbol of the Mariner’s authority over the Guest. Like the threat of the adult’s 
watchful eye on a child’s behavior, the authoritative eye intimidates the Guest so much so 
that he sits down and “cannot chuse but hear,” (l. 22) for the Mariner has transfixed him. 
The Guest, though he will dispute further, eventually hears the Mariner’s tale through. 
The Wedding Guest becomes engrossed in the Mariner’s tale, and the narrator 
mentions that he “listens like a three-years’ child” (l.19). We should note that the Guest’s 
subsequent behavior does, in fact, model a childlike deference to the Mariner’s authority. 
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The childlike wonder the Guest portrays demonstrates that literary belief in the fantastic 
has been established. Of course the Guest does not literally return to the innocent 
perspective of the child, but he acts childlike in his belief in the authority of the Mariner’s 
tale. The return to childhood, then, does not mean an impossible return to innocence, but 
acquiescence to authority – an obedience, or suspension of the will, that submits to the 
authority of the author during the course of the tale.24 However, as I will explain below, 
submission to storytelling does not mean an unthinking acceptance of ideology. 
Coleridge claimed we should have a willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, in 
order to engage with the fantastic text’s depiction of the unreal. After the tale concludes, 
we should, like the Wedding Guest, be provoked into reflection and interpretation about 
our experiences of the fantastic. 
Like this poem, experimental literary fantasy novels model readership by asking 
for the reader’s childlike wonder in the text’s events. Yet, also like the poem, the novels 
remain open-ended so that subjective meaning takes precedence over a concrete truth the 
text could reveal. This emphasis on the childlike perspective, or, the reader’s need to 
remain in a condition of wonder when interpreting the fantastic, relies on the nineteenth-
century adult’s new perspective on the importance of childhood.  
The Romantic idealization of childhood had created a widespread cultural fantasy 
for adults.  Romantics often felt that children were untarnished by cynicism and had more 
direct access to imagination than adults did. A child could perceive the world unimpeded 
by logic, and though adults could not literally become children again, Romantic poetry, in 
particular, attempts to recover for readers this perfect state of human perception. As 
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Sandner explains, “For the Romantics, the sacred innocence and imagination of 
childhood offered redemption to fallen adulthood” (6). The child represented a primitive 
state of imagination and was therefore endowed with the Romantic adult’s feelings of 
loss and desire. James Holt McGavran, Jr. emphasizes the Romantic “adults’ 
simultaneous idealization of the child and lament over the loss of their own childlike 
innocence” and explains how the Romantic adult may overlook actual problems in 
childhood, such as labor and poverty, in his attempt to use the figure of the child to 
recapture his own lost sense of innocence (2; 7).  Naturally, not every writer or reader 
views childhood in the same way. As Andrew O’Malley notes, there is a vast difference 
between Wordsworth’s depiction of childhood and that seen in poems by Blake (128-
129). Regardless of how a particular writer or reader feels about childhood, it 
nevertheless functions as a discourse within literature and therefore becomes 
ideologically imbued. In fact, Fiona McCulloch argues that childhood is “a cultural 
construction conforming to ideological desire in which any sense of ‘real children’ is 
erased/replaced by idealised innocence” (3).  
Childhood, then, is itself a form of adult fantasy, and nineteenth-century writers 
that create fantastic texts may evoke this cultural fantasy, drawing on both their and their 
readers’ desires for lost childhood. While a writer’s depiction or a reader’s preconceived 
notions of childhood may influence how successful the fantastic project becomes, 
childhood still functions as a place of adult fantasy in which both writers and readers can 
gather through the fantastic text.  
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Coleridge does not explicitly state the role of childhood in helping the reader 
receive truth through fantasy, but he does remark on the importance of “carrying on the 
feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood” and calls the “privilege of genius” the 
ability to view the material world with a childlike sense of wonder (Biographia Literaria, 
I. 80-81).25 Though Coleridge’s discussion concerns the role of the author/Poet, rather 
than the reader, his entire theory of the willing suspension of disbelief relies on both an 
author who has this wonder himself and can convey it to a reader who submits to the tale.  
In “Rime of the Ancient Mariner” Coleridge demonstrates the childlike reader 
when the Guest sits on a stone (l. 21) and remains relatively still throughout the rest of 
the tale. His posture recalls the obedient child who takes on a position of passivity in 
relation to the more authoritative, adult figure of the Mariner, who wields authority based 
on his possession of story. Though the Guest still resists the tale somewhat, he does not 
leave his position as listener and quickly becomes involved in the Mariner’s narrative.  
The next time the Guest speaks, just before the Mariner confesses he shot the 
albatross, he does not argue with the Mariner or plead with him to attend the wedding; 
instead, he asks for more detail about the story, saying, “‘God save thee, ancyent 
Marinere! / From the fiends that plague thee thus – / Why look’st thou so?’”(l. 77-79). At 
this point in the tale, the Mariner has not mentioned any supernatural activity, so the 
Guest’s willing suspension of disbelief has not been truly tested. His interest in the story 
lies in the Mariner’s authority, his visible distress in the tale he tells. Charles A. Owen, 
Jr., notes, “The Mariner’s hold on the Wedding Guest depends on his presence, his ability 
to project even before he can express it, the overwhelming quality of what he has lived 
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through” (262). This emotional appeal gives the Mariner authenticity and persuades the 
Guest to listen.  
Similarly, the experimental fantasy author claims authority through the tale he 
relates, and the reader decides to submit to the tale based on her perception of the story’s 
authenticity – or, for Coleridge, her perception of the author’s ability to give the story 
“psychological truth and probability” (Patterson 125). An author may persuade a 
skeptical adult reader into this position by introducing a supernatural tale with elements 
of realism, especially psychological realism, as Coleridge noted in his discussion of 
Shakespeare. These elements of realism demonstrate an underlying unity to the tale, even 
though fantastic elements may occur (Patterson 125). Thus the Mariner’s tale remains 
rooted in realism until the moment of his transgression. Once he kills the albatross, the 
story moves into the realm of the supernatural as the Mariner suffers repercussions for his 
actions. 
In addition to psychological truth and probability, an author’s use of the fantastic 
encourages the adult reader’s nostalgia for childlike imagination, which in turn begins to 
overcome rational cynicism and allows the reader to willingly suspend his disbelief. The 
fantastic text evokes the discourse of lost childhood through its utter difference from 
adult rationalism. As Sandner explains, we may compare reading fantasy to an encounter 
with the sublime, for both require “a grasping beyond the actual, beyond what is 
known…a reach exceeding grasp which promises the transcendent beyond” (51). As the 
reader longs for the world of the imagination and spirit, he forgets his rational self; 
fantasy overwhelms the senses, which, for Sandner and for Coleridge, makes possible the 
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perception of unity (Sandner 54-55). The self-transcendence the reader experiences as he 
apprehends unity affects him on a spiritual level, beyond the text that enabled this 
sublime encounter. Sandner concludes: 
 
The fantastic sublime must move the reader to glimpse beyond the printed page, 
because the sublime does not lie in the text at all, but reveals, beyond it, Joy, with 
a capital J. The fantastic sublime, like the natural sublime, requires a visionary to 
arouse wonder and desire, fear of loss of identity and a sudden rising above that is 
“poignant as grief.” Only a certain kind of reader, bringing longing and a shaping 
spirit of imagination, will find the sublime in the fantastic text at all. (56-57) 
 
 
While Sandner’s model explains philosophically how a fantastic text may work 
on readers, he does not show what the author actually does to enable self-forgetting or the 
perception of unity, beyond producing nostalgia. His model therefore provides only a 
beginning structure for those interested in an analysis of reading experimental literary 
fantasies. In addition to his claim that “only a certain kind of reader” can properly 
experience the fantastic text, I believe that only certain authors could enable the proper 
literary belief necessary to the fantastic reading experience. In order for the reader to read 
with belief, she must first encounter a text that persuades her that when she relinquishes 
her rational stance, she will not be left wandering in a world of nonsense. Rhetorical cues 
left by the author allow the reader to let go of her rational position, to read with faith, and 
to experience the sublime transformation Sandner describes. 
In Coleridge’s poem the Ancient Mariner gives these assurances to the Wedding 
Guest in order to solidify his imaginative participation in the tale. For after the Mariner 
confesses to shooting the albatross, the tale quickly becomes implausible for a listener 
who does not willingly suspend disbelief. The crew’s becalming and subsequent suffering 
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in the heat, relatively realistic events, are followed by the appearance of Death and Life-
in-Death, completely fantastic characters.  As he explains these events, the Mariner calls 
for the Guest’s attention as he relates his crew’s untimely death. At this point, the Guest 
not only believes the realistic elements of the Mariner’s tale, but he also accepts the 
supernatural events that follow. Importantly, the Guest responds with fear, not for the 
crew, but that the Mariner is actually a ghost. The Mariner reassures his listener “this 
body dropt not down” (l. 223) and continues to speak. But the Guest’s exclamation at this 
point allows Coleridge to model a listener that has thoroughly suspended disbelief. As 
such, the Guest’s outcry also allows Coleridge to interject reassurance into his own tale 
and to guide his own readers in understanding that the supernatural elements of the story 
do have limits – the Mariner is not a spirit or demon. 
For the rest of the poem the Guest models truly suspended disbelief, even in all 
the fantastic elements of the Mariner’s tale. In fact, when he speaks again, he reassures 
the Mariner of his investment in the fantastic story. The Mariner explains the reanimation 
of his dead crew and cries, “‘Listen, O listen, thou Wedding-guest!’” and the Guest 
replies, “‘Marinere! thou hast thy will:/ For that, which comes out of thine eye, doth 
make/ My body and soul to be still’” (l. 362-365). In doing so, he reconfirms the 
Mariner’s authority (again, the watchful eye functions as a symbol of the story’s power). 
This prompts the Mariner to assure him that the fantastic tale will produce moral value at 
its conclusion: “Sadder and wiser thou wedding-guest! / Thou’lt rise to morrow morn,” 
he predicts (l. 368-369). At this point the Mariner no longer relies on emotional authority 
or realism, but promises that somehow the Guest will be forever changed by the tale if he 
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continues to listen with belief. This promise allows the Guest to continue suspending 
disbelief, for he understands that in doing so he may receive insight from the Mariner. 
Thus he does not question all the supernatural events of the story but continues to listen 
with faith that the resolution will provide clarity, knowledge, and affect his 
understanding.  
This poem, then, attempts to use impossible events to affect material reality by 
transforming the listener’s perspective after the tale concludes. The Mariner explains the 
moral purpose of his story by claiming, “I know the man that must hear me; / To him my 
tale I teach” (l. 622-623). His use of the word “teach” implies that the fantastic tale 
should produce knowledge of some sort. The Mariner does concludes his tale with a 
seeming moral when he cries,  
 
He prayeth well who loveth well 
   Both man and bird and beast. 
 
He prayeth best who loveth best, 
   All things both great and small: 
For the dear God, who loveth us, 
   He made and loveth all. (l. 645-650) 
 
 
But this moral cannot contain all the fantastic elements of the tale. The Wedding Guest’s 
response, to go “like one that hath been stunn’d / And is of sense forlorn” (l. 655-656) 
provides even less closure for the poem’s readers, as we, like the Guest, try to interpret 
the tale we hear. Since the Wedding Guest does not speak again, we never discover what 
the true meaning of the Mariner’s tale is, for the Guest’s reaction shows only that he has 
been affected by the fantastic. The poem demonstrates that the imaginative truth of the 
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fantastic does not mean the story will conclude allegorically in order to provide objective 
meaning. Rather, the Mariner’s tale teaches the Guest by waking his moral consciousness 
to the reality of the fantastic, causing his reaction to the material world to change from 
one of jubilance (at the poem’s beginning) to one of sober reflection.  
The Guest hears the fantastic tale to its conclusion because he believes that the 
fantastic elements of the tale will contain value for his material world. Significantly, this 
role of listening with belief mirrors the way in which adults imagine a child receives 
knowledge, and it further emphasizes the necessity of the adult reader’s acceptance of the 
childlike position when listening to a fantastic tale. By allowing the author to assume 
authority, by trusting in the process of storytelling, the reader proceeds through the story 
with belief that the supernatural or fantastic elements introduced will eventually be 
explained and produce knowledge that benefits him beyond the story. The authority the 
Mariner possesses, then, depends on an adult reader who willingly accepts this role. Just 
as Coleridge understood, the fantastic experience exists in the medium between the 
author’s ability to persuade and the audience’s willingness not to disbelieve. The reader 
willingly submits for the moment, as Coleridge rightly says, suspending disbelief until 
the tale concludes. Then, affected by the fantastic, he must incorporate this new 
experience into his understanding of the everyday. 
 
The Willing Suspension of Disbelief: A Viable Theory? 
 This model of reading fantasy functions only if readers would actually suspend 
disbelief in the fantastic long enough to be affected by it, or if they could accept the lack 
of closure the fantastic experience may exhibit. I want to discuss the willing suspension 
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of disbelief as it applies specifically to fantastic literature, for it seems to contain several 
paradoxes that must be addressed if we are to take it seriously as a theory of reading. 
Coleridge explains that the suspension of disbelief can occur when a work of art 
demonstrates sufficient unity and harmony; the author must create a work in which all 
parts complement one another and absorb the audience without causing distraction 
(Biographia Literaria II. 15-16).26 He writes, “a specific dramatic probability may be 
raised by a true poet, if the whole of his work be in harmony; a dramatic probability, 
sufficient for dramatic pleasure, even when the component characters and incidents 
border on impossibility” (II.218, italics his). The audience’s literary belief in the 
probability of the artistic work depends on the artist’s ability to bring all the various parts 
of his work into harmony with one another; all parts must be in harmony so that the unity 
reflected reveals imaginative truth. As the artist does so, Coleridge argues, he  
 
does not require us to be awake and believe; he solicits us only to yield ourselves 
to a dream; and this too with our eyes open, and with our judgment perdue behind 
the curtain, ready to awaken us at the first motion of our will: and meantime, only, 
not to disbelieve. (II.218)27  
 
 
The audience must yield to fantasy by withholding judgment; to “be awake and believe” 
implies a scrutiny that does not submit to the author’s storytelling authority. Instead, the 
audience relinquishes judgment of what may, at first, seem impossible. In doing so, they 
give the artist room to create a work that can give them deep pleasure.  
Coleridge understood that the reader could not be completely deluded by the text, 
nor would she remain completely judgmental. He writes: 
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…in sleep we pass at once by sudden collapse into this suspension of the  
will and the comparative power; whereas in an interesting play, read or 
represented, we are brought up to this point, as far as it is requisite or desirable, 
gradually, by the art of the poet and actors; and with the consent and positive 
abidance of our will. We choose to be deceived. (Shakespearean Criticism, Vol. I, 
126-132)  
 
 
Here we encounter the first paradox of the suspension of disbelief as a viable reading 
theory. How can the author gradually lead the reader at the same time that the reader 
chooses to be led? I believe that the reader’s literary belief in the text, within the 
parameters of conventional generic expectations, rests on her ability to revert to a 
childlike perspective. This perspective, itself a pre-existing cultural fantasy that each 
reader brings to the fictional experience, allows the reader to participate in the fantastic 
tale, to suspend judgment, and to be persuaded by the imaginative truth of the 
experiences the author will present. 
 Though the author may overcome judgment about the fantastic tale, there yet 
remains some distance between enjoying fantasy for the pleasure it brings and 
experiencing a transformation akin to the one had by Coleridge’s Wedding Guest. We 
still wonder if an audience truly can suspend disbelief? Here lies a second paradox: if we, 
as readers or as audience members at a performance or film, completely believe in what 
we read and/or view, would we not be so affected by the depictions that they would cause 
us to act in the world? We do not, as H.H. Price points out in Belief, “rush out of the 
theatre and ring up the police” when something disastrous happens during the course of a 
play (Qtd. in Hanfling 241). We certainly have emotions about fictional characters and 
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events, yet we still implicitly understand that they are not real, so disbelief remains 
despite our emotional involvement.28  
The resolution of this paradox has yet to be conclusively determined. Eva Schaper 
suggests that the paradox does not matter, since we hold beliefs about the nature of the 
text or the performance that supersede those we hold about the actions in them (38). She 
argues that our beliefs about fiction (that we know it is false) are essential to our 
emotional response to a text or performance. By understanding the nature of fiction, we 
can suspend judgment about what we read or see and allow our emotions to become 
involved in the characters’ stories (Schaper 39). Though she does not discuss the 
implications, Schaper’s argument assumes that an author and her audience both 
participate in the process of creating literary belief, for the author must work on the 
audience’s expectations (Schaper’s “first-order beliefs”) within established generic 
parameters so that the audience members recognize the structure and feel confident in 
relinquishing their judgment to the unfolding events. Authors must, in fact, use certain 
rhetorical strategies to persuade their audiences into this willing suspension. 
Coleridge did elucidate his philosophy, discussing it most often in terms of 
dramatic illusion related to theatrical performances. Charles I. Patterson, writing about 
Coleridge’s reaction to novels, notes that his theory of dramatic illusion depended on a 
balance of “psychological truth and probability” (125). Coleridge understood that the 
reader/viewer could not be completely deluded by the text, nor would he/she remain 
completely judgmental; instead, as Patterson explains, Coleridge thought of dramatic 
illusion as a dream, one in the course of which we choose to be deceived through a return 
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to our imaginative childlike perspective (126). While the author must bring the text into 
unity, giving psychological probability and writing within generic parameters, the 
audience must be willing to take on the position of the child and to listen with faith. As 
we saw within “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” the Mariner’s emotional authenticity 
works as a balance to the Guest’s submission to the tale. Like the Guest, a reader must 
reach this childlike perspective through the use of her will, even when confronting events 
or characters that border on impossibility. Coleridge’s philosophy does not merely ask 
the audience to suspend disbelief, but to do so willingly, or with effort.29  
Sarah E. Worth, however, argues that “we do not have the ability to will, or to 
decide consciously, what we do and do not believe” (334). She explains that we cannot 
control our reactions to fiction, because we do not “willingly or consciously approach 
fictions thinking it is now time to willingly disbelieve what we are about to experience” 
(334). Instead, she agrees with Noel Carroll’s argument for “thought theory,” in which 
we do not have to believe (outside the fictional experience) that the fiction is true. 
Instead, we entertain it as a thought, which has no real basis in material reality. 
Therefore, we can still be moved by it, but we do not actually believe it (Worth 334-335). 
Interestingly, Worth connects her argument to Aristotle’s, and she explains that 
according to him, “one does not need belief in order to have emotive responses to the 
mimetic accounts conveyed through poetry. Belief is required of rhetoric in order to 
perform its task” (335, italics hers). Worth continues: “The poetic process of poeisis-
mimesis-catharsis can in no way be confused with the rhetorical process of rhetoric-
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proof-persuasion. Beliefs need not be altered with the first, but such alteration is a 
requirement of the latter” (335).  
Aristotle’s distinction rests on the difference between impressions (phantasia) and 
beliefs (doxa). We may experience emotions based on our impressions, but we do not 
change our beliefs unless we are rationally persuaded through rhetoric (Worth 337). 
Worth’s analysis focuses mainly on the problem of emotional response to fictional 
situations, and she does not address the problem of didactic literature; here, whatever the 
genre, the author does in fact intend to change the reader/viewer’s actual beliefs about 
material reality beyond the text. The catharsis of literature then fuses with a rhetorical 
project as the author uses the reader’s phantasia to transform her doxa. While, as Worth 
puts it, “belief is not a precondition to perceiving and responding to something 
emotively” (337) neither does the fictional experience exclude ones in which the author 
aims not merely for catharsis, but, instead, for conversion.  
Aristotle “praises imitations [fictions] as vehicles of learning, and notes that as 
such they are pleasurable. It is not entirely clear, however,” Worth argues, “how they 
really do affect the soul” (336). Yet literature often changes the reader’s beliefs. Through 
the phantasia, the reader may submit to a childlike perspective, suspend disbelief, receive 
imaginative truth, and emerge from the fictional experience transformed by the power of 
story. In fact, I find this model of readership in “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.”30 
This poem depicts the problems of reading fantasy and suggests that a subjective 
experience of the fantastic can still be morally productive, even if the fantastic tale resists 
an objective meaning. Importantly, the problem of reading Coleridge’s poem, with its 
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multiple interpretations and resistance to closure, exactly mirrors the problem of reading 
later experimental Victorian literary fantasy novels.  
 
The Problem of Reading: “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” and its Criticism 
Coleridge’s comments on the composition of “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” 
recorded in Biographia Literaria, remind us that he and Wordsworth began Lyrical 
Ballads as a project that would tackle two themes:  
 
In the one, the incidents and agents were to be, in part at least, supernatural; and 
the excellence aimed at was to consist in the interesting of the affections by the 
dramatic truth of such emotions, as would naturally accompany such situations, 
supposing them to be real….For the second class, subjects were to be chosen from 
ordinary life. (II.6) 
 
 
Coleridge focuses his efforts on the supernatural as dramatic truth, and “The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner” functions as an experiment in which the supernatural tale draws 
attention to the “truth of such emotions”; this truth, as noted in Coleridge’s comments 
above, can be transformative to readers’ beliefs after they experience the tale.  
 I believe the poem reflects the reader’s encounter with the fantastic and prefigures 
the problems of interpretation and belief that arise in later Victorian literary fantasy 
novels. The relationship between the Ancient Mariner and the Wedding Guest enacts the 
relationship of the author and reader; the author depicts an unreal story, and the reader 
must willingly suspend disbelief, attempt to interpret the story, and may be affected by 
this experience – significantly, however, she may be affected by the experience of 
desiring meaning and not by actually uncovering it.  
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 The idea that the relationship between the Mariner and the Guest may be like that 
of an author and a reader has been noted before (see below), though not in terms of the 
fantastic or its connection to suspending belief and reading with childlike wonder. 
Regardless of differences in how the poem may or may not model readership, many 
critics agree that the poem’s meaning eludes actual readers, and therefore the poem 
engages problems of hermeneutics. This theory seems sound and helps explain the wide 
variety of critical interpretations of the poem. As David Perkins explains: 
 
Depending on the interpreter, [“The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”] expresses 
Coleridge’s personal life or psychoanalytic case, his poetic theories, religious 
beliefs, pantheist metaphysics, biblical hermeneutics, belatedness in literary 
history, or feelings about Western maritime expansion, about slavery, or about 
politics generally. The albatross is nature, Coleridge himself, Sarah Coleridge, a 
human being, Christ, the Divine immanent in nature, or fresh meat as an 
antiscorbutic. The world of the poem is providential, existential, morally 
incoherent, or dreamily irrelevant. (425)31 
 
 
The multiple interpretations demonstrate the poem’s complexity and resistance to a 
singular meaning. My argument falls in line with those critics who view the poem as 
modeling interpretive method, yet I differ from them significantly in that I view the poem 
as specifically about the affective nature of the fantastic tale, and not just about reading 
any type of text. 
“The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” however, actually contains two readers. The 
Mariner tells his fantastic story to the Wedding Guest, but the gloss of the poem also tells 
its own story, acting as a commentary on the narrative action of the poem. While I am 
primarily concerned with the 1798 version of the poem, a full understanding of the 
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poem’s relationship to interpretation and literary belief must account for the later addition 
of the gloss, which introduces another type of reading into the text.  
As Jerome McGann explains, “From its first appearance in Lyrical Ballads, the 
‘Rime’ was an arresting, if problematic work. Though well known to readers during the 
first two decades of the nineteenth century, no early consensus about the meaning or 
value of the poem was reached.”32 McGann’s article, called “The Meaning of the Ancient 
Mariner,” tries to eliminate the poem’s multiple interpretations by reading the poem’s 
structure from “Coleridge’s viewpoint,” in which “the ‘Rime’ is a poem which illustrates 
a special theory of the historical interpretation of texts” (50). McGann’s complex 
argument lays the groundwork for later critics who read the poem as indicative of 
hermeneutic theory.  McGann equates the suspension of disbelief with an acceptance of 
ideology suggesting that “what Coleridge re-presents in the ‘Rime’ is a historically and 
culturally limited set of ideas” (57). One should resist a willing suspension of disbelief, 
then, for to participate in the text “is necessarily to reify the Romantic concept of the 
creative imagination” (McGann 65). The best type of reader, McGann suggests, will not 
be like the Wedding Guest, but will instead reject the controlling influence of the Ancient 
Mariner (and Coleridge’s) historically-situated ideology.  
Yet, as John T. Netland explains, submission to storytelling does not mean 
complicity with an author’s agenda:  
 
We are not told that the Wedding-Guest has validated the Mariner’s story, much 
less that he has converted in any sense […]. We are merely shown that he has 
been so deeply affected that he cannot resume his normal activities. […] The 
poem also invites us as belated reader to enter the hermeneutic circle, to follow 
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the example of the Wedding-Guest and hence discover for ourselves the dramatic 
power of the tale. (54-55) 
 
 
He explains the poem’s connections to Coleridge’s interest in Biblical hermeneutics, 
implying that the Wedding Guest’s affective response indicates a model of reading of 
which Coleridge himself would approve (44). Netland bases this argument on the 
difference between the Wedding Guest as reader and the reader implied by the presence 
of the gloss.  
 The introduction of the gloss into the text of the poem causes tension for readers 
and becomes problematic for an argument that the poem models any one type of 
interpretive method. Some critics argue that we cannot even participate in the text due to 
the tension the gloss introduces into the reading process. Davies, for example, claims that 
the poem can produce meaning only when the reader identifies with a particular role in 
the poem (261).33 She claims that “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” uses three different 
“subjectivities,” with which the reader could identify: 1) the Poet/Balladeer; 2) The 
author of the Gloss and 3) the Ancient Mariner. Yet, the different perspectives result in a 
conflict for readers, who, Davies claims, cannot identify with anyone. She concludes, 
“Denied a place where meaning coheres and appears obvious, the reader is forced to 
know herself and identify herself as a critic, or interpreter of the text” (261). The gloss, 
then, reflects the reader’s role as critic, mimicking the reader’s own struggle to interpret 
the action of the poem (262).34  
 Interestingly, Davies notes that the main action of the tale “demands that the 
reader ‘suspend disbelief,’ be mesmerized and enthralled, both sharing the urgency of the 
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mariner’s tale and being affected, like the Wedding Guest, by the burden of its message” 
(265). In this way, the Wedding Guest does act as a model for readers. Yet, she argues, 
the gloss prevents complete identification with this narrative and undermines the reader’s 
ability to model herself on the Wedding Guest’s reaction. Instead, the gloss “forces the 
reader to adopt a position in which she must participate in distanced and knowing 
interpretation of the poem” (265). For Davies, the poem’s meaning matters less than that 
the poem causes readers to become critics, who know themselves through the new 
discourse they produce as they interpret the poem (265-266).35 
 Davies’s argument, while sound, does not include the role of the fantastic in its 
interpretation of the poem’s affective nature. I think the point of the poem is not to know 
the meaning of the Mariner’s tale, but to watch the reaction of the Wedding Guest. He is, 
as Davies shows, a model for readers. He has been affected by the Mariner’s tale; on this 
point most critics can agree.36 But the Mariner’s tale contains fantastic, supernatural 
elements. Importantly, these elements are the primary reason why rational meaning 
escapes readers, because they expect an objective interpretation of the tale, even though it 
contains events that defy a rational perspective. Rather than provoke a reader into critical 
interpretation, which relies on a return to the text of the poem, I believe the Wedding 
Guest models a reader-reaction that shows the affective nature of the fantastic. He goes 
away “sadder and wiser,” because his material reality has been transformed by the 
Mariner’s tale. Again, it does not matter what the tale means, so much as what it does. 
The poem’s elusive meaning, then, is precisely the point. The multiplicity of subjective 
experiences the poem produces result from an encounter with the fantastic that affects 
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readers, causing them – not only to become critics of texts, as Davies claims – but to 
desire meaning from material reality (for critics, this may include a return to the poem’s 
text, but for general readers, meaning may cohere in other ways). Through literary belief 
the fantastic tale affects the reader’s material world, manifesting as a desire for meaning 
or as interpretive inquiry about the presence of the supernatural. 
 The Wedding Guest, then, shows readers that an encounter with the fantastic 
relies on suspending disbelief and receiving a tale with wonder. But what of the gloss? 
Why would Coleridge revise the poem to provide a more stable, logical interpretation of 
the poem, if he wanted readers to experience the fantastic in the same way the Wedding 
Guest does? As Netland explains, the gloss tries to control the Mariner’s supernatural 
narrative because it functions as another example of a reader in the poem; in this case, the 
gloss portrays the “rational reader,” one who “in the written record of his reading, 
demonstrates a sympathetic, scholarly interest as he seeks to explain and interpret the 
tale, but who never shares the Wedding-Guest’s affective response” (39).37 As Netland 
persuasively argues, the gloss-writer epitomizes the type of reader that “is so intent upon 
knowing what transpired that he fails to experience the pathos of the tale in the way that 
the Wedding-Guest does […because he] simply ignores that which lies beyond his 
imagination” (40).38 Netland reminds us that  
 
Coleridge urges the reader to approach a text with a receptive attitude, capable of 
suspending both a disbelief in mystery and an unthinking acquiescence to the 
incomprehensibility of mystery (Lay Sermons 44-47); and […] Coleridge believes 
the hermeneutic encounter must not be reduced merely to classification, 
categorization, dissection, and other such analytical activities of the 
Understanding (Lay Sermons 77-78). Reading is always morally purposive. One is 
to seek insight in order to be moved, affected, changed. (47) 
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As Netland shows, the gloss-writer cannot suspend disbelief, and he therefore cannot 
experience or relate to the Wedding Guest’s response. The gloss, then, ironically 
indicates a model for a bad reader, one who remains in a logical, disbelieving perspective 
as he reads (Netland 47). The Wedding Guest, by contrast, reacts in a way that is “far 
more consistent with Coleridgean hermeneutical imperatives than is the editor’s cool 
detachment” (Netland 53).39 
 I agree with Netland’s interpretation of the gloss’s function, though I view the 
tension between the good reading of the Wedding Guest and the gloss-writer’s bad 
reading as dependent on the presence of the fantastic, the same elements that would later 
manifest more specifically in Victorian literary fantasies. As I will argue, suspending 
disbelief in realistic fiction does not require the same type of engagement with a text as 
the fantastic does. The gloss-writer does seek to contain the supernatural elements of the 
tale, to render them uncanny, rather than marvelous, and to eliminate their affective 
nature. And the Wedding Guest’s affective response does indicate a “model of 
hermeneutical openness,” which Netland claims (55). Yet the model of the affected 
reader of fantasy that the Wedding Guest presents marks a new type of reader, one who 
submits to a tale with childlike wonder. The role of the childlike reading, in particular, 
differs from the adult rationalist perspective the gloss contains.  
To read with childlike wonder would become a theme in later Victorian fantasy 
novels, and I believe “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” models the necessity of wonder 
and the suspension of disbelief needed in order for fantasy literature to accomplish its 
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affective goal of “waking a meaning” in readers. Coleridge’s interest in the 
transformative potential of the fantastic influences his depiction of the Wedding Guest’s 
response, and this model addresses the problems of later literary fantasy novels that ask 
readers to suspend disbelief, but still expect them to find some sort of meaning after the 
tale concludes. But the lack of definite closure often found in fantastic literature further 
contributes to the author’s challenges when constructing an experimental text. 
  
Disbelief and the Fantastique: Aesthetics and the Problem of Subjective Meaning 
While any genre may ask the reader to suspend disbelief in fictional events, the 
fantasy genre tests the reader by claiming truth through the presentation of what may 
border on nonsense. The reader of realism need not read with belief in quite the same 
way, since realism ostensibly depicts a stable, recognizable world. The imaginative truth 
Coleridge proposes for the fantastic differs from Wordsworth’s “real life” poetry in that it 
asks readers to believe in events that would not occur normally. This belief in the 
fantastic requires more faith in the poet’s authority, because it asks readers to leave 
behind adult trappings of rationality and realism. Acceptance of the unfamiliar may be 
uncomfortable, even frustrating, for the reader who cannot suspend rational judgment and 
believe that fantastic and supernatural events can still produce knowledge relevant to 
material experience.40  
 Tension arises when reading the fantastic because the potentially subjective 
experience allows room for multiple truths or even for the reader to miss the author’s 
meaning altogether. Here there cannot be a definite moral purpose, because the very 
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nature of the fantastic experience relies on the impossible. Coleridge seemed to 
understand this tension, for though he argues that the “The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner”’s moral was too explicit, the poem’s meaning still remains under debate.41 The 
Guest seems dismayed, rather than inspired, by the obliquely Christian lesson, yet he is, 
in fact, transformed by the tale and goes away “sadder and wiser.” This ambiguous 
ending implicitly suggests the perilous potential of the fantastic tale: in aiming for 
objective truth the author may lose his reader in the realm of fantasy.  
K.M. Wheeler also acknowledges the affective nature of the Mariner’s tale, yet 
she categorizes the Wedding Guest’s reaction in terms of the aesthetic, rather than the 
fantastic. She claims that the Wedding Guest framework of the poem acts “as a ‘recipe’ 
for reading and aesthetic response” because the structure mirrors actual readers’ reading 
of the poem (45). Wheeler argues that the poem represents a theory of art, one in which 
“art does not correspond to reality: it creates a new reality, or offers a rival account of 
reality to the account given by memory and understanding” (46). She continues, “The 
reader, analogically, is instructed to see the narrative not as an end in itself […]. The 
narrative is rather a threshold, not an end, where the reader must remain poised” (46). 
Since the Wedding Guest is the “ideal reader” of the Mariner’s tale, then “his position on 
the threshold would also be a description of the appropriate reading and response to art” 
(46). Interestingly, she describes the reader’s position as one “poised or balanced on the 
boundary of two worlds,” and maintaining this aesthetic reaction relies on the difference 
between the reader’s use of imagination, rather than her understanding (46).42 The 
68 
imagination becomes aroused by the poem’s imagery, leaving the reader (like the 
Wedding Guest) in a state of silence (Wheeler 55).43 
Wheeler provides a persuasive description of an aesthetic reading model. Yet, 
though she distinguishes between the type of reader needed to respond to art (i.e. the 
Mariner’s tale), she does not address the way this response differs depending on the 
content the art portrays. As we will see below, her definition of aesthetic response echoes 
fantastic theory, in which the reader’s position on the threshold of two worlds results 
from his encounter with the fantastique. A critical reading of the poem in light of theories 
about fantasy exposes the way this aesthetic response to the Mariner’s tale relies more on 
the presence of the fantastic and the evocation of the child’s perspective of wonder and 
belief than it does a generalized reaction to any work of art. The presence of the 
supernatural and the disruption of the familiar are preconditions for an encounter with the 
fantastique, and the threshold experience Wheeler describes occurs primarily with non-
realistic texts. This distinction between mere aesthetic response and the presence of the 
fantastique will be made clear below, where I will argue that the author uses the 
“threshold” moment to provoke interpretive inquiry about the presence of the fantastic in 
the material.  
The Wedding Guest’s reaction, while inconclusive in revealing the moral of the 
Mariner’s tale to actual readers, provides an exact model of what Tzevtan Todorov 
would, years later, claim as the essence of the fantastique. As I mentioned in Chapter 
Two, the fantastique manifests as reader hesitation as she tries to discover the source of 
fantastic occurrences within a narrative. She hesitates between two choices: the uncanny, 
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which resolves the fantastic into a natural event (as in Gothic novels); and the marvelous, 
which resolves the fantastic into a completely supernatural event (as in fairy tales). The 
Guest’s unresolved confusion, and implicitly the reader’s reaction to the poem’s 
ambiguity, leaves the Mariner’s tale squarely in the fantastique, where a natural or 
supernatural explanation would have resolved this tension by pushing the tale out of the 
fantastique and into the uncanny or the marvelous, respectively.44 Instead, the poem 
leaves the Wedding Guest and the poem’s readers in an unresolved position. It escapes 
the closure typically found in narrative structures, whose teleological constructions 
predetermine a drive to the conclusion. Unlike Wheeler’s aesthetic explanation, fantasy 
theory demonstrates that this lack of resolution results from the reader’s need to decipher 
the origin of the supernatural events of the text (a desire demonstrated by Coleridge’s 
addition of the gloss). If the source of the fantastic remains unresolved, Todorov 
suggests, the reader remains in the fantastique, the condition Wheeler ascribes to the 
aesthetic threshold.  
Importantly, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” demonstrates the disruptive 
potential of fantastic discourse that would later emerge within longer experimental 
fantasy narratives. Yet, even Todorov’s theories can be supplemented by connecting his 
fantasy theory to reader-response criticism, which allows us to better understand the 
model of reading presented in Coleridge’s poem. Christine Brooke-Rose complicates 
Todorov’s theory of the fantastique by connecting its open-ended nature to the work of 
Roland Barthes, specifically to his hermeneutic code (38-41).45 She claims textual 
ambiguity occurs for readers when an author under-determines the hermeneutic code, 
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which results in more mystery for the reader (63-65).46 If the author reveals too much, the 
reader becomes bored; if he reveals too little, the reader is confused (Brooke-Rose 116). 
The pure fantastique, she suggests, results from an under-determination of the 
hermeneutic code that requires the reader to become hypercritical as she searches for 
“clues” left by the author in order to interpret the text’s meaning.  
Yet authors of experimental fantasies like Coleridge’s seem more concerned with 
the reader’s experience of the text, rather than with leading the reader to a single textual 
meaning. I believe an hermeneutic under-determining in the text could also occur in order 
to create an aesthetic effect intended to affect the reader’s material reality. In this case, 
the fantasy author who uses the fantastique does not want the reader to become 
hypercritical.47 Rather than creating a hypercritical reader, who searches for meaning 
during the course of reading, I believe the fantastic text asks for a reader who will 
suspend this hypercritical impulse in order to experience the fantastic tale fully. The 
experience of encountering the fantastique will provoke the reader to interpretation of the 
fantastic experience, rather than of the fantastic text. 
 As we saw above, the Wedding Guest does not respond to the fantastic tale by 
asking the Ancient Mariner for clarification about his meaning. Rather, he goes away 
“sadder and wiser” to consider his experiences. The difference, then, is that the aesthetic 
moment produces a fantastic encounter that provokes readers into reflection about their 
experiences of external reality, regardless of what meaning they garner from the fantastic 
text. This seemingly didactic motive vastly differs from any type of affective literature 
that had been attempted through traditional allegory, for it does not rely on conveying 
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one meaning through the text, but instead allows for subjective interpretations that carry 
weight on an individual (rather than an objective) level. Coleridge’s poem anticipates 
later experimental Victorian fantasists that would use this theory as a way to affect their 
readers’ moral consciousness through the process of encountering the fantastic in a non-
allegorical text. 
Throughout the development of the literary fantasy novel, authors had to contend 
with the competing tensions produced by the pure fantastique; if an author wished to 
affect readers with the imaginative power of fantasy, she had to consider how to disorient 
the reader’s typical reading expectations (which generally relied on mimesis or 
allegorical fantasy) while also providing a way for the reader to experience an 
imaginative perception of truth. If the reader chose to resolve the fantastique by refusing 
to believe in the supernatural events, then the work becomes merely the uncanny, which 
disrupts for the moment but remains in the material. Yet if the reader resolved the 
fantastique by believing completely in the supernatural events, assigning them to the 
context of the story, then the work becomes merely marvelous, a text primarily of 
entertainment with little value beyond the moment of reading. By modeling readership 
within texts, authors like Coleridge were able to demonstrate a reader affected by the 
truth of fantasy, and often, as in “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” they chose never to 
resolve the fantastique as disruptive discourse. This lack of resolution enabled the reader 
to move from reading the text into an act of interpretation rooted in aesthetic experience, 
one that might penetrate everyday reality with imaginative perception.  
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Conclusion 
 
I will argue throughout this project that the movement from interpretation to 
reader-reaction, often unexamined in fantasy criticism, relies on Romantic philosophies 
like the return to the child’s perspective as a reader. In fact, Victorian fantasy authors 
seemed to understand implicitly the need for readers to take on the willing suspension of 
disbelief through the child’s perspective, as they often address their texts (ostensibly or 
otherwise) to children. Thus children’s literature and the Victorian literary fantasy are 
often conflated, because they both rely on the reader’s willing submission to the author’s 
authority in order to participate in a fantastic world.  
 My next chapter, quite fittingly, discusses the way that Coleridge literally passed 
on his philosophy of fantasy’s transformative potential directly to his own child, Sara. 
After his death Sara meticulously gathered her father’s papers and served as editor for 
various volumes of his work, most notably for Biographia Literaria (Mudge 3). As 
Bradford Keyes Mudge explains, Coleridge became the most influential intellectual 
presence in Sara’s life, as she edited his work, argued for his reputation, and helped to 
define his role as a philosophical Romantic writer (24). Significantly, in her essay on 
Wordsworth’s “Lines Left on a Yew-tree Seat,” she argues that a reader will discover the 
meaning of a work by “resigning himself completely to the will of his author” (Qtd. in 
Mudge 78). But where Coleridge’s exploration of the transcendent potential of fantasy 
remained in his poetry, Sara provides a link between these poetic philosophies and the 
development of the experimental literary fantasy novel that has garnered so little attention 
in criticism of the Victorian Golden Age of fantasy. Her novel, Phantasmion: Prince of 
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Palmland, deals even more specifically with the problem of presenting fantasy without 
explicit allegory, and my next chapter will examine this problem and the implications for 
the fantastique, as well as for later Victorian literary fantasies, in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A TISSUE OF UNREALITIES  
 
 In 1874, the publishers at H.S. King and Company reissued Sara Coleridge’s 
literary fantasy novel Phantasmion: Prince of Palmland, originally published in 1837. 
The novel had initially received little notice, and The London Society quickly pointed out 
that it “was not a success on first publication” (“New Books Received” 559). Classing it 
with other “literary failures” that try for broader audiences, the editors predicted the 
public would not appreciate it any more in 1874 than it did in 1837.48 They were right. 
 Of the positive reviews Phantasmion received in 1837, that of the Gentleman’s 
Magazine exemplifies the kinder reactions to the novel. The editors called it “a charming 
tale of fairy fiction,” full of “simplicity” and “sweetness” (“Phantasmion” 276).49  They 
praise the story’s construction, especially its truthfulness, but instead of giving examples 
from the novel’s prose, they extract a poem for readers to appreciate. Readers best 
remembered Coleridge as her father’s editor and as a children’s poet. Her Pretty Lessons 
in Verse for Good Children (1834) was quite popular and went to five editions. Yet when 
critics later mention Coleridge’s work, they often remark on her editorial achievement, 
occasionally mention her poems, and contrast these endeavors with the failure of her only 
novel.50 In a review of an edition of her father’s poems, for example, the Athenaeum 
praises her editorial skills but regrets her own lack of success as a writer: 
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Possibly the great amount of antique and classical learning which she had stored 
up, and the profound metaphysical training to which she had been subjected, may 
have somewhat overlaid and clouded the rich gifts of imagination with which also 
she had been endowed by Nature. Her faëry tale ‘Phantasmion,’ though full of the 
most beautiful images and suggestions, wants a design appreciable by even the 
readers of what is remote, dreamy, and difficult. (“The Poems of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge” 841) 
 
 
This critical consensus prevailed, and when the Edinburgh Review assessed Memoir and 
Letters of Sara Coleridge in 1874, they agree with the poor reaction the public had to 
Phantasmion, claiming “the story has no backbone: no definite plan or purpose” (“Art II: 
Memoir and Letters of Sara Coleridge” 54).  
Perhaps Phantasmion may still be perceived as an experimental failure, yet an 
examination of Coleridge’s goals as a fantasy writer enables us to chart the development 
of later, more successful, literary fantasies. The mixed critical reviews the novel received 
reflect the reading preferences for nineteenth-century fantasy literature at the time of the 
novel’s publication. These expectations structured readers’ experience of the novel and 
influenced the novel’s reception. The lack of a direct moral or allegory, in particular, 
contributed to readers’ sense of meaninglessness in the text. Herbert Wilson of The 
Examiner complained, “It has barely a plot, barely a distinct character, barely an exciting 
episode….[It is] a fairy tale without allegory, without humor, with meagre [sic] fancy and 
imagery, and still more meagre wonders and excitement” (Qtd. in Low 139).51 Wilson’s 
comments reveal the average reader’s expectations for a fairy tale and demonstrate how 
Coleridge’s novel resists these generic categorizations. 
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Readers did not understand that Coleridge consciously avoided the typical 
didactic use of fantasy in order to generate a novel that would affect their moral 
consciousness through belief in the fantastic. Her experiment with fantasy that lacks 
allegory contributes to the development of the Victorian literary fantasy novel and 
changes the way fantasy was used to communicate moral meaning. Dennis Butts explains 
that Romantic poetry “emphasized the value of the imaginative exploration of the unreal 
and fantastic […]. In doing so, it pointed the way to the works of Sara Coleridge […]” 
(101). Indeed, like her father Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Sara valued the power of the 
imagination to reveal truth and agreed that fantasy and fairy tales could develop a 
reader’s sense of morality through pleasure. When writing Phantasmion she draws on 
Romantic philosophy that she absorbed from her father as she edited his work for 
publication. Yet, when she focuses on writing a novel that abandons the clear interpretive 
paradigms her contemporaries had established, she confronts the crucial tension of 
writing the literary fantastic. Authors of literary fantasies intentionally resist explanations 
or limitations that would constrain the unreal, and in doing so they disrupt readers’ 
expectations. But they also ask readers to believe that a literary fantasy can be morally 
productive, even without the text conveying one, objective meaning. A text, they felt, 
could have meaning for material reality without presenting clear moral guidelines and 
without explaining to readers how they should interpret the stories.  
As Coleridge’s letters show, she consciously chose to abandon allegory, and she 
knew her readers might become frustrated. Her decision to omit didacticism within a 
fantastic text results in confusion for readers and exposes both past and contemporary 
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readers’ expectations about the way fantasy should be written and read. Phantasmion, 
then, exemplifies the problems of interpretation and literary belief central to experimental 
fantasy novels. Ultimately, Coleridge’s novel marks the shift in literary fantasy from 
teaching truth overtly through allegory or fable, as had predominantly been the case 
during the eighteenth century, to the Victorian emphasis on affecting the reader’s moral 
consciousness through the aesthetic experience of the fantastic.  
One cannot quickly summarize Phantasmion’s narrative, but a brief attempt 
seems necessary here since most readers will be unfamiliar with the text. The overall plot 
follows the adventures of Phantasmion, the novel’s hero, as he tries to prevent an 
invasion of his land after his parents’ deaths. He also tries to win the heart of the Princess 
Iarine through the help and hindrance of various female spirits. Several subplots involve 
the pairing of different women with appropriate lovers, and Coleridge uses many scenes 
of enchantment and disguise as Phantasmion travels through the different realms of his 
world. The novel concludes with what seems to be a predictably happy ending with 
justice served and love triumphant. Yet this overly simplistic summary masks the 
difficulty of the novel, for Coleridge’s resistance to a direct plot or complex 
characterization makes the 387-page, two-volume fairy tale a struggle to understand.  
By contemporary standards, Phantasmion would not be considered a fairy tale so 
much as a literary fantasy novel, but this distinction did not exist at the time of 
publication. Phantasmion’s difference from other fairy tales can be demonstrated best by 
comparing it to more typical, allegorical stories. Prior to Coleridge’s writing, oral fairy 
stories had become literary fairy tales mainly due to the influence of the French 
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aristocracy. As Jack Zipes explains, “By the mid-seventeenth century, aristocratic women 
had established literary salons and were promoting a type of parlor game that 
incorporated the use of folk motifs and narrative conventions” (“Fairy Tales: 
Introduction” 176).52 These salons were extremely popular and lasted into the early 
eighteenth century. Attendees, many of them women like Marie-Catherine d’Aulnoy, 
began to collect their tales and use them within longer novels or publish them separately 
as editions. Charles Perrault, the author of the “Tales of Mother Goose,” frequently 
attended the literary salons. His tales were translated into English in 1729 and 
enormously influenced the structure of English fairy tales, as did the publication of 
German Popular Stories by the Brothers Grimm, translated into English by Edgar Taylor 
in 1823 (Zipes, “Fairy Tales: Introduction,” 176).53 Authors, even Perrault, wrote early 
fairy tales for adults and intended to both “amuse the listeners but also to establish the 
conventions of a discourse on manners and civilité, with an implicit code that 
corresponded to the standards of propriety” (Zipes, “Fairy Tales: Introduction,” 177).54 
Thus an overt didactic intent remained, even when tales were told for amusement. 
In Chapter Two I defined genre fantasy, including fairy tales, as a closed form, 
and the fantastic, including novels like Coleridge’s, as an open, disruptive form. Lucie 
Armitt reminds us that the difference between these two types of literature primarily lies 
with the reader’s response to and participation in the text: 
 
First, where genre fantasy deals in enclosed worlds, the literary fantastic  
deals in disruptive impulses. Second, where genre fantasy implies complicity on 
the part of the readers, the literary fantastic actively seeks out reader hesitancy as 
a means of building in competing readings of the text. (7-8, emphasis mine) 
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This is not to say that fairy tales, as genre fantasy, cannot be subversive or that they only 
support dominant cultural ideologies.55 As Zipes has shown, authors wrote fairy tales that 
supported and critiqued cultural practices.56 Traditional fairy tales differ from 
Coleridge’s literary fantasy in how they ask readers to uncover meaning. Typical fairy 
tales may raise questions for readers about particular social practices, but they do so
obvious manner, in which they do not ask readers to investigate the story in order to 
determine how its events may connect to the real. When Victorian writers like Charles 
Dickens or John Ruskin used fairy tales to critique the industrial revolution, for exam
they explicitly embedded their critiques within the stories’ action, typically through 
allegory (Zipes, When Dreams Came True, 115-118). In fact, Zipes remarks that “almos
all the fairy tales of the 1840s and 1850s use allegorical forms to make a statement 
Christian goodness in contrast to the greed and materialism that are apparently the most 
dangerous vices in English society” (When Dreams Came True 119). Lewis Carroll and 
George MacDonald’s fairy tales that use playfulness and textual destabilization (1850s-
1860s) have often been recognized as the beginning of a more subversive fairy tale 
tradition, yet Coleridge’s novel anticipates these works by nearly 30 years. 
 in an 
ple, 
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We can observe the difference of Coleridge’s work by comparing the closed 
nature of a fairy tale by Perrault with Phantasmion’s open narrative. Perrault’s well-
known story of “The Master Cat; or, Puss in Boots,” for example, uses the supernatural to 
structure the adventures of a young boy who receives only a cat for his inheritance when 
his father dies. He fears he will starve to death, but the cat assures him that his “share of 
the inheritance is not as bad as [he] believes” (Perrault 186). The characters of the story 
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take the cat’s speech and his subsequent actions on behalf of his master at face-value 
within the story. The young man shows no surprise, and neither do any of the other 
characters with whom the cat interacts.  
In these terms the reader can clearly follow the narrative action and can watch it 
unfold with little active participation in the text. The reader finds pleasure in the formula 
of the story, the clearly defined parameters between the “good” young man, the craftiness 
of the Puss in Boots, and the way in which the two secure the young man’s fortune by 
manipulating the other characters in the story. The reader, told in advance that the cat’s 
actions are all successful, never wonders about the narrative outcome or experiences any 
frustration in determining the text’s meaning, and within the story the supernatural does 
not disrupt the reading experience. The brief tale concludes favorably for the young man, 
but to be sure that readers understand the lesson of the tale, Perrault appends two morals: 
 
    Moral 
 Although the advantage may be great 
 When one inherits a grand estate 
 Passed on from father to son, 
 Young men often find their industry, 
 Combined with ingenuity, 
 Leads to greater prosperity. 
 
    Another Moral 
 Though the miller’s son did quickly gain 
 The heart of a princess whose eyes he tamed, 
 As he charmed her in a natural way, 
 It’s due to good manners, looks, and dress 
 That inspired her deepest tenderness 
 And always help to win the day. (189) 
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Both morals clarify the story’s meaning for readers and dispel any doubt the fantastic 
elements may have introduced. The story is not about a magical cat. It is about hard 
work, good manners, and the importance of wealth. This type of closed form practically 
guarantees that every reader of the tale will extract the same meaning from it.57  
When authors translated fairy tales like these into English in 1729, they highly 
influenced the development of fantasy in British literature. Sarah Fielding, for example, 
wrote The Governess: or, Little Female Academy in 1749 and created “a larger frame tale 
of schooling to hold stories that illustrate lessons of morals and manners” (Zipes, “Fairy 
Tales: Introduction,” 177). At this point fairy tale authors began to address younger 
audiences, but many still feared that fantasy would corrupt children.58 Zipes explains that 
“Fielding had read and loved fairy tales during her youth, and she included two in The 
Governess, [but she] felt that she had to apologize for and justify their inclusion” (“Sarah 
Fielding” 189). Characters within her frame story tell fairy tales, but they also reassure 
readers that “all sorts of supernatural Assistances in a Story are introduced only to amuse 
and divert. […] Therefore by no means let the Notion of Giants or Magic dwell upon 
your Minds” (Qtd. in Zipes, “Sarah Fielding,” 190). Though Fielding did not append 
clear morals to her fairy tales, as Perrault did, she includes narration about the proper use 
of fantasy and instructs readers directly in how to decipher the text, again dispelling any 
doubt about the story’s meaning. Additionally, “The Story of the Cruel Giant Barbarico, 
The Good Giant Benefico, and The Little Pretty Dwarf Mignon” still concludes with a 
clear lesson for readers: 
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Peace, Harmony and Love reigned in every Bosom; Dissension, Discord, and 
Hatred were banished from this friendly Dwelling; and that Happiness, which is 
the natural Consequence of Goodness, appeared in every chearful [sic] 
Countenance throughout the castle of the good Benefico. (Fielding 199) 
 
 
The closure this ending provides diffuses any disruptive potential of the fantastic and 
constrains the story’s meaning in an allegory.  
Clearly, authors used fantasy within strict narrative conventions in order to avoid 
any pluralism the use of the supernatural may introduce. Readers could not test the truth 
of the fantastic because it exceeded their own experiences of reality. Authors worried that 
readers would take all fantasy elements as truth, simply because they were presented in a 
relatively realistic manner within the text. To contain the potential for misreading or 
falsehood, they used allegory to illustrate an objective truth that readers would easily 
recognize.  
Even with these clear guidelines, however, later authors still worried that the use 
of any fantasy would confuse readers, especially children. In 1824 Mary Martha 
Sherwood edited and rewrote Fielding’s The Governess and removed the fairy tales from 
the text (Zipes, “Sarah Fielding,” 190). In fact, during the 1820s through the 1850s, “the 
majority of fairy-tale writers […] emphasized lessons to be learned in keeping with the 
principles of the Protestant ethic. These were industriousness, honesty, cleanliness, 
diligence, virtuousness – and male supremacy” (Zipes, “Fairy Tales: Introduction,” 
179).59 When Sara Coleridge wrote Phantasmion, then, her readers had very distinct 
expectations about what a fairy tale should be and do. The novel fails because she avoids 
allegory and resists conventional expectations, overturning interpretive strategies readers 
86 
would have used to decipher the text. Later Victorian fairy tale authors, like Carroll, 
William Makepeace Thackeray, and Oscar Wilde would subvert typical generic 
expectations more successfully, but Coleridge’s early attempt to do so proved too 
unfamiliar for audiences used to clear didactic conventions. 
Even before the reviews were published, Coleridge knew Phantasmion might not 
be well received. She expressed hesitation about writing the novel when she sent a copy 
of it to Arabella Brooke on July 29, 1837. In the accompanying letter she explains her 
feelings about her fairy tale publication: 
 
In these days, too, to print a Fairy Tale is the very way to be not read, but shoved 
aside with contempt. I wish, however, I were only as sure that my fairy tale is 
worth printing, as I am that works of this class are wholesome food, by way of 
variety, for the childish mind. It is curious that on this point Sir Walter Scott, and 
Charles Lamb, my father, my Uncle Southey, and Mr. Wordsworth, were all 
agreed. (Memoir and Letters 136-137, emphasis hers)60 
 
 
In choosing to write a fairy tale that relied less on allegory and more on the power of the 
reader’s imagination, Coleridge embraces a philosophy she learned from her Romantic 
predecessors. Bradford Keyes Mudge has discussed S.T. Coleridge’s influence on his 
daughter’s work, and I do not intend to trace this history, which has already been well-
established by Mudge and Dennis Low. 61 Instead, I want to examine how Coleridge 
enacts these ideas and changes the reader’s relationship to the fantastic.  
As Low argues, Phantasmion reflects the way Coleridge absorbed S.T. 
Coleridge’s ideas as she edited and rewrote his work for publication. Low describes how 
Coleridge’s editorship of her father’s papers contributed to the particular style of writing 
in Phantasmion that produces reader frustration. Chronologically, she worked on both 
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during the same period, and Low believes she writes the novel as a “phantasmagoric 
allegory,” a genre S.T. Coleridge professed interest in, but never completed himself 
(137). S.T. Coleridge wrote: 
 
The prominent characters of the phantasmagoric Allegory are its’ breadth, or 
amplifitude, [sic] & its’ rapid Auroraborealis-like Shifting & thorough flushing of 
its Cones & Pyramids – yet still within a loosely predetermined Sphere, and with 
a unity of direction … The Allegoric does not exclude the Liberal, nor the one 
Allegory another. The solution is given in the name, phantasmagoric – 
Inconsistency is prevented by Motion – the Columns shift. (Qtd. in Low 137)62 
  
 
This definition seems too vague to be practicable, but Low’s point is well-taken. He 
establishes Coleridge’s self-conscious decision to incorporate her father’s philosophical 
and poetic interests into a new genre that privileges the power of imagination. Whether or 
not Sara wrote Phantasmion as a connection to this particular idea, the novel transmits 
new poetic philosophies into the fantasy genre, which, as stated above, typically used 
overt didacticism to give fantasy a moral function.  
Coleridge’s choice to write the novel combines her interest in experimenting with 
the “phantasmagoric allegory,” and S.T. Coleridge’s philosophical inquiry into the 
relationship between the fantastic writer and her reader. Specifically, as explained in 
Chapter Three, this relationship involves the reader’s willing submission to the authority 
of the author as they meet in the experience of the fantastic text. Coleridge supports this 
philosophy in an analysis of William Wordsworth’s “Lines Left on a Yew Tree Seat” that 
she wrote in 1835. She argues that a reader will discover the meaning of a work by 
“resigning himself completely to the will of his author” (Qtd. in Mudge 78). Like her 
father, she believed the imagination “can be a vehicle of revelations more profound than 
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those achieved by the understanding” (Mudge 79). As I wrote in Chapter Three, the 
relationship between the fantasy author and reader may enact that of the adult and child 
during storytelling. The reader will suspend disbelief and allow herself childlike wonder 
in the events the text depicts, even when the text frustrates her expectations. In 
suspending disbelief she uncovers meaning by believing the text can affect material 
reality. The reader, spiritually moved by the aesthetic pleasure of the fantastic, 
investigates the source of that pleasure in the material world. Meaning emerges as the 
reader perceives the presence of imaginative, spiritual truth at work in the material, 
although the text itself may lack closure.  
Zipes claims that traditional fairy tales, he calls them “wonder tales,” also induce 
wonder in readers:  
 
In an oral wonder tale, we are to wonder about the workings of the universe where 
anything can happen at any time, and these happy or fortuitous events are never to 
be explained. Nor do the characters demand an explanation. […] The tales seek to 
awaken our regard for the miraculous condition of life and to evoke in a religious 
sense profound feelings of awe and respect for life as a miraculous process, which 
can be altered and changed to compensate for the lack of power, wealth, and 
pleasure that most people experience. (When Dreams Came True 5)  
 
 
He locates the listener’s wonder in the way “in which a narrator/author arranges known 
functions of a tale aesthetically and ideologically to induce wonder” as he transmits the 
tale (When Dreams Came True 7). The variety and creatively an author demonstrates in 
creating a fairy tale can, indeed, produce wonder in readers. However, I distinguish this 
wonder from that of the literary fantasy. As Vladimir Propp has shown (and as Zipes 
acknowledges), authors construct fairy tales from “thirty-one basic functions that 
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constitute the formation of a paradigm” (When Dreams Came True 3). An author may 
produce wonder by varying the formula readers expect, but the story’s aesthetic pleasure 
occurs because of the strict formula that guides these variations. The childlike wonder I 
identify as a needed part of suspending disbelief in the literary fantastic differs from this 
pleasure. We experience wonder as we read about supernatural events and as we take on 
a childlike perspective in believing, for the moment, in the text. However, if the tale 
upsets our expectations, as is often the case in literary fantasies, we must sustain this 
childlike wonder through our willing suspension of disbelief. Even when the text does not 
give us pleasure, we maintain belief that it can still produce meaning if we work to 
interpret the text beyond traditional paradigms. In this case, readers will experience 
wonder and pleasure as a result of interpretive inquiry, rather than as a result of novelty 
within a closed system. 
Coleridge consciously tried to create this sense of wonder through fantasy in order 
to awaken her readers to imaginative truth. In a letter to her brother Derwent she writes: 
 
If you ask me …what advantage a young person could possibly derive from such 
a tissue of unrealities, I should say that every work of fancy in its degree, and 
according to the merit of its execution, feeds and expands the mind; whenever the 
poetical beauty of things is vividly displayed, truth is exhibited, and thus the 
imagination of the youthful reader is stimulated to find truth for itself. (Qtd. in 
Mudge 96)63 
 
 
A text reveals poetical beauty through fantasy that remains open and non-allegorical. In 
this type of text the author uses “incidents and agents [that] were to be, in part at least, 
supernatural; and the excellence aimed at was to consist in the interesting of the 
affections by the dramatic truth of such emotions, as would naturally accompany such 
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situations, supposing them to be real” (S.T. Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, II.6). 
Coleridge incorporates her father’s poetic philosophy into a book-length text in order to 
reveal the same kind of imaginative truth he had hoped for in his own poems. She creates 
Phantasmion as a prose experiment of a poetic philosophy, and though she continues to 
call her novel a fairy tale, Phantasmion purposely works against these categories in order 
to actively confront them and change the reader’s relationship with the fantastic text.  
The difficulty of Phantasmion, then, only reinforces its experimental nature. It 
was not, as readers assumed, a typical fairy tale, and therefore it resists generic 
expectations when readers approach it with certain beliefs about what a fairy tale should 
be. Coleridge anticipated some of the negative reaction to the novel because she was 
aware of the way in which it broke conventions. In a letter to her husband, she defends 
Phantasmion’s difference and distinguishes her use of fantasy from her contemporaries: 
 
In regard to “Phantasmion’s” want of general purpose and meaning, I can only 
say that it does not belong to that class of fictions in which a single truth or moral 
is to be illustrated by a sequence of events, of which Miss Edgeworth’s and Miss 
Martineau’s tales are instances …[and where] the character and descriptions are 
all for the sake of an allegory…. It belongs to that class of fictions…where the 
ostensible moral, even if there be one, is not the author’s chief end and aim, which 
rather consists in cultivating the imagination, and innocently gratifying the 
curiosity of the reader, by exhibiting the general and abstract beauty of things 
through the vehicle of a story…. (Memoirs and Letters 146-147)64 
 
 
The criticisms Phantasmion received (and would receive again on reissue) emerge when 
readers try to read with conventional interpretive strategies. When they cannot find the 
allegory they expect, they call the novel a failure. I argue, rather, that readers did not 
recognize the different way in which Coleridge wrote, because she subverted their 
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expectations. Readers unprepared for this type of encounter cannot interpret the text in a 
way that produces the closure they desire. The novel as text fails for these readers 
because they do not believe that the text as written can communicate truth or produce 
meaning. They cannot, in other words, suspend disbelief in Phantasmion’s story; they do 
not submit to Coleridge’s storytelling authority because she does not allow them the 
comfort of morals and an allegory. 
Yet Coleridge did attempt to guide readers to textual meaning, and a closer 
examination of the novel reveals those strategies she put in place. The novel begins with 
Phantasmion’s childhood. He encounters the fairy Potentilla in his garden, and she 
delights him by demonstrating her power over the insect world. Potentilla’s visit, 
however, also introduces the reader to a different use of fantasy than she had encountered 
previously. Potentilla tells Phantasmion,  
 
…thou needest no fairy now to work wonders for thee, being yet so young that all 
thou beholdest is new and marvelous in thine eyes. But the day will come when 
this happiness will fade away….[then] I will appear before thee, and exert all my 
power to renew the delights and wonders of thy childhood. (Coleridge 3)65 
 
 
This passage implies that fantasy does not exist merely to enchant children or to teach 
them lessons. Rather, it works once children have lost the wonders of their youth and 
need it in order to recover joy. This time comes quickly for Phantasmion. In the next 
chapter his mother mysteriously dies. He does not understand death until a tragic accident 
in his garden, in which a young child is killed. As he looks on the child’s corpse, he 
shrieks and runs away – directly into his own mother’s funeral procession. In just a few 
short pages, Phantasmion’s father also mysteriously dies, leaving Phantasmion King of 
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Palmland. Then, scorpions suddenly sting his friend Dariel to death, and Phantasmion, 
perhaps rightfully so, begins “to think that all persons and things connected with himself 
were doomed to misfortune” (Coleridge 9). He falls into a depression, only recovering 
when he calls on Potentilla to save him. 
Coleridge does not make her meaning explicit, but Phantasmion’s use of fantasy 
models a type of reader-response that gives the text meaning. Phantasmion fears his 
encounter with the physicality of the dead, emphasized by Coleridge’s descriptions of the 
corpses’ “pale swollen cheeks, covered with purple spots,” the “slack limbs and glazed 
eye,” and the “blue tinge” that marks “decay” (6-9). These images provide a stark reality 
for the young hero and reveal his own mortality. In doing so, they also initiate the desire 
for the lost joy of innocent childhood, a time when death was unknown. Coleridge links 
the desire for the supernatural to the desire to escape death. The return to innocence 
through fantasy allows the hero to use the supernatural as a way back to a place of 
comfort, an escape from the realities of aging. Phantasmion models a potential reader-
response, for his encounter with death mirrors a very human struggle with impending 
mortality. Death as a marker of the “real,” the inescapable Fact of life, propels the reader 
into an encounter with fantasy through the desire to escape, even momentarily, into the 
world of the text.66 Phantasmion’s first use of fantasy, for comfort and escapism, enacts 
the reader’s desire for the fantastic experience.  
Because he initially views fantasy only as a place of comfort and escape, 
Phantasmion hides from his new responsibilities as King by playing with the 
supernatural. Potentilla gives him the gift of feet “like those of flies, which climb up the 
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mirrors or walk over the roof,” and he uses his new power to pass the time “gliding along 
the walls and over the vaulted ceilings of his palace” (Coleridge 17; 18).  Here fantasy 
provides consolation by merely giving him entertainment. Yet, the next day, his use of 
the powers turns to a much more meaningful purpose. He accidentally discovers a young 
child that has been stolen by an eagle and rescues it. In doing so, he meets the Princess 
Iarine, whom he will pursue throughout the rest of the novel. But he also sees “companies 
of soldiers clad in mail [exercising] themselves in a mock battle” (Coleridge 23). This 
revelation, seemingly insignificant in the moment, later provides useful knowledge for 
Phantasmion when his counselor disappears. He begins to realize that there are those in 
his kingdom that “wished their youthful sovereign to remain ignorant and careless of all 
that pertained to the government of the realm” (Coleridge 25). 
This episode demonstrates the simultaneous movement of the fantastic experience 
that Coleridge’s text uniquely displays. While fantasy ostensibly provides escape and 
consolation to one who uses it, it can also reveal knowledge and truth that would have 
been impossible to discover without its use. The novel suggests that escapism through 
fantasy can only be temporary. Coleridge implies that fantasy should reveal knowledge, 
and so we see Phantasmion make the transition from using fantasy to avoid his duties to 
using it to enact them.67 Had Potentilla not given Phantasmion feet like flies, he would 
never have been able to scale the mountains and discover the neighboring army preparing 
for battle. And yet, nowhere in the novel does the reader feel the “feet like flies” to be 
anything more than just what they are in the context of the story. Unlike Perrault’s “Puss 
in Boots,” Coleridge never tells the reader that these magical gifts correspond to 
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“industry,” “duty,” or any other allegorical quality. Instead, the reader must decipher any 
moral by watching the progress of Phantasmion’s story, since Coleridge does not embed 
overt instruction within the narrative, appended any lessons to chapters, or create 
allegorical constructions to guide reader interpretation. To produce meaning from the 
text, then, the reader must willingly suspend disbelief in Phantasmion’s experiences and 
read with wonder in the fantastic events the texts depicts. Rather than searching for the 
text’s one “meaning,” or analyzing Phantasmion’s experiences in terms of typical reading 
conventions, readers must submit to Coleridge’s storytelling authority and experience the 
fantastic through Phantasmion’s perspective.  
Traditional fairy tales often clearly define the hero’s path, and readers rarely 
experience doubt about the story’s outcome due to clearly defined roles between “good” 
and “evil” characters. Phantasmion’s journey, however, does not go smoothly. In his 
world, anyone may use fantasy for her own purposes. Thus, a variety of spirits provide 
powers to different humans based on their own motives and allegiances. For example, the 
wicked Queen Maudra asks the fairy Seshelma to help secure her power in the Land of 
Rocks. Seshelma initially refuses. Even though she is also a “bad” character, she does not 
automatically align herself with the other evil characters in the novel. She has her own 
plans and desires. Once she agrees to help the Queen, she does so only within terms that 
benefit herself. The narrative does not make clear whether either (or both) of these 
characters will be successful or will be punished (Coleridge 16). This lack of clarity 
provides narrative suspense about whether or not Phantasmion’s quest will be productive, 
but it also complicates the nature of fantasy for readers. Coleridge’s story does not, then, 
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provide a clear-cut allegorical reading that readers desire, for we cannot align fantasy as 
merely “good” or its lack as “bad.” Rather, characters use it for good or bad depending on 
their changing allegiances and motivations.  
Because Coleridge tries to avoid a didactic tone, audiences assumed the novel had 
no purpose whatsoever. Ironically, both Coleridge and her father suffered the same 
criticisms about the lack of moral to their writing. In an 1830 entry in Table Talk S.T. 
Coleridge records that Anna Barbauld disliked “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” for 
two reasons: “it was improbable, and had no moral” (S.T. Coleridge 91).68 S.T. Coleridge 
agrees that the poem’s probability could be questioned, but he argues that its chief 
problem was rather too much than too little moral. In fact, he regretted “the obtrusion of 
the moral sentiment so openly on the reader as a principle or cause of action in a work of 
such pure imagination” (S.T. Coleridge 91).69 He wished instead that it “had no more 
moral than the Arabian Nights’ tale of the Merchant and the Demon” (S.T. Coleridge 
91).70 Her father’s regrets about the poem may have influenced Sara’s stylistic choices in 
Phantasmion. Low argues that “In writing Phantasmion, Sara Coleridge attempts to 
sidestep the ‘obtrusion of the moral sentiment,’ which, in her father’s eyes, crippled the 
‘Ancient Mariner’” (137). Sara, in the same letter to Derwent quoted above, explains: 
 
Now I fairly admit that [Phantasmion] was written to illustrate no one general 
truth: I thought it sufficient for the soul and individuality of the piece that there 
should be upon the whole a unity of conception and feeling throughout…though 
the story was not written to illustrate one moral in particular…yet there are plenty 
of morals in the several parts of it…but thinking as I do that an ostensible or 
predeterminate moral would quench the spirit of a Fairy tale I cannot wish that I 
had done more in this line. (Qtd. in Low 139-140)71 
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Coleridge purposely avoids a distinct moral in her novel in order to leave room for “the 
spirit of a Fairy tale.” In Coleridge’s version of the fairy tale, the story reveals poetical 
beauty by creating the aesthetic effect of poetry through the fantastic; poetry moves the 
spirit, not just the mind, so the poetical beauty she describes will not manifest 
allegorically. This aesthetic, however, can still be morally productive for readers. Readers 
can still discover “plenty of morals in several parts of it,” but the text itself would not 
force these morals on readers by inhibiting individual interpretation of the text. Rather, 
the novel would resist one interpretation and aim for cultivating readers’ imaginations 
instead.  
The fantastic, however, will still be productive to material reality. The hero does 
not experience fantasy as a dream, which would imply to readers that the fantastic 
remains separate from material reality. Rather, Coleridge’s fantasy allows the hero to 
gain knowledge about the material world that transforms his fortune and perspective (but 
again, in a manner different from a hero like Perrault’s in “Puss in Boots”). In order to 
interpret the fantastic, the reader must recognize that an encounter with fantasy may 
affect his own material reality, even if the text may not indicate how, exactly, this will 
happen. As we will see, Coleridge’s fairy tale depicts how fantasy should awaken the 
reader’s imagination and produce an affect beyond the text in his material world.  
Phantasmion models how fantasy can be used productively when he decides to 
travel through the neighboring countries in disguise, “for the sake of making observations 
relative to war, and still more from a hope of meeting with [Princess Iarine]” (Coleridge 
39). Potentilla grants him the power to travel quickly and cross great distances by leaping 
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like a grasshopper, and the prince sets out on a quest for knowledge and love. He learns 
that the townspeople assume “‘our captains will march up to King Phantasmion’s palace 
next, and see what can be made prize of there’” (Coleridge 31).  Phantasmion, shocked 
by this discovery, retires to the forest to think about what he has heard. He wonders, 
“‘How have I been living like an animal in its winter burrow, wrapped in luxury, without 
hearing or seeing aught of what went on around me?’” (Coleridge 32). He decides to 
pursue his quest for more knowledge, rather than returning home so soon, so that he can 
“‘survey this injurious, this faithless country, as an eagle eyes the flock on which he 
means to descend….[then] I will return to my own kingdom, and be a monarch indeed’” 
(Coleridge 32). His use of the fantastic, through this ability to travel in disguise and 
observe Rockland, causes him to grow and mature in his duty as King of Palmland. His 
newfound awareness of the state of his own kingdom gives him insight into his role as 
King and causes him to begin to use the supernatural in order to produce more wisdom 
and preparation for the future. The fantastic affects the material and gives him an 
advantage as he makes observations about reality. No longer does the fantastic merely 
provide consolation and escapism from that world; instead, it gives him a vantage point 
from which he can more clearly understand his environment. 
Phantasmion’s use of fantasy does not always go exactly as planned, though 
eventually it does provide maturity that he lacked.  He uncovers history about the 
relationship between his own kingdom and neighboring countries, and he returns to 
Palmland in disguise, surprising his court by ascending the throne:  
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Thence he addressed the council, relating all he had learned during his absence 
which concerned the welfare of his country, and appearing no more like him who 
til [sic] then had been called the sovereign of Palmland, than a tree full robed in 
leaf and blossom resembles the same tree ere a bud is unfolded; for he was 
clothed with majesty, and spoke like one who desired and deserved to be a king. 
(Coleridge 132)  
 
 
Though Phantasmion will continue to use supernatural powers in order to achieve his 
goals, his personal transformation is complete, further signaled by the fact that this 
passage closes Volume One of the novel. Though the volume does not close with a moral 
or with distinct instructions for readers, Phantasmion’s use of fantasy to produce 
knowledge and wisdom models a type of fantasy reader. The story still contains a moral, 
then, but the text emphasizes imagination rather than allegorical interpretation. If this 
section contains any explicit moral, it would be that fantasy provides both escapism from 
adult fears and anxieties while it also produces wisdom and maturity when properly used. 
Yet Coleridge forces readers to glean this moral from a close examination of 
Phantasmion’s use of the fantastic, rather than from an obvious commentary. 
Coleridge’s interest in the moral work of fantasy directly connects to the religious 
views she inherited from her father. In writing to Miss Morris in 1848, she explains that 
S.T. Coleridge’s “theory of faith pre-eminently appeals to the heart, to the moral and 
spiritual being. He never supposed that the inspiration of Scripture, a spiritual subject, 
could be known or apprehended by mere intelligence” (Memoir and Letters 339).72 She 
reminds Morris that her father claimed that reason and intelligence help us understand the 
spiritual, and that the spiritual can only “subsist by the co-inherence of the intelligential” 
(Memoir and Letters 339).73 These two sides exist in union, but the spirit must be moved, 
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and with the help of the mind, one can comprehend moral truth.74 Likewise, the moral 
consciousness of readers must be awakened before they can comprehend any truth the 
fantastic tale contains. Therefore, the literary fantasy does not explicitly teach readers or 
transmit allegorical lessons that would be interpreted only by the Reason. Instead, readers 
will encounter fantasy by assuming a childlike perspective of wonder during the tale. 
Rather than reading only for allegorical of didactic interpretive cues, they experience the 
text on a spiritual level, which in turn encourages them to search for the source of 
spiritual pleasure by moving from the spiritual (aesthetic) feelings produced by the text 
into the use of their rational understanding.  
The turn from the fantastic tale to reflection in the material world, also seen at the 
conclusion of “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,” demonstrates the moral power of the 
fantasy tale. The spiritual awakening fantasy causes should produce growth and maturity 
for readers, though not in the same way that an allegory would. Coleridge articulates the 
unity of this movement between perception of the spiritual and use of the intellect in a 
letter to Edward Quillinan late in her life: 
 
What I said to you the other day about the inseparability of faith from 
reason was only an attempt to express a characteristic doctrine of my father’s, 
which has planted itself firmly in my mind. I spoke of reason, not as the faculty of 
reasoning, of reflecting, weighing, judging, comparing, but as the organ of 
spiritual truth, the eye of the mind, which perceives the substantial ideas and 
verities of religion as the bodily eye sees colors and shapes. […] Our saving faith 
consists, I think, in a spiritual beholding, a perception of truth of the highest order 
which purifies the heart, and changes the soul from glory to glory, while it gazes 
on the image of the divine perfections. (Memoir and Letters 460-461, emphasis 
hers)75 
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Later in the same letter, Coleridge compares ways of knowing, both through the rational 
understanding and felt within the spirit. The tenets of the Christian faith, she writes, are 
founded as “doctrines of reason, which may be spiritually discerned.” We learn basic 
moral principles and beliefs about religion, she explains, but in order for these to hold, 
they must be felt within the spirit: 
  
We are early told that the Bible is the Word of God, and believe it implicitly. But 
if we did not find and feel it to be divine, as our minds unfold and we begin to 
inquire and seek a reason for our beliefs, surely this early faith would fall from us 
as the seed-leaves from the growing plant, the husk from the blossom and fruit. 
(Memoir and Letters 460-461, emphasis hers)76 
  
 
Coleridge’s personal belief about the balance between spiritual feeling and rational truth 
influences the way in which she writes her fantasy novel. Where previous fairy tales 
appealed only to the reader’s reason, Coleridge appeals to the reader’s spiritual faculty. In 
doing so, she does not need to provide one, concrete meaning for the tale. For, as she 
understood, “we may perceive truth in a thousand different ways and degrees, but [we] 
can really perceive none at all except by the mirror of heaven within us” (Memoir and 
Letters 512).77 
There is a fine distinction between revealing knowledge and truth for readers 
through fantasy and teaching it directly through allegory, but this difference, though 
slight, is the major characteristic that distinguishes the literary fantasy from other forms 
at use during the Victorian era. An allegorical text rarely asks the reader to suspend 
disbelief in the events described, to transcend the self or to perceive the unity that only 
imagination can display. Coleridge’s combination may allow the reader to learn, so the 
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novel is not merely escapism, yet she leaves that learning to the reader’s ability to 
decipher his encounter with the fantastic. A purely allegorical reading would explicitly 
teach an identifiable, specific moral lesson. 
Even though unrecognized in its own time, Phantasmion anticipates and 
complicates contemporary fantasy theory as Coleridge destabilizes the text on a structural 
level in order to create a novel that resists one meaning. In doing so, she produces reader 
hesitation, not about the source of the fantastic, but about the form her fairy tale takes. I 
find four ways that Coleridge undermines the reader’s search for allegory throughout the 
novel, and these methods also exemplify current fantasy theory about the subversive 
nature of fantastic discourse. First, Coleridge limits our perspective to Phantasmion’s 
throughout much of the novel. Since he often eavesdrops on other characters, this forces 
the reader to know only as much about the narrative action as Phantasmion can learn 
himself. Yet Coleridge also limits readers’ access to Phantasmion’s psychology. In doing 
so, she does not allow Phantasmion to provide readers with an interpretation of the text’s 
meaning that might give closure to the events. On a structural level, Coleridge disrupts 
our reading by including poems within the text, which ask us to interpret them in order to 
understand how they relate to the plot of the novel. Finally, she destabilizes sentence 
structure by shifting verb tenses throughout the novel. These four narrative resistances all 
contribute to readers’ hesitation and force readers to use new interpretive strategies in 
order to glean meaning from the text. These resistances also produce readers’ discomfort 
and likely contribute to the novel’s failure, yet they demonstrate how Coleridge was able 
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to create a novel that abandoned allegory but still relied on the moral power of 
imagination to create meaning. 
Coleridge tells the story in third-person, so we are not bound to Phantasmion’s “I” 
perspective, yet she often limits his position to only what he can discover through the act 
of listening. The reader largely aligns herself with Phantasmion’s perspective and desires 
because the novel primarily unfolds from his point of view. Interestingly, he does not 
always demonstrate those active characteristics usually associated with a hero in quest of 
maturity and purpose. Phantasmion typically exhibits what would be considered 
“feminine” characteristics, for he lacks knowledge about his circumstances, always 
faints, and rarely triumphs on his own. In fact, he receives much of his information about 
other characters and events by listening in secret to other people’s conversations, 
soliloquies, and songs, and he discovers important information by listening to women. 
Throughout the novel he relies heavily on other people to tell him stories or give him 
information in order to guide him. 
Phantasmion, the hero positioned as listener, needs others to move him to action, 
to give him information, and to help him understand his circumstances, and the reader too 
must attempt to decipher the text from this perspective in order to understand it. 
Contemporary theorist of fantasy Tzevtan Todorov identified the presence of the 
fantastique through reader hesitation that seems similar to that which Coleridge creates. 
The fantastique depends on the reader’s hesitation as she interprets a text in which 
appearances of the supernatural occur. As the reader works to uncover the source of the 
supernatural, her uncertainty drives the narrative forward. Thus, the pure fantastique 
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occurs in the moment of ambiguity, doubt, and hesitation experienced by the reader as 
she reacts to a non-realistic text (Todorov 60). Coleridge’s novel, in these terms, would 
primarily be categorized as “marvelous,” rather than fantastique, since the reader never 
questions the presence of the supernatural.78  
Yet the process of reading this novel produces narrative doubt and hesitation 
because Coleridge refuses to provide a completely stable narrative. Coleridge’s resistance 
to allegory changes the reader’s expectations about reading fantasy and actually 
anticipates Todorov’s discussion of why allegory cannot be equated with the presence of 
the fantastique. He explains how allegory negates the fantastique because “If what we 
read describes a supernatural event, yet we take the words not in their literal meaning but 
in another sense which refers to nothing supernatural, there is no longer any space in 
which the fantastique can exist” (63-64). Todorov notes:  
 
Fairy tales, which habitually include supernatural elements, sometimes approach 
fable, [the genre that comes closest to pure allegory]. Here allegorical meaning is 
made explicit to an extreme degree: we find it summarized, in the form of a few 
lines of verse, at the end of each tale. (64)  
 
 
Not all stories state allegory directly, and the fairy tale reader can resist the allegorical 
reading and focus on other aspects of the text. But a story that asks for an allegorical 
reading shuts down a reader’s active participation and may not lead to reflection beyond 
the text. Coleridge transforms the expected use of fantasy because her lack of a direct 
allegory or moral enables her novel to escape generic conventions, which moves it into 
the realm of the fantastique on a formal level, even though the supernatural elements 
remain obvious.  
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This novel challenges Todorov’s definition by producing reader hesitation 
through its form and narrative structure, rather than through the reader’s sense of doubt 
about the text’s supernatural elements. Coleridge complicates Todorov’s model by using 
a limited third-person perspective throughout the novel. Todorov writes, “In stories of the 
fantastique, the narrator habitually says ‘I.’ This is an empirical fact…the exceptions are 
almost always texts which, from several other points of view, withdraw from the 
fantastique” (82).  
When a text uses a narrator that says “I,” Todorov claims, his discourse remains 
outside of the test of truth, but he can lie, which means that the reader can experience 
doubt about the perspective from which the novel unfolds. If a non-represented narrator 
(third person omniscient) were used, any reference to a supernatural event would place 
the text in the realm of the marvelous, where the source of the fantastique is already 
explained. Since, he argues, “the fantastique confronts us with a dilemma: to believe or 
not to believe?” then the first-person narrator must be used because he “most readily 
permits the reader to identify with the character…thus we enter as directly as possible 
into the universe of the fantastic” (84).  
Todorov’s insistence on the reader’s confusion about the source of the 
supernatural as the main component of the fantastique results in a narrow definition that 
can seem to exclude texts like Coleridge’s in which she used third-person limited 
narration. Phantasmion never says “I,” yet Coleridge never intrudes into the narrative and 
rarely presents information outside of his perspective. By limiting the reader’s 
perspective to Phantasmion, Coleridge allows for reader hesitation and doubt – not about 
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the source of the supernatural, but about the reading experience itself as a process of 
encountering a text that resists expectations. Here the fantastique becomes form, rather 
than strictly a form of narrative hesitation, because the textual structure leads to the very 
reader hesitation and ambiguity that Todorov uses to define the pure fantastique. The 
reader must ask, not “to what source does the fantastique belong,” but “in what form am I 
encountering the fantastique”?  
In aligning herself with Phantasmion, the reader relies on the same sources within 
the text to navigate the reading experience of it; she must listen to the songs and stories of 
the women in the text in order to understand it. She must discover events as they unfold 
for Phantasmion before she can understand the connections that exist throughout the 
novel. Despite Todorov’s assumptions, the fantastique does not come only from a first-
person narrator, since the author constructs this narrator in order to limit the reader’s 
perspective. In fact, the author can also construct a third-person limited-perspective hero 
which also forces the reader to decipher the text in an unpredictable way that upsets 
traditional patterns of reading. 
 Coleridge further resists readers when she refuses to give us direct access to all of 
Phantasmion’s thoughts, even within his limited perspective. Often the narration only 
tells readers that “Phantasmion stood motionless, while swift thoughts were passing and 
repassing through his mind” or that “keen thoughts stimulated his mind till [sic] sleep 
suppressed them with imperceptible hand” (Coleridge 41; 79). Fairy tales were rarely 
psychologically complex, but when Coleridge does not allow readers access to 
Phantasmion’s mind, she forces them to become more active interpreters of the 
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information they do receive. Readers cannot rely on Phantasmion to decipher the text’s 
meaning, so they ultimately have to participate actively in the text by uncovering the 
ways it can produce meaning, even when it upsets conventional interpretive strategies.  
In addition to the hesitation she creates by limiting readers’ perspectives, 
Coleridge has Phantasmion eavesdrop on people who sing to themselves, thinking they 
are alone. These songs take the form of poems that Coleridge embeds into the text, and 
the poems often provide insight into characters’ motivations and feelings. But the poems 
also disrupt expected conventions of reading. Though it was not unusual for writers to 
include poems within a longer text, Coleridge forces the reader into the eavesdropping 
position Phantasmion occupies, which produces hesitation and doubt about the story’s 
direction. For example, Phantasmion hears “a soft melancholy voice” and “unable to 
catch a glimpse of the singer” overhears the words of her song: 
 
Tho’ I be young – ah! Well-a-day! 
 I cannot love these opening flowers; 
 For they have each a kindly spray 
 To shelter them from suns and showers; 
 But I may pine, oppressed with grief, 
 Robbed of my dear protecting leaf. 
 
 Since thou art gone, my mother sweet, 
 I weep to see the fledging doves 
 Close nesting in a happy seat, 
 Each beside the breast it loves; 
 While I, uncared for, sink to rest, 
 Far, far from my fond mother’s breast. (Coleridge 33-34) 
 
 
The embedded poem continues for five more stanzas, and readers do not learn who the 
speaker is, or what the song means, until Phantasmion does. The inclusion of this song 
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produces hesitation for readers, who must treat the poem almost like a riddle within the 
text: Who is the “I” of the poem? Who is the “dear protecting leaf?” What happened to 
the speaker’s mother? The poems, then, raise questions for readers and initiate 
interpretation and openness, unlike more allegorical texts that would use rhymes (like 
concluding morals) to simplify meaning for readers. Phantasmion’s limited perspective 
on these embedded songs forces the reader to take an active, inquisitive position as the 
novel unfolds.  
 Finally, Coleridge also disrupts the reader’s expectations through her use of 
shifting verb tenses. The story begins in past tense, but at certain points within the novel 
the narration shifts into present tense. Perhaps Coleridge used this technique in order to 
make the action seem more immediate to readers, so that they moved from being 
observers of to participants in the text. For example, note the shifting verb tenses in the 
passage below, in which Phantasmion (now equipped with legs like grasshoppers, in 
order to leap long distances during his travels) accidentally crashes into a market that 
sells porcelain and destroys some of the merchandise: 
 
The owners all stood aghast while he endeavoured to glide away; but, soon 
recovering from their amazement, the whole crowd bustled after him […]. They 
hem round the prince, the ring grows smaller and smaller; still each man waits for 
his neighbour to seize the mysterious culprit, and ere the circle has closed upon 
him, Phantasmion has sprung away, and, having cleared many a lofty edifice, he 
is now alighting in another quarter of the town. (Coleridge 29-30)  
 
 
The narration then switches back to past tense and the story continues. The shift from 
past to present tense may give readers a literal pause, as they have to re-read sentences 
several times in order to comprehend such a small difference in structure. Yet a reader 
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may not register this subtle change in narration as anything other than a vague feeling 
that something is “off’ or strange during this section. These moments, embedded on the 
structural level, destabilize the reading experience and disrupt the reader’s sense of 
security about how the text functions. Even a minor moment, such as a switch in verb 
tenses, enacts the larger structural complications of Coleridge’s novel. This literary 
fantasy does not allow readers the comfort of consistency. 
The novel resolves with an apparently closed ending. Phantamsion succeeds, and 
he wins Iarine’s love. All mysteries are answered, and the narrative seems to stabilize. 
Yet, judging from the reviews, readers still wanted more meaning than the narrative 
provided. In fact, even though the text seems to end “happily ever after,” just as a 
conventional fairy tale might, the text still resists this simple closure somewhat. In the 
final paragraph, Phantasmion “looked round in momentary dread” (Coleridge 387); he 
fears that Iarine will vanish and that all his experiences will have been a dream. Though 
Coleridge writes that “all he hoped for was not to fade like a dream,” (387, emphasis 
mine), the mention of dread and the introduction of instability into the concluding 
sentence undermines the happy ending the text seems to achieve. In doing so, the text 
maintains narrative closure on a formal level, but it resists simplistic moralism. Readers 
remain unsure about Phantasmion’s future – will everything remain “happily ever after,” 
or will instability return? This instability leaves the narrative in the realm of the 
fantastique, where meaning eludes readers as they cannot discover it through a simple 
allegory. 
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Precisely because it resists generic, rather than narrative closure, Phantasmion: 
Prince of Palmland explodes preconceived notions of what a fairy tale should do for 
readers. The novel has a significant place in the historical development of fantasy 
because it provides a bridge from the poetic philosophy of the willing suspension of 
disbelief articulated by S.T. Coleridge to Victorian novels that would embrace this 
philosophy within more accepted interpretive conventions. This text demonstrates a 
poetic theory in the process of becoming a narrative discourse, before the literary fantasy 
becomes codified by distinctions of fantasy as genre, which would return the fantastic to 
a mode primarily used allegorically. 
Yet, when S.T. Coleridge writes that we should suspend our disbelief “for the 
moment,” this raises the question of how long one can inhabit Fairyland with suspended 
disbelief before the rational necessarily intrudes. How long can we put by the 
conventions we use to decipher a text before we lose interest or become frustrated? At 
what point do the aesthetics of childlike wonder require a recognizable model of reading? 
The public, it seems, did not appreciate a journey into Fairyland that did not include an 
allegory or didactic instructions in what such a journey should mean. Phantasmion 
anticipates the critical problem authors face when they want to disrupt reading 
conventions but still hope to convey meaning through their texts. Unlike later Victorian 
literary fantasies by Lewis Carroll (who provides stability by dispelling fantasy through 
an “it’s all just a dream” conclusion), Phantasmion resists closure. In doing so, it 
sacrifices the audience’s pleasure in favor of structural experimentation. This novel 
engages the problems of interpretation and belief by asking readers to use fantasy 
110 
productively; but in withholding a distinct moral lesson, Phantasmion loses readers, who 
cannot suspend disbelief in a book-length narrative without the guarantee of conclusive 
insight provided by the text.  
Perhaps it can be argued that a novel fails when it cannot be understood because it 
loses any efficacy the author wished to impart. I concede this probability, but I also want 
to propose that reading novels like Phantasmion can be productive. Ideally readers would 
experience textual hesitation and disruption as an aesthetic affect – one that may produce 
pleasure, discomfort, or even both. The feelings produced by the text, even negative ones, 
should initiate interpretive action. Even if readers reacted negatively, they should ask 
why the text resists them and assess their reading strategies, rather than abandoning 
interpretive inquiry altogether. Phantasmion’s contemporary readers missed this moment 
of imaginative participation and self-reflection by rejecting a text they did not recognize.  
Critical examination of texts like Coleridge’s allows us to assess our own reading 
strategies and values and allow us to question our biases for such subjective categories as 
“taste” and what makes a novel “good.” We may return from Fairyland convinced more 
than ever of our preference for more obviously coherent novels, yet encountering the 
fantastic should leave us changed as readers. A novel like Phantasmion challenges us to 
read and interpret in unexpected ways, and in doing so, it provokes us into an interpretive 
action about ourselves as readers and critics.  
This interpretive movement, from fantastic text to reflection about the self in 
material reality, encompasses the philosophy of the experimental literary fantasy novel. 
In my next chapter I explore how George MacDonald enables this movement from text to 
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self by using a confessional model in Phantastes. His novel, also considered a failure by 
readers, continues the experimental nature of the literary fantasy begun by Sara 
Coleridge.  
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CHAPTER V 
WAKING A MEANING 
 
 
 The preference for allegorical fantasy would change drastically in the latter half of 
the Victorian era as writers like Charles Dickens debated the appropriate audience for 
fairy tales and fantasy during the late 1840s and early 1850s. Dickens’s “Frauds on the 
Fairies,” (1853) for example, denounced the moralism of George Cruikshank’s edition of 
didactic stories, and this essay signals a shift in reading preferences for fairy tales (Briggs 
and Butts 138).79 Though fantasy continued to have a moral use, readers’ familiarity with 
literary fantasy meant that authors could begin to parody, satirize, and play with the 
audience’s conventional expectations (Briggs and Butts 139). Hans Christian Andersen’s 
Wonderful Stories (1846), for example, “inaugurated a new era in child literature” by 
targeting children more explicitly, downplaying his tales’ moralism in favor of 
amusement (Briggs and Butts 137). Eric S. Rabkin reminds us that an audience’s 
familiarity with a genre forces authors to push its conventions further in order to provide 
novelty for readers (164-167). This need for novelty, combined with a shift in perceptions 
of childhood introduced during the Romantic era, resulted in the development of new 
interpretive strategies within fantastic texts.80 When Lewis Carroll introduced Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland (1865) to the public, he forever changed the direction of 
fantasy literature through his commercial success. Carroll successfully navigated the 
competing problems of interpretation and belief by expelling fantasy through a dream-
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narrative structure, parodying fantasy’s didactic use through nonsense. Many writers 
would follow Carroll’s example, yet writers who satirize or parody didactic fantasy still 
work within the paradigm that they subvert; in order for audiences to understand and 
appreciate the reversal of conventions, writers draw on those recognizable structures and 
therefore still remain somewhat traditional in their portrayal of the fantastic.  
Perhaps Carroll learned how to create his commercial success by watching the 
failure of his good friend George MacDonald. Carroll’s Alice books appeared seven 
years after MacDonald’s Phantastes (1858) had failed to garner any critical or 
commercial interest. Fantasy was changing during the 1840s and 1850s, but the reading 
public still expected authors to provide clear indications of how to interpret the fantastic. 
Phantastes was MacDonald’s first fantasy work, and he would learn this lesson about 
staying within conventions through the negative reaction the public had to his novel. In 
later publications, like The Light Princess (1864), The Golden Key (1867), and At the 
Back of the North Wind (1871), he successfully employed and subverted recognizable 
conventions like the allegory to create fairy tales that have remained popular into 
contemporary times. With Phantastes, however, he strayed beyond the English tradition, 
drawing on the German Märchen to write an experimental literary fantasy that he hoped 
would affect readers’ moral consciousness through the imagination, much like Sara 
Coleridge’s Phantasmion. In doing so, he rejected the audience’s expectations for a stable 
narrative with clear indications of how the story would cohere. The conventions he used 
in order to disrupt the familiar proved too novel for readers, and the fairy tale received a 
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“savaging by the critics” (Raeper 154).81 Interestingly, they complained about the novel’s 
lack of allegory.82  
Unlike Coleridge’s novel, in which the hero encounters the supernatural as part of 
his everyday reality, MacDonald depicts Fairyland as a separate place into which the hero 
travels. The novel follows a loose plot based on this journey, which begins on the 
morning after the hero’s twenty-first birthday. Anodos receives the keys to his father’s 
desk as a present, and when he opens it and investigates its contents, a fairy-woman 
appears, claiming to be his great-grandmother. She tells him he will go to Fairyland the 
next day. Indeed, when he awakes the following morning, his bedroom begins to 
transform into an outdoor scene: “A stream of clear water was running over the carpet, all 
the length of the room, finding its outlet I knew not where” (MacDonald 9).83 The 
organic patterns on his curtains come to life; ivy covers his dressing table; and then 
Anodos leaves his known reality behind and takes the path to Fairyland. 
Anodos’s adventures unfold in an episodic structure that frustrates readers’ 
desires for a traditional narrative. As William Raeper remarks, “Anodos’ quest is not 
[deliberate]; indeed his path is haphazard and only ever followed intuitively” (148).84 
C.N. Manlove agrees, noting that Anodos begins the novel in a dream-like state, 
wandering without purpose (as his name implies), until the second half of the novel in 
which his “actions emerge from rather more sustained desires and sequences of motive 
and act” (“The Circle of Imagination” 62). Since most readers may be unfamiliar with the 
novel, I will recount some of the most important moments that form the basic narrative 
structure. First, an Ash-tree follows Anodos and represents a source of evil in Fairyland. 
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Next, he encounters a marble woman, whom he awakens by singing, but she flees from 
him and he pursues her throughout much of the novel. Then, a tree spirit called the Alder-
maiden pretends to be the marble woman and seduces Anodos before he enters the 
Church of Darkness and discovers his shadow. This literal figure has a life of its own, but 
it attaches itself to Anodos and everywhere dispels the wonder of the fantastic. Anodos 
next travels to a Fairy Palace and reads fairy stories (which he embeds into the text). He 
briefly finds the marble lady, only to quickly lose her again, which sends him out of the 
Palace and, eventually, to a cottage inhabited by a wise woman. He makes several trips to 
and from her home, battles giants, and eventually is killed when he upsets an idol at a 
religious ceremony. But Anodos continues to live spiritually, even after his physical 
death, and he can see and hear the marble lady as she finds his grave and weeps for him. 
Suddenly he returns to his material reality, only to discover that he has been gone for 
twenty-one days. The story concludes with Anodos’s confusion about his experiences as 
he wonders what his new purpose will be and if he will ever return to Fairyland. 
Throughout the novel Anodos often comments on the difficulty of recounting his 
experiences for readers. In doing so he calls attention to the novel as text by trying to 
transcribe fairy stories and then explaining why he cannot do so sufficiently. The novel 
remains open-ended for readers too, as they work to interpret the narrative’s meaning. 
As I have argued throughout this project, the tension between interpretation and 
belief informs the rhetoric of the nineteenth-century literary fantasy novel. Sara Coleridge 
used Phantasmion to experiment with a non-allegorical fantasy, and MacDonald’s 
Phantastes follows this tradition. Like Coleridge (and unlike Carroll), MacDonald 
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assumes moral work for his fairy tales. He believed fantasy could affect readers through 
the power of imagination, much like his Romantic predecessors.85 MacDonald rejects 
traditional didactic paradigms, however, including the allegory, and he resists the 
alternative interpretive strategies of nonsense and parody which were being developed by 
Dickens, Carroll, and William Makepeace Thackeray. In doing so he hopes Phantastes 
will wake readers’ moral consciousness through the aesthetic tension produced as they 
search for textual meaning. However, MacDonald further complicates the problems of 
interpretation and literary belief when he foregrounds the issue of communication about a 
fantastic experience through the arbitrary system of language. Anodos struggles to 
explain his experiences in Fairyland, implicitly investigating how a writer can 
communicate truth in the unreal. How can a writer induce belief in a fantastic text, the 
novel asks, if the events of the text are mimetically untrue and language itself cannot be 
perceived as real within the material world?  
The rhetorical nature of fantasy has been part of its appeal for many writers. 
Carroll, for example, called attention to the playfulness and arbitrary nature of language 
in his Alice books, just as Edward Lear had delighted readers with his nonsense poetry (A 
Book of Nonsense 1846). But MacDonald uses Phantastes to pose a problem for readers 
as he exposes the incommunicable relationship between text and reader through 
Anodos’s journey into Fairyland. The hero’s inability to articulate his experiences, 
contrasted with his need to tell, anticipates contemporary analysis in rhetorical theory in 
which communication may break down between reader and writer as mediated by the 
text. Additionally, the writer cannot communicate one, objective meaning, when 
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language can yield a variety of meanings, a problem further complicated when he 
introduces supernatural events that must be described using a linguistic system meant to 
depict the material. Yet MacDonald does not despair of the plurality produced by 
language. Instead, he hopes to “wake a meaning” in readers through Anodos’s 
experiences, even if the meaning of the text shifts from reader to reader. This goal aligns 
him with Coleridge’s interpretive experiments in Phantasmion and distinguishes 
Phantastes from more traditional Victorian literary fantasies. 
Phantastes’s complexity has continued to puzzle both readers and critics who 
attempt to unravel its symbols and rambling plot in pursuit of an elusive, underlying 
meaning. Readers may struggle when they try to make sense of its complex symbolism, 
even if they suspend disbelief in the hero’s supernatural encounters. As Raeper explains, 
“A novel tells a story about certain characters in given situations, but Phantastes has no 
such comforting stability; there is merely a series of encounters, as in a night of dreams, 
and the question lingers – what does it all mean?” (145). Stephen Prickett, Manlove, and 
Adrian Gunther decipher the text by explaining the generic and historical influences on 
MacDonald’s Phantastes. Their criticism often includes an analysis of the novel’s 
narrative structure, yet they overlook the way MacDonald confronts the problem of 
interpretation and belief through the specifically confessional relationship of the 
narrator/author Anodos to his readers.  
I argue that MacDonald has Anodos write the text using a confessional mode in 
order to elicit readers’ belief in the text and to involve the reader in self-examination 
initiated by interpretive desire. Though Sara Coleridge also experimented with using 
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fantasy to awaken readers’ moral consciousness, MacDonald’s novel differs in its 
narrative perspective and its treatment of Fairyland as a place separate from the material 
world. First, and most importantly, Anodos narrates his adventures, but we learn that he 
also writes the text we read. 86 This narrative perspective enables MacDonald to privilege 
the subjective nature of language and the problems of literary belief as Anodos tries to 
explain his experiences to readers who will automatically be skeptical about his journey 
since it contains supernatural elements. Through the confessional mode, MacDonald can 
still abandon obvious allegory and didacticism as Coleridge did, but he also solves the 
problem of literary belief and interpretation in a less traditional manner than later satires, 
parodies, or even his own more allegorical texts.  
Additionally, MacDonald depicts Fairyland as separate from the material world. 
Many Victorian fantasies employ this motif to further distinguish the way fantasy and 
nonsense differ from the real, yet MacDonald’s Fairyland still exists as part of the 
material, for Anodos does not dream it, as Alice does. The fact the Fairyland exists, that 
Anodos literally goes there and returns to recount his experiences, places the reader in the 
position of one who can confirm or deny Anodos’s truth through the text. The tension 
between literary belief in the text and Anodos’s bizarre encounters undermine the text as 
a source of authority, which in turn pushes readers beyond the text in their search for 
meaning. MacDonald does not need to mock reading conventions or dispel the power of 
fantasy through a dream-structure; rather, the novel demonstrates that the fantastic 
remains a powerful, transformative force that affects readers’ moral consciousness, even 
in the moment of undermining its own textual stability. The complexity of the novel, 
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including its open-endedness, its meta-textuality, and MacDonald’s theological interests 
all cohere through his use of a confessional narrative.  
I believe MacDonald consciously constructed Phantastes to reflect his ideas about 
the transformative potential of fantasy. In an essay called “The Fantastic Imagination,” he 
describes how fairy tales can be meaningful for readers. He argues that a true work of art 
need not “convey a meaning” so much as “wake a meaning,” and therefore a true fairy 
tale “is not an allegory,” for “He must be an artist indeed who can, in any mode, produce 
a strict allegory that is not a weariness to the spirit” (67).87 We hear echoes of Sara 
Coleridge here, in that a fairy tale does not teach through obvious didacticism but reveals 
imaginative truth through the process of story, waking a meaning by enabling the reader 
to think things for himself. Similarly, MacDonald acknowledges that fantasy cannot 
convey absolute or objective truth. “Everyone, however, who feels the story,” he writes, 
“will read its meaning after his own nature and development: one man will read one 
meaning in it, another will read another” (66). It does not trouble MacDonald that readers 
may misunderstand a tale or not agree about its meaning, for “it may be better that you 
should read your meaning into it. That may be a higher operation of your intellect than, 
the mere reading of mine out of it: your meaning may be superior to mine” (66). 
MacDonald concludes: 
 
If a writer’s aim be logical conviction, he must spare no logical pains, not merely 
to be understood, but to escape being misunderstood; where his object is to move 
by suggestion, to cause to imagine, then let him assail the soul of his reader as the 
wind assails an Aeolian harp. (69) 
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He calls Phantastes a fairy tale, and under this definition we understand that the novel 
will not provide a logical interpretive structure, since he does not fear 
misunderstanding.88 Anodos’s confession functions as a model of spiritual development 
and belief, but it only demonstrates how one person responds to the fantastic experience. 
The reader’s encounter provides the impetus for her own journey into “the fairyland of 
the soul”; thus, the novel is not a blueprint for spiritual development but merely the 
catalyst for interpretation. 
 MacDonald’s reference to the Aeolian harp recalls his Romantic predecessors, 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth, who both had an enormous influence 
on his literary and religious philosophies (Raeper 241).89 Coleridge, in particular, 
influenced MacDonald’s conception of the spiritual work accomplished by literature. 
MacDonald admired Coleridge as one “who combined philosophy, poetry and theology 
drawing on the ancient tradition that stemmed from Plato and Plotinus,” and Raeper 
describes MacDonald as Coleridge’s “devoted disciple” because of his interest in the 
latter’s theory of the imagination (110-111). Coleridge believed that “the soul was 
forever developing and grasping after spiritual truth,” that “there was a transcendent 
element in nature which found a living response in the heart of every man whether he was 
a believer or not” (Raeper 238). This theological perspective led Coleridge to the idea 
that “two things apparently contradictory, even opposite, could be simultaneously true,” 
as in metaphor, in poetry, and, for MacDonald, in fantasy literature that depicted unreal 
events that seemed to contradict the material but could still reveal spiritual truth (Raeper 
239). Raeper notes that MacDonald “eschewed any defined theological system” and 
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believed, rather, that followers should have “an intuitive response to God and Christ” that 
emerged through a “quickening” of their spirits as they read the Bible and looked to 
nature (242).90 This theology directly influenced MacDonald’s literary goals, for he felt 
that God was immanent (in all of creation), which meant that “literature outside of the 
Bible was in some profound way Christian” (Raeper 244). MacDonald thought that when 
people enjoyed literature, including his work, they did so because they responded to its 
implicit spiritual truth, even if the work did not contain overt moralism (Raeper 244). 
Thus, in a text like Phantastes, readers could disagree about the meaning of the novel as a 
whole. Anodos may not provide closure for his experiences, but the confessional rhetoric 
he adopts could urge readers into spiritual interpretive action, even when the text never 
cohered. 
I believe the key to affecting the reader, the key to creating belief in the text 
necessary to waking a reader’s consciousness, lies in Anodos’s confession as he writes 
the text. Anodos reconstructs his narrative to help readers interpret it, just as he had to 
interpret the actual experiences as they occurred. The confessional tone Anodos adopts 
functions rhetorically to draw the reader into his fantastic exploration. In doing so, the 
text forces the reader into a similar self-examination, giving the novel a moral function 
even though it evades overt didacticism or claims to absolute truth. This self-
development, however, can only occur through the reader’s belief in Anodos’s 
experiences, which include the fantastic. MacDonald uses the confessional mode to 
alleviate the problem of belief and interpretation for readers as they encounter a spiritual 
confession that relies on fantasy instead of mimesis. 
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Though we most often think of confession in terms of guilt, whether one 
confesses to a judge or to a priest, Terrence Doody explains that confession does not 
involve guilt so much as the need to understand the self: “most of the confessions in 
literature and in life,” he claims, “come from an individual who must confess himself, not 
because he has done anything wrong, but simply because he no longer understands 
himself fully and has to talk himself out” (21).91 Importantly, Doody believes the rhetoric 
of confession in novels draws the reader into an act of community; when the reader 
finishes the text, she will see herself in a new way based on the confession she has heard 
(36).  
Confessional narratives involve the reader in the text through the narrator’s use of 
the power of disclosure: by claiming that he will relate secret knowledge through his 
confession, the narrator can set the reader to work in an act of interpretation driven by the 
need to uncover the secret or to hear the confession out to its conclusion (Foster 2-3). 
Dennis A. Foster best explains the relationship between confesser, reader, and the text 
when he argues that confession engenders interpretation. “By calling on the listeners’ 
need to understand,” he writes, “[confessional narratives] evoke in them a sense of loss 
that is experienced as a desire for truth” (3). Foster distinguishes between a ritual 
confession, in which the confesser merely relates a conventional pattern of sin and 
redemption, and book-length confessional narratives, in which convention cannot contain 
the breadth of the speaker/writer’s experiences. The longer narratives, Foster claims, “say 
the truth is hard to tell and you must work to understand” (3). In this case, confession 
induces belief in the listener/reader that the confession itself contains some unexpressed 
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truth that must be discovered through interpretation (Foster 11). This need to uncover the 
truth drives the narrative forward, but engagement with the narrator in his attempt to 
depict the self in language puts the listener/reader in a complicated position, one, in fact, 
that Samuel Taylor Coleridge had explored in “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.” 
Perhaps MacDonald’s interest in the confessional narrator arose from his study of 
Coleridge’s “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”; Raeper claims MacDonald was 
“obsessed” with the poem (111). Phantastes and “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” do 
seem to share a similar narrative perspective, though they differ in that MacDonald 
removes the frame of the Wedding Guest and instead has Anodos recount his 
supernatural tale directly to readers. Like the Ancient Mariner, Anodos does not give 
readers an overt moral or provide closure to his experiences, nor does his confession 
seem to alleviate his need to understand his supernatural encounter. But by placing the 
reader in the position that Coleridge’s Wedding Guest occupied, MacDonald forces 
readers to experience the supernatural tale and to attempt an interpretation of Anodos’s 
adventures. Anodos’s need to tell, combined with the rhetorical problems of language’s 
inability to accurately convey the fantastic, foregrounds the interpretive paradoxes that 
Coleridge’s poem also creates. MacDonald’s novel, however, destabilizes the reader by 
placing her in an interesting position as she listens to Anodos’s confession; like the 
Wedding Guest, she must assume a child-like faith in the narrative by willingly 
suspending disbelief.  
One who listens to a confession must navigate the tension between the desire to 
produce meaning from the confession she hears and the challenges to rationality a 
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confession, especially one that uses the fantastic, will present to her rationality (Foster 5). 
In the same way that a fantasy reader must suspend disbelief in the fantastic, in order to 
perceive any truth the story (or poem) may present, so too must the reader of a confession 
willingly submit to the confesser’s rhetoric in order to engage in interpretation. When she 
believes with childlike wonder, then, the reader allows the confesser a position of 
storytelling authority; however, the authority claimed by confession’s rhetoric does not 
always result in persuasion to the speaker’s point of view. 
Doody identifies confession’s rhetorical problem as the narrator’s need for 
community. He explains that confession and community are irrevocably linked, and the 
confesser’s desire for acceptance from the community also defines the way in which he 
confesses: confession cannot but be a self-conscious act designed to evoke a particular 
response in the listener/reader (10).92  According to Doody we often overlook the rhetoric 
of confession because “our immediate appetite is for information rather than form” (16).  
Because any confession occurs through language, the act of confession (like any 
act of communication) is fraught with the problem of interpretation and belief. Doody 
solves this problem by arguing that confession relies on the speaker’s desire to persuade 
the listener in order to receive acceptance. Foster, however, explains, “The issue is not 
persuasion, for there is no urging of a position; it is seduction” (4). He continues, “The 
writer and reader meet in a discourse, less in a generous desire to share than in 
contention: the writer attempting to perpetuate his discourse, the reader attempting to 
appropriate it to his own uses” (4). Foster’s argument relies on the tension between the 
reader’s desire for meaning through interpretation and the writer’s challenge to the 
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reader’s rationality (5). This conflict, I have argued, is also central to the literary fantasy 
novel. 
 Though MacDonald may not have intended to model Phantastes on a 
confessional narrative, the parallels allow us to observe how the novel’s rhetoric aligns 
with MacDonald’s definition of the spiritual work a fairy tale should do. Foster’s 
explanation of how confession functions will help expose Phantastes’s mode. Foster 
claims that confessional narrators desire self-representation in language in order to purge 
themselves of a sin or crisis they have experienced. In doing so, they seek a return to 
innocence or self-understanding. Using the work of Paul Ricoeur, Foster explains how 
the confesser tries to return to innocence but in doing so must “re-enact in the language of 
confession the loss he feels”; essentially, he must re-experience his sin or crisis, speaking 
of the disunity of the self in his search for unity (Foster 16). The listener/reader follows 
this re-enactment through her need to understand the narrator’s crisis, but in doing so, she 
“experiences herself the alienation motivating the speaker, and thereby [is] thrust onto 
confession’s long detour back to a primal state of innocence” (Foster 17). The 
listener/reader, then, embarks on her own journey into the self. MacDonald’s use of this 
mode allows his readers to engage with the text as they seek interpretation of Anodos’s 
confession. But, ideally, the text will not produce meaning, which will encourage readers 
to seek meaning beyond the text.  
The confessional mode can be broken down into three stages, all of which occur 
in Phantastes.93 In the first stage, before the narrative is written or the confession 
undertaken, the speaker experiences a crisis or sin. This moment produces the need for 
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confession. In Phantastes, Anodos experiences a crisis at the beginning of the text when 
his “grandmother” appears to him and tells him he will soon go to Fairyland. Anodos 
claims “my surprise was by no means of so overpowering a degree as such an apparition 
might naturally be expected to excite,” but as he interacts with the fairy woman, he 
experiences confusion (MacDonald 4-5). He is “drawn towards her by an attraction 
irresistible as incomprehensible,” and when he looks into her eyes, he experiences “an 
unknown longing” (MacDonald 6; 7). This new knowledge of an alternate world disrupts 
Anodos’s stable sense of self and his understanding of reality. Anodos, of course, tells 
readers of this moment in retrospect through the writing of his confessional narrative, but 
his expressions of confusion and surprise depicted within the text indicate that his 
grandmother’s revelations have upset his traditional ways of knowing the world. Later, 
the novel ends with little closure for Anodos, who cannot understand completely why he 
went to Fairyland or what he should learn from his visit. His interaction with the 
supernatural has disrupted his stable sense of self. He claims, “Even yet, I often find 
myself looking round sometimes with anxiety” and “I have a strange feeling sometimes, 
that I am a ghost, sent into this world to minister to my fellow-men, or, rather, to repair 
the wrongs I have already done” (MacDonald 321). This crisis of the self provides the 
need to write a confessional narrative in order to make sense of his experiences, and the 
novel’s text ostensibly acts as evidence of this confessional drive. 
 Anodos’s confusion about his experiences, the characters he meets, and the 
purpose of his journey mirror the confessional narrative that retraces the self’s 
disconnection from reality in order to attempt a return to the original state of innocence or 
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self-unity. This is the second stage of the confessional narrative, in which the speaker re-
experiences his original crisis through the telling of the confession in order to overcome 
the confusion the event has caused. Anodos attempts to find the self-unity he lost through 
the re-creation of his adventures as a written text, but re-tracing his experiences only 
emphasizes the self-crisis that initiated his need to tell. In the novel’s beginning, for 
example, Anodos tells readers that he “felt some anxiety as to how I should fare among 
the elves and other children of the night who wake when mortals dream,” and he 
repeatedly describes himself as anxious and fearful throughout his time in Fairyland 
(MacDonald 14). Fairyland continually undermines his position as a rational adult, 
destabilizing his traditional ways of knowing and interpreting his experiences. As he 
journeys, followed by the Ash tree, he cannot convey to readers his feelings about his 
experiences. He frequently uses negative phrases, to emphasize his lack of knowledge 
and understanding, phrases like “What I feared I could not tell” and “in a state of vaguest 
uncertainty” and claims he feels only horror and a “vague though powerful fear” 
(MacDonald 40). Anodos needs to tell readers about his experiences in order to 
contextualize them and try to interpret their meaning. But language cannot contain the 
fantastic, and the problems of language as a system undermine his communicative 
desires. Anodos calls attention to this issue, and it becomes a theme throughout the novel, 
emphasizing the novel’s connection to its confessional mode. When he tries to describe 
the Ash tree, for example, he writes:  
 
Just as one cannot translate a horrible odour, or a ghastly pain, or a fearful sound, 
into words, so I cannot describe this new form of awful hideousness. I can only 
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try to describe something that is not it, but seems somewhat parallel to it; or at 
least suggested by it. (MacDonald 43)  
 
 
Later, when he tries to write down the things he reads in the Fairy Palace, in order to help 
readers (and himself) understand how Fairyland functions, he cannot accurately recreate 
either the texts or his adventures.  In reliving the disunity of his experiences, Anodos can 
reach no truth, and thus he also can not provide any meaning or conclusions for readers. 
His re-telling merely repeats the confusion and disunity he initially experienced.  
Yet, the final stage of confession may be productive, for the reader if not the 
speaker. In the third stage, confession fails to cohere, moving the listener/reader beyond 
the initial confession (in this case, the text) to self-examination. Through the need to 
understand the speaker, the story draws the listener in as she seeks an interpretation of the 
experiences she reads. MacDonald has Anodos initiate this movement from text to self by 
destabilizing the reading experience. In his confession Anodos expresses desire for more 
than material reality can reveal. “Why are all reflections lovelier than what we call the 
reality?” Anodos asks his readers. He continues: 
 
All mirrors are magic mirrors. The commonest room is a room in a poem when I 
turn to the glass….In whatever way it may be accounted for, of one thing we may 
be sure, that this feeling is no cheat; for there is no cheating in nature and the 
simple unsought feelings of the soul. There must be truth involved in it, though 
we may but in part lay hold of the meaning…. (MacDonald 83) 
 
 
In Fairyland Anodos realizes that mirrors do not reflect the real, a traditionally mimetic 
use. Instead, they reveal a new perspective on the material, transforming the world. In 
realistic literature, the writer uses language to “reflect” reality and often figures the text 
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as a mirror. Anodos invokes this interpretive context, only to subvert it by transforming 
the test of truth into a supernatural lens, one that defies a stable, realistic perspective. The 
text, written in language, should reflect the material, but this new type of mirror, the 
fantasy text, will not provide such stability, even though “there must be truth involved in 
it.” Language cannot ultimately represent the transcendent longing key to a real journey 
of the soul. Anodos confession will not provide the closure he desires, then, but as the 
text fails, the reader should be drawn beyond it, transcending it at the moment she can no 
longer rationally interpret it.  
To summarize, then, the reader of Anodos’s confession in Phantastes will 
(ideally) attempt to understand his experiences and try to make sense of all the random 
events, characters, and complex symbols he depicts. Since his adventures contain 
supernatural events, she must willingly suspend disbelief in order to interpret the 
narrative. The need to interpret forces the reader to experience the speaker’s disunity in 
herself; she desires to understand Anodos’s confession and cannot do so, because he 
cannot explain his experiences accurately in language. The narrative remains open-ended, 
and as the text fails, the reader’s interpretive desire shifts from the text toward self-
examination beyond the confession she originally read. Her inability to determine a 
definite meaning results in (again, ideally), her own exploration of the self.94  
The narrative movement from the confessional cycle creates the equivalent 
aesthetic effect of the fantastique that I have discussed in previous chapters. Anodos’s 
confession simultaneously evokes and frustrates the reader’s literary belief. Readers may 
experience pleasure or desire through Anodos’s descriptions through the way the 
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confessional rhetoric persuades them into interpretive community. But, as Anodos 
laments, he cannot reproduce his supernatural experiences, and this leads to his own 
frustration – as well as his readers. The tension between literary belief, desire, and 
frustrated interpretive inquiry manifest as an aesthetic moment of open-endedness (the 
fantastique) that, ideally, draws the reader beyond the text into inquiry about the material 
world. 
The confessional mode, then, enables MacDonald, through Anodos, to involve the 
reader in a complex interaction with a text that encourages interpretation and belief. Yet 
readers may miss this rhetorical cue to move from text to self without the guidance of the 
confesser. Doody explains that writers of confessional narratives often use themselves as 
models for readers, since they realize the potential to affect the reader through this cycle 
of confession, interpretation, and belief (14). In this case, Anodos as “writer” and hero 
becomes very important to the overall structure of the novel. As confessional writer, he 
will also model himself as an active reader in order to demonstrate for readers how to 
interpret the confession productively. 
Anodos’s confession encourages a move from text to self through the way the text 
points to the limitations of language. Gunther explains how Anodos repeatedly represents 
“trance-like insights into other times and other places [that] are always conveyed in terms 
of a direct experience defying expression in language” (“The Multiple Realms” 179). 
Anodos acts as a model for the reader through his constant reference to reading and 
through his comparisons of his experiences to other books. Each chapter contains 
quotations and references to other works of literature, calling attention to its construction 
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as text, which in turn asks the reader to engage with the text in an act of interpretation.95 
Unlike genre fantasy or traditional fairy tales, which provide escape through repetition 
and predictably anticipated narrative structures (closed forms that do not disrupt the 
reading experience),96 Phantastes engages the audience by modeling the hero as an active 
reader who leads actual readers through the text without giving them a final, overt 
explanation of what to do or how to act after the reading experience ends (thus, the open-
ended nature of the novel, which I will discuss at length below).  
Prickett claims that the variety of quotations used to open each chapter create a 
text both “meta-fictional and intertextual in its mode of operation” (“Fictions and 
Metafictions” 113). For Prickett, these epigraphs function as a way for MacDonald (and 
not Anodos) to create textual unity that leads readers to an awareness of its allegorical 
quality. Because I define an allegory as a closed form that does not typically involve the 
reader in active interpretation, I think, rather, that these epigraphs emphasize Anodos’s 
awareness of his text’s need for an interpretive context. Rather than direct the reader in an 
allegorical response, then, the epigraphs actually cause tension in the reader as she 
engages with Anodos’s tale, for his use of them acts as a claim to legitimacy for his 
experiences. His awareness of literary history and convention implies that he constructs 
his text to fall in line with this tradition and that he understands his audience’s 
expectations, even if the majority of his experiences will not cohere in a traditional 
manner. 
Anodos, as writer and confesser, tells his story in first-person and often depicts 
himself as a reader, mirroring the actual reader’s role in responding to the fantastic. 
134 
Interestingly, Manlove claims that Anodos’s ultimate journey is “one into the interior, to 
discover some hint of the root of his true being” (“The Circle of Imagination” 74). In fact, 
Anodos’s first real act in Fairyland is to read a book of fairy tales. After wandering 
through the woods in which he finds himself upon entering Fairyland, he discovers a 
cottage. He discusses the nature of Fairyland with the residents, and then he spends hours 
sitting in the cottage reading fairy tales. Traditionally, a hero would not begin his journey 
in a strange land with an afternoon of reading, as this passivity would seem to negate any 
active characteristics we typically associate with the protagonist of a novel. Yet Anodos’s 
reading actually informs nearly all his activity in Fairyland, and his knowledge of books 
and story conventions affect his ability to understand his experiences. In depicting 
himself as a reader, he enacts the very activity of his own readers, who can then view 
their own action of reading as a dynamic and important act regardless of the variety of 
meanings stories may produce. 
Anodos, as “author” of Phantastes, acts as a guide to readers, both through his 
experiences and as a model reader of the fantastic text. Importantly, Gunther notes, 
“MacDonald believed [that] all great artists function as spiritual guides helping us to 
break through barriers [to comprehending transcendent Truth], to experience deeper and 
deeper levels of meaning [in the text]” (“The Structure” 54).97 By depicting himself 
primarily as a reader, Anodos anticipates his own audience’s role in reading his 
confession. He models the reader in his use of epigraphs, his self-conscious references to 
fairy tales and genre, and to scenes in which he reads and reacts to fantastic texts. This 
allows actual readers to engage in the interpretive act of reading that will ideally produce 
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spiritual growth. As the reader listens to Anodos’s confession and watches him model a 
type of readership, she may feel a spiritual longing for truth and thus transcend the text in 
her search for meaning.98 
 As lack of critical consensus about the text proves, the meta-textual references 
and inter-textual clues do not provide unity, in terms of clarifying the text’s meaning, but 
noticing the confessional mode of the novel begins to solve some of the interpretive 
paradoxes produced by the meta- and inter- textual parts of the narrative. The meta-
textual nature of Anodos’s confession, for example, allows MacDonald to navigate that 
crucial tension of the fantastic text – how to create an innovative, complex work that 
draws on fairy tale conventions while also providing a way to encourage interpretation of 
a text with which readers will be frustrated, confused, and certainly unfamiliar. 
MacDonald seems to explain this problem through Anodos, when the latter decides to 
reproduce for his readers one of the stories he reads while in the Fairy Palace.99 First, 
Anodos describes his own reading experiences: “Mine was the whole story,” he writes, 
“for I took the place of the character who was most like myself, and his story was mine; 
until…I would awake, with a sudden bewilderment…and find I joyed or sorrowed only in 
a book” (MacDonald 95). Then, he attempts to recreate one of these stories for readers, 
but he acknowledges the difficulty of doing so:  
 
It is like trying to reconstruct a forest out of broken branches and withered leaves. 
In the fairy book, everything was just as it should be, though whether in words or 
something else, I cannot tell. It glowed and flashed the thoughts upon the soul, 
with such a power that the medium disappeared from the consciousness, and it 
was occupied only with the things themselves….Of course, while I read it, I was 
Cosmo, and his history was mine. Yet, all the time, I seemed to have a kind of 
double consciousness, and the story a double meaning. (MacDonald 106) 
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Anodos does not mean to imply that the story is allegorical when he claims it has a 
double meaning. Rather, as he explains in the next paragraph, he believes the fairy story 
reveals connections between Fairyland and his own reality that would otherwise be 
unknown. This connection between the material and the supernatural aligns with 
MacDonald’s theological interests and his philosophy about the spiritual potential of 
fantasy literature. 
 Interestingly, especially in light of his later, more successful fairy tales, 
MacDonald also agreed with Romantics on the importance of the child’s perspective, 
particularly childlike wonder. “Childhood,” Raeper writes, “was an important symbol 
[for MacDonald] in theological terms as well as emotional and poetic” (305). MacDonald 
explained that he did “not write for children, but for the childlike, whether of five, or 
fifty, or seventy-five” (“The Fantastic Imagination” 67). As readers respond to fantasy 
with childlike wonder and belief, they may perceive spiritual truth within the text. I have 
noted in earlier chapters the importance of childlike belief and wonder in suspending 
disbelief in the fantastic, in order for readers to perceive fully the non-objective meaning 
the text may convey. In the same way Phantastes encompasses these Romantic ideas by 
deploying a confessional mode in which Anodos must take on the position of a child, 
even as he struggles to understand the way in which his journey into Fairyland may 
change his adult perspective. 
Significantly, in light of MacDonald’s Romantic influences, Anodos’s response to 
Fairyland after he reads evokes the wonder of a child who believes his experiences will 
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produce meaning, even when he does not understand them initially. He frames his own 
narrative in the context of an unfolding story, with his “unfinished story urging him on” 
(MacDonald 37). Yet, he depicts himself not as an active hero with a focused purpose, 
but as one who begins to accept his fantastic experiences in the same way that a child 
accepts a fairy tale. “It is no use trying to account for things in Fairy Land,” he tells 
readers, “and one who travels there soon learns to forget the very idea of doing so, and 
takes everything as it comes; like a child, who, being in a chronic condition of wonder, is 
surprised at nothing” (MacDonald 37). Anodos’s journey moves him away from the 
world of adult rationalism as he embraces a childlike perspective of belief in the fantastic. 
In doing so, he also hints at a type of reader for the literary fantasy novel. Anodos shows 
that the reader should accept the fantastic with the belief and wonder of a childlike 
perspective, which will enable the reader to follow and experience an inward 
transformation.100  
 The emphasis on the hero (and by proxy, the reader) as a child runs throughout 
the novel. Though the text begins on the morning after Anodos’s twenty-first birthday, 
which marks his transition into adulthood, his passage into Fairyland seems to undo any 
emphasis on the developing adult. Instead, the people of Fairyland typically refer to him 
as a boy, a youth, a baby, and a child.101 At one point “a kind-looking, matronly woman” 
calls him a boy, and Anodos writes, “I should have ill endured, the day before, to be 
called boy; but now the motherly kindness of the word went to my heart; and, like a boy 
indeed, I burst into tears” (MacDonald 58).  
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Significantly, the scene that follows introduces the “rational adult” figure of the 
woman’s husband, a farmer, who laughs at his wife’s belief in fairy tales. Anodos begins 
to doubt his experiences in Fairyland through the farmer’s influence, for the sound of his 
voice and the grasp of his hand “produced such a reaction in me, that, for a moment, I 
could barely believe that there was a Fairy Land” (MacDonald 60). Yet, as soon as 
Anodos sees a young girl sitting in the corner, reading a book, he believes again 
(MacDonald 61). The contrast between the adult and the child, between their corollaries 
of rationalism and imagination, present alternative patterns of readership for Anodos’s 
audience.  
Anodos next depicts a conversation between himself and the farmer, which 
demonstrates the importance of the childlike perspective while encountering the fantastic. 
The farmer and Anodos discuss whether or not to believe in the fantastic, and when 
Anodos downplays his own recent excursions, the farmer significantly calls him a 
“sensible man” (MacDonald 61, emphasis mine). The farmer explains that his wife 
“believes every fairy-tale that ever was written,” and when Anodos asks why he cannot 
“treat her belief with something of respect, though you cannot share in it,” the farmer 
replies: “Yes, that is all very well in theory; but when you come to live every day in the 
midst of absurdity, it is far less easy to behave respectfully to it” (MacDonald 60-61). 
The perspective shakes Anodos’s belief in his own experiences, and he only regains some 
conviction about the truth of his adventures by talking to the young girl and going to her 
room to look out her window onto Fairyland. The child’s alignment with belief in the 
fantastic, with the reading of fairy tales, and with reading as activity underscores the type 
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of reader Anodos himself models. Though he is tempted toward adult rationalism, the 
hero must follow the correct path back toward childlike faith and wonder. As Manlove 
notes, “[MacDonald] was absolute and uncompromising in his rejection of rationalist or 
empiricist approaches to the world and in his advocacy of the unconscious imagination as 
the source of truth” (“The Circle of Imagination” 55).102 Anodos’s actions direct 
MacDonald’s readers to undertake their own inward journey, rejecting the adult 
perspective and to become readers that “take everything as it comes; like a child, who, 
being in a chronic condition of wonder, is surprised at nothing” (MacDonald 27).103  
Read meta-textually, Anodos clearly indicates to readers that his own story should 
reveal connections between Fairyland and their reality which will become apparent 
through the process of reading. Gunther explains how “Initially, Anodos does remind us 
at key points that he is in ‘the Fairy-country’ and that things are different there, although 
many of these comments tend to have ironic undertones suggesting that actually it is not 
so different” (“The Structure” 47, emphasis his). This blending of fantasy and reality 
functions as a way to point to the purpose of the text and to guide readers in an 
interpretation of what they, too, should begin to notice during their own reading 
experiences. For example, as he describes the fairy story of Cosmos to readers, Anodos, 
in the voice of Cosmos, writes: 
 
But is it not rather that art rescues nature from the weary and sated regards of our 
senses, and the degrading injustice of our anxious everyday life, and, appealing to 
the imagination, which dwells apart, reveals Nature in some degree as she really 
is, and as she represents herself to the eye of the child, whose everyday life, 
fearless and unambitious, meets the true import of the wonder-teeming world 
around him, and rejoices therein without questioning? (MacDonald 113) 
 
140 
 
Here we read the most explicit meta-textual comment yet on the purpose and goal of a 
literary fantasy. Through the use of imagination, the fantastic text reveals truth about our 
own reality that we would not recognize through a traditional mimetic depiction. Thus, 
MacDonald implies, our reading experience should position us as children in our wonder 
and amazement at the fantastic occurrences depicted, but our reading should also enable 
us to transcend the text through our rediscovery of imaginative truths analogous to our 
own experiences in reality. Anodos acts as our spiritual guide in order to demonstrate the 
way to read a fantastic text that clearly anticipated its own complex problems of reading.  
 Most confessional narratives remain open-ended because the writer cannot 
resolve his experiences by re-telling (and thus re-experiencing) them. In the same way, 
when Anodos returns home, he first feels insecure about what he has experienced in 
Fairyland. He asks,  
 
Could I translate the experience of my travels into common life? This was the 
question. Or must I live it all over again, and learn it all over again, in the other 
forms that belong to the world of men, whose experience yet runs parallel to that 
of Fairy Land? These questions I cannot yet answer. But I fear. (MacDonald 236) 
 
 
The hero’s own lack of resolution prefigures the probable reaction of the novel’s reader 
and also exhibits the open-ended nature of the confessional mode, which can never 
provide the unity the speaker desires.  
Foster claims confessional narratives produce pathos as the reader’s desire for 
meaning becomes frustrated by the inability of language (as a system) to contain meaning 
(9). He bases this drive to pathos on Jacques Lacan’s analysis of the self and other in 
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language, particularly that “whatever can be announced in language (the demand) is 
always inadequate to the need” (9). For Lacan, the speaker understands his own identity 
through conversation with the Other, as he can recognize his own expectations for 
himself and his listener through his address. The Other also responds to the Word of the 
speaker and must reassess herself in light of how the speaker addresses her. The speaker, 
then, must always anticipate the use of the Word, how he will define his audience, and 
how his address to them will contain expectations and elicit a particular response. 
Importantly, when one speaks, his use of the Word can transform another’s reality when 
he calls the Other by a certain name (in Lacan’s example, “You are my wife.”), but 
authentic communication breaks down when we acknowledge that language, as a closed 
system, cannot provide authentic discourse or convey truth between the speaker and 
listener (Lacan 62-64). Thus, for Foster, confession functions when “The failure of 
speech to be adequate to its subject calls for exegesis; confession engenders 
interpretation, drawing the listener into the production of meaning,” even though this 
attempt to discover meaning ultimately will be frustrated by the problems inherent in 
language (10).104 
“The advantage of conceiving of narrative as confession rather than expression,” 
Foster writes, “is that it allows us to see the pathos of the simultaneous pursuit and 
evasion of meaning in narrative” (10). Yet the pathos Foster claims for confessional 
narratives does not always have to exist. In Phantastes, for example, MacDonald turns 
this problem into a positive experience for both the writer and the reader. Rather than 
despair at the inability to achieve authentic communication, MacDonald feels confident 
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that the text can still have meanings for readers, even though it will not be a single, 
concrete meaning; the work of active interpretation will be productive, regardless of 
differing results.  
For MacDonald, the production of meaning through interpretation is not a futile 
act, even if the text demonstrates that language cannot contain all the meaning readers 
desire. The confessional mode allows him to produce an aesthetic effect through the 
tension between the desire for meaning and the inability of language to contain 
experience. In fact, the very moment that readers recognize the inability of language to 
contain their desire for truth and meaning, they become open to self-examination and the 
spiritual possibilities MacDonald saw as implicit in the fantastic experience. The novel 
lacks true closure and exists in the moment of the fantastique in order to encourage 
readers to move from inquiry about the text to inquiry about the feelings the text evokes. 
As Raeper explains, “MacDonald happily invited an imaginative participation in 
the meaning of his stories. Such openness is a marked difference from the intrusive adult 
voices intent on laying down the law in the Victorian nursery” (313). MacDonald’s use of 
confession through Anodos ensures an open-ended conclusion so that “everyone, 
however, who feels the story, will read its meaning after his own nature and 
development: one man will read one meaning in it, another will read another” 
(MacDonald, “The Fantastic Imagination,” 66). Anodos confesses his experiences to 
readers, and our hero becomes our guide by modeling himself as a childlike reader. But, 
inevitably, in the fantastic experience each reader’s journey will be her own. 
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After Phantastes’s failure MacDonald turned toward more obviously allegorical 
fiction and directed his fantasy stories to children. Raeper explains that “The commercial 
failure of Phantastes persuaded his main energies away from fantastic writing,” and 
though he did publish a few fairy tales, these were published specifically for children and 
written in a more conventional manner (310). Julia Briggs and Dennis Butts describe how 
MacDonald’s editorship of Good Words for the Young, begun in 1869, provided 
“pressure to fill its pages” and “produced MacDonald’s best writing for children [after] 
Phantastes previously failed to sell” (146). The difference in tone used by his 
contemporaries also provided MacDonald with other examples of more successful fairy 
tales. As mentioned above, writers like Dickens (“The Magic Fishbone,” 1868) and 
Thackeray (The Rose and the Ring, 1855) had begun using comic effects in their fairy 
tales, and this “parodic treatment” became quite familiar to readers by the end of the 
century, since audiences recognized fairy tale conventions (Briggs and Butts 138-139). 
Carroll developed this playful and skeptical tone in more depth throughout his Alice 
books, pointing out “the arbitrary nature of social and linguistic rules” and parodying 
social practice (Briggs and Butts 142). Carroll’s ability to clearly indicate how he would 
overturn the fairy tale conventions he invokes throughout the text made his novel a 
commercial success and permanently changed the direction of fantasy and fairy tales.  
MacDonald, however, maintained his interest in German and Romantic influences 
and still believed a fairy tale could “bring to consciousness something which had until 
then remained firmly in the unconscious” (Raeper 312). He blended his interest in 
mysticism and symbolism with more recognizable fairy tale conventions in order to make 
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them more marketable, but he rarely took up the satiric or parodic tone of his 
contemporaries. For this reason, many of his tales can seem overly sentimental, and he 
has sometimes been criticized for drawing his characters too thinly.105 Most of his fairy 
tales show “the progress of his characters from immaturity to maturity” and “the theme of 
rebirth is never far distant” (Raeper 313). Yet these later fairy tales differ from 
Phantastes more in style than in purpose or tone.  
MacDonald still does not explain all events or translate all meanings in his works 
for children. He maintains symbolic openness and “allowed children to think for 
themselves while reading his tales,” even if he included more obvious allegorical 
parallels about growth and maturity (Raeper 313). In The Light Princess, for example, the 
princess cares only for her own happiness and literally floats everywhere. Only when she 
learns compassion does she regain her “gravity,” both morally and literally. These 
simpler allegorical elements help readers interpret the tale’s meaning, but MacDonald’s 
use of complex symbolism often gives his tales more depth and complexity than a 
traditional allegory.  
Consider the scene in The Golden Key, in which Mossy and Tangle follow a fish 
through the forest until it leads them to a woman’s cottage. The fish jumps into her 
cooking pot, where it dies. The children eat it, but somehow when the woman looks into 
the cooking pot again, the fish has been reborn as an angel. MacDonald does not directly 
explain what this scene means, and readers are left to themselves as they try to decipher 
its symbolism within the context of the story (Raeper 313). MacDonald valued this 
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openness and hoped readers would work to uncover meaning that would affect them after 
the tales concluded. 
Importantly, as Raeper explains, MacDonald expected his fairy tales and longer 
fantasy novels to affect readers’ relationship to material reality (321). Both Carroll and 
MacDonald wanted readers to examine their relationship to the real through the lens of 
fantasy, which could take the real and turn it upside down.  Phantastes’s legacy can be 
observed in later, more traditional Victorian fantasy novels like the Alice books, but 
MacDonald’s interest in blending the fantastic and the material has another clear 
descendent in the work of Jean Ingelow. Where the supernatural and material remain 
somewhat incommunicable in MacDonald, even when he uses this difference for 
transcendent purposes, Ingelow imagines a world where the separation between fantasy 
and material collapses. Unlike Carroll’s Wonderland, Ingelow’s Fairyland will not be all 
a dream. And though allegory will be present, its subversion means Ingelow can also 
overturn our traditional depictions of reality in order to show that language does not 
operate separately from experience, just as the supernatural also coheres with the 
material. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THAT’S ALL 
 
 
 By the time Jean Ingelow wrote Mopsa, the Fairy in 1869, a new era of fantasy 
literature had begun. The fantasy tale had changed in audience and tone through subtle 
shifts in reading taste initiated during the early nineteenth century. Authors addressing 
adults preferred to use their stories to focus on Victorian social problems through realism, 
and fantasy had been relegated to the nursery where children were now allowed to learn 
with pleasure, rather than through heavy didacticism. Because fantasy seemed to deal 
with nonsense, the unreal, or to provide an escape from the growing industrialization of 
Victorian life, it became aligned with less serious topics and a less mature audience.  
Publishing literature for children, however, became a very profitable business 
(MacLeod 129).106 Authors had developed more subtle literary techniques designed to 
give pleasure to both children and the adults who read fantasy to them. Rather than 
contain fantasy within obvious allegory, writers like Lewis Carroll subverted traditionally 
didactic techniques, mocking conventional expectations through playfulness and 
nonsense, as Carroll did in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865). Experimental 
fantasies like Sara Coleridge’s Phantasmion and George MacDonald’s Phantastes had 
met with such resistance that it did not seem profitable to risk a literary experiment when 
there was money to be made. Stable narratives with secure authorial voices reigned, and 
though they did provide some wonder and surprise for readers, these texts typically did 
149 
not engage readers in active interpretation through narrative destabilization. Rather, 
writers often worked to satisfy reading expectations instead of provoking them into 
philosophical reflection about fantasy’s moral use. 
 Tastes had changed, and authors who wanted to publish successful fantasy novels 
now had plenty of examples to follow. Due to the boom in children’s and fantasy 
publishing during the mid-to-late Victorian era, we may easily overlook authors who 
employed traditional interpretive strategies but also subverted them. In Mopsa Ingelow 
certainly uses obvious didacticism, playfulness, and even a bit of nonsense, just as her 
contemporaries did. Her literary fantasy also seems more coherent and readable than 
Coleridge’s or MacDonald’s. She does not destabilize the reading process, and Mopsa 
therefore seems more conventional and could easily be classed as either “a wholly 
escapist fairy story” or as a failed copy of Carroll’s Alice stories, both of which critics 
now claim (Avery 69; 135).  
Yet, when examined closely, the novel demonstrates characteristics that link it to 
the experimental literary fantasies I have been tracing in this project. Ingelow does not 
disrupt her text on a structural level in order to provoke the reader into interpretation or 
active reading, which separates her from Coleridge and MacDonald’s literary 
experiments. Instead, the experimental nature of her fantasy novel occurs through the 
unified vision she proposes through it, one that blends the mythic, the scientific, the 
historic, and the religious, collapsing the separation of the fantastic and the material 
through the lens of storytelling. Through inter-textual allusions and irony she creates a 
negative model of readership through the story’s hero, Jack. His example functions to 
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wake readers’ moral consciousness, just as Coleridge and MacDonald hoped, but in a 
different manner than her predecessors had envisioned. Ingelow employs rhetorical cues 
that suggest a complicated philosophy, one that argues for the power of story and the way 
the fantastic story, in particular, can unify disparate, contradictory perspectives. 
Coleridge and MacDonald had experimented with narrative technique in order to create 
an aesthetic affect that ideally would lead to readers’ self-reflection, but Ingelow’s novel 
uses more conventional Victorian interpretive strategies while still deploying an unusual 
and experimental vision that aligns her purposes with her predecessors. 
Ingelow wrote Mopsa, the Fairy after Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in 
Wonderland had achieved critical and commercial success, and critics like Gillian Avery 
believe Carroll influenced Ingelow’s story (135). Instead of referring only to this recent 
influence, I trace the novel’s history back to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s “The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner” and align it with the development of the literary fantasy novel. 
Ingelow’s frequent and obvious allusions to the Ancient Mariner poem throughout the 
novel show her awareness of the Romantic tradition in which the reader’s belief in the 
fantastic is at stake. Ingelow uses Jack as an anti-hero for the reader, one who, unlike 
Coleridge’s Wedding Guest, does not go away from his encounter with the fantastic 
“sadder and wiser.”  
In fact, Ingelow inverts the Mariner’s story of transgression and confession in the 
figure of Jack, who quickly forgets his experiences in Fairyland as soon as they end. 
Critical readings have taken Jack’s perspective at face value, assuming that Ingelow 
endorses his rejection of the fantastic.107 I believe, rather, that Ingelow critiques this 
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position through pervasive irony and instead argues for an active reader that will use the 
lessons of fantasy to inform everyday experiences beyond the text, much in the same way 
that Sara Coleridge and MacDonald had envisioned. Ingelow’s novel does contain 
various didactic moments, and its Evangelical undertones have garnered it little 
distinction among critics. Yet it provides nothing less than a revolutionary proposition for 
a unified vision of scientific, material, religious, and historic interpretations of human 
experience. This novel is far from a stereotypical Sunday-school lesson disguised as 
fantasy, and I will argue that, even given Ingelow’s conservative perspective, its theory of 
the unity of fantasy and reality explodes traditional depictions of the fantastic, especially 
during the Victorian period. 
The novel begins with Jack’s journey to Fairyland through a hole he discovers in 
a tree. He finds a nest of fairies who encourage him to call for an albatross, Jenny, who 
then carries him on her back to Fairyland. Jenny entrusts the fairies to Jack, and the 
story’s main narrative involves one of these fairies, Mopsa, whom Jack kisses, causing 
her to grow in size and to eventually become a Fairy Queen. Jack explores the various 
countries within Fairyland, rescues the reigning Fairy Queen, and accompanies Mopsa on 
a journey to her new kingdom. The novel, however, ends on an almost mournful note, 
with the last chapter titled “Failure.” Jack, replaced by a Fairy prince who changes to 
look exactly like him, is expelled from Fairyland and must return home. Mopsa becomes 
a Fairy Queen, rescuing her subjects and beginning a new life without him. He returns to 
the material world and hears a story before having a snack and falling asleep, forgetting 
his journey as the novel concludes. 
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Because Mopsa’s development into a Fairy Queen becomes central to the novel, 
many critics interpret the story as “a female Bildungsroman,” or as representative of “a 
concern for separate, gendered fiction for girls and boys found in mid-century children’s 
literature in general.” (Auerbach and Knoepflmacher 208; Vallone 289). Typically, critics 
discuss the novel in terms of its gender politics, with Mopsa’s journey to become a Fairy 
Queen as the primary value of the novel,108 and they often assume the conclusion limits, 
rather than opens, possibilities for readers. Nina Auerbach and U.C. Knoepflmacher, for 
example, read the novel’s last words – “That’s all” – as indicative of Ingelow’s need to 
soothe readers after Jack’s return (209). They argue that Jack, like readers, easily forgets 
his experiences in the feminine domain of Fairyland, and that “there can be no return to 
the imaginative worlds Jack has now altogether forgotten” (209). 
I believe, rather, that the novel remains open-ended, and I align it with the 
tradition of the literary fantasy novel that I have been developing in this project. Once 
read within the history of this genre’s engagement with the problems of belief and 
interpretation, we can recognize how Mopsa complicates the typical children’s fantasy 
novel for which critics often mistake it. I will show that Ingelow’s novel resists closure 
and instead poses questions to readers, asking them to engage in active investigation of 
what is known and knowable about their world. In fact, Ingelow’s vision anticipates 
contemporary rhetorical philosophy, particularly that of Donald Davidson, that addresses 
the problem of belief through the proposal of a unified perspective that relies on charity. 
Specifically, when Ingelow depicts a Fairyland that blends history, religious story, 
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science, and fable, she asks that the reader reject ontological dualism and acknowledge a 
unified perspective that joins the subjective and the objective in one world through belief. 
Unlike Coleridge and MacDonald before her, Ingelow’s rather direct narrative 
contains more obvious didactic and allegorical moments, and she remains somewhat 
traditional in her use of the fantastic, which can mask the novel’s more revolutionary 
proposition about the unity of fantasy and reality. For example, on his journey into the 
heart of Fairyland, Jack discovers a country in which people help rehabilitate mistreated 
horses. One of the women explains how the horses come to Fairyland after they die, and 
“We take care of them, and gradually bring them up to be young and happy again” 
(Ingelow 32). The women then go on to list the atrocities men do to horses, making this 
scene obviously moralistic. There are other allegorical scenes like this, yet the overall 
vision of the novel escapes one easy lesson, even though Ingelow’s own religious 
perspective definitely influences the novel’s tone. 
 The anonymous writer of Some Recollections of Jean Ingelow explains that 
Ingelow’s parents were “pronounced Evangelicals,” and in childhood Jean supported the 
missionary work undertaken in Africa during colonialization (17). Ingelow wrote for 
Youth’s Magazine (later called Bible Class Magazine), an Evangelical periodical to which 
she submitted many of her first stories and which she later edited (Some Recollections 
65). Ingelow published these early tales anonymously in 1860 as Tales of Orris, and 
Maureen Peters explains that these stories were “heavily moral, for it was still considered 
that the fun in a children’s tale merely supplied the jam around the educational pill” (56). 
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But Peters distinguishes Ingelow’s moral work as “gentle” and notes that she 
sympathized with, rather than judged, her young readers (56). 
The tone of Ingelow’s early stories manifests later in the poems for which she 
became so famous. Ingelow was well-known during her adult life as a poetess and was so 
famous, in fact, that American admirers nominated her for the post of Poet Laureate after 
Alfred Lord Tennyson’s death in 1892 (Some Recollections 117). Due to changes in taste 
since Ingelow’s time, her poetry has gone out of fashion and may now seem overly 
patriotic, sentimental, or moralistic. But Ingelow’s popularity as a poet arose from her 
ability to express the feelings and sentiments of many of her contemporaries. Peters 
explains that Ingelow’s books were part of “two out of three literate households” at this 
time because she “embodied the aims and ideals of respectable Victorians” (103). 
Ingelow’s didactic poetic tone, in particular, may have emerged from the fact that “she 
felt it was her duty to expound the virtues of Christian charity and forgiveness,” a 
traditional Victorian aim (Peters 71). Yet, as Peters notes, she often complicated typical 
Christian poetry with her own imaginative embellishments and, at times, obscure 
symbolism (71).  
For example, in her nine-part prose poem, “The Story of Doom,” Ingelow 
interjects personal interpretation into Noah’s commission to build the ark, exploring the 
moments between God’s summons until the first drops of rain fall. She tells the story 
from Noah’s wife’s perspective, and Ingelow juxtaposes Noah’s religious summons to 
build the ark with his wife’s own ghostly visions (Poems 361). The characters compare 
themselves to Adam and Eve, retelling the Fall, in which Ingelow imagines Adam as 
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knowing and thoughtful, not blindly tempted by Eve, when he chooses to eat the 
forbidden fruit (Poems 364). The characters discuss giants as if they existed, and the 
poem often philosophically reflects on the nature and reality of God, blending the 
fantastic and the religious. The poem’s complexity belies one, easy explanation of 
Ingelow’s religious or philosophical beliefs, even though she draws on Christian 
symbolism and story. Thus, while the majority of her poetry, and even Mopsa, may 
contain certain conservative points of view, Ingelow evidently used her writing to 
explore, rather than transmit, a particular perspective. I believe her tendency to blend a 
personal imaginative perspective with her received religious traditions manifests more 
prominently in Mopsa, where the fantasy mode allows for even more exploration of how 
the imagination contributes to one’s belief and understanding of story.  
As I will show, Ingelow’s Fairyland functions as a way to draw together several 
contradictory philosophical perspectives, and in Mopsa she envisions an ideal world of 
unity where all tensions disappear through the combination of the fantastic and the 
material. Ingelow resolves contradictions between conflicting “stories” about reality by 
imagining that Fairyland is actually the same place as human reality. It does not exist as a 
separate world (or only as a dream) but instead becomes a state of prehistory available 
through the imagination. Mopsa’s didactic moments may cause readers to miss Ingelow’s 
more subtle use of inter-textual and ironic interpretive cues that create a subtext within 
the fantastic, one that she uses to propose a more revolutionary, less traditional, and, 
perhaps, controversial, ontological philosophy. 
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At the novel’s beginning, Jack passes into Fairyland with little confusion and 
almost no surprise, unlike most previous heroes/heroines, who at least demonstrate some 
sense of wonder.109 Yet, perhaps Jack recognizes little difference between Fairyland and 
his own world because Fairyland, like the material world, follows rules and operates with 
little nonsense, though fantastic elements do exist. Knoepflmacher reads this insistence 
on reliability as evidence of the way Ingelow establishes a hierarchy in which reality 
trumps fantasy. He argues that though she is “a latter-day Romantic,” she revises fantasy 
novels like Carroll’s Alice books and MacDonald’s At the Back of the North Wind 
because her Evangelical theology would not endorse “a boy’s dreamy enchantment” 
(301-303). Perhaps because his reading of Mopsa relies strictly on its relationship to these 
recent works, Knoepflmacher fails to consider what the novel itself has to say about the 
worlds of reality and fantasy.110  
Jack’s lack of surprise does not endorse reality so much as indicate to readers how 
familiar fantasy should be. The first clue to this depiction of Fairyland as his own land 
comes in the opening poem to Chapter One: 
  
“And can this be my own world? 
 ‘Tis all gold and snow, 
 Save where scarlet waves are hurled 
 Down yon gulf below.” 
 “‘Tis thy world, ‘tis my world, 
 City, mead, and shore, 
 For he that hath his own world 
 Hath many worlds more.” (Ingelow 1)111  
 
 
The dialogue of this poem poses and answers a question about the world of fantasy. The 
first speaker questions the unfamiliar and wonders at how different it seems. But the 
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second speaker reassures the first that the alien world should not seem so. As the novel 
begins, Ingelow establishes parameters for her readers by instructing them to recognize 
the strange and the unfamiliar as part of their own experiences. Throughout Mopsa she 
continually reinforces this initial idea of a unified perspective that depends primarily on 
belief; if we believe that the unfamiliar world is “my own world,” then we open the 
possibility for “many worlds more.” Contradictory perspectives unify through belief that 
differences can cohere in one world that contains many. 
Because fantasy and reality are the same place, Ingelow crafts a Fairyland built on 
solid rules and parameters. For example, Jack’s adventures begin when he realizes that he 
cannot escape from the tree trunk in which he discovers the fairies’ nest. Rather than 
offering nonsensical advice, the fairies advise him to whistle. He does so, and an 
albatross immediately aids him by lifting both him and the fairies to safety through the 
top of the tree (Ingelow 7-9). The scene does not contain any real threat of danger or 
confusion, and Jack never appears distressed. Likewise, the narrative stability Ingelow 
employs allows readers to proceed without hesitation through the actions without probing 
the text for deeper meaning or significance. But that stability only reinforces the fact that 
fantasy is no different than the material. Importantly, the confidence Jack displays here 
and throughout the rest of the book undermines any potential threat to his happiness. Yet, 
Jack is shut out from Mopsa’s kingdom once she becomes a Fairy Queen, and the novel’s 
last chapter, ominously titled “Failure,” suggests that Jack’s adventure has not been an 
entirely successful one.  
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I view Jack’s presence in the novel as Ingelow’s main philosophical plot, one 
easily overlooked if we take Jack’s experiences at face value. The novel will endorse a 
unified vision of Fairyland, one that Jack “misreads,” because of his inability to interpret 
his surroundings and his general lack of belief in his experiences. This “Failure” on his 
part ironically functions to indicate the importance of a unified perspective that blends 
the material and the fantastic. 
 Jack’s inability to interpret unfamiliar experiences can be compared to rhetorical 
theories that insist on a dualist view of reality, in which language and experience operate 
under separate conditions. As Stephen Yarbrough explains, post-modern language 
theorists like Stanley Fish and Gregory Ulmer insist on this separation and in doing so 
must abandon rationality and knowable truth: “To many postmodernists,” Yarbrough 
writes,  
 
little we do can improve and nothing can ensure our chances of knowing the 
world except by the terms with which we already know the world. If the world is 
a text, what we get out of that text is what we read into it, unless chance or force 
intervene. (29)  
 
 
He contrasts these theories with those of St. Augustine and Donald Davidson, both of 
whom argue that “in order to communicate at all, we must assume there is but one world 
and that our beliefs about it are ultimately unifiable through discursive invention” (31). 
 While I feel confident claiming a Romantic influence on Ingelow’s work, I do not 
intend to argue that she purposely incorporated St. Augustine’s philosophy into her 
literary fantasy novel. Yet the novel displays an obvious concern with storytelling, 
communication, and belief that I think engages with the same issues that both Augustine 
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and Davidson explore. These writers are concerned with the incommensurability of 
experience and language, and Ingelow too depicts the problems of interpreting reality, 
when one cannot actively “read,” and therefore cannot decipher the points of 
communication between the material and the fantastic. While my application of these 
theories is not completely analogous, I hope that the similarities between these theories 
and Ingelow’s vision will reveal the philosophical complexity of the novel. 
 Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation relies on his claim that “meaning and 
belief are interdependent” (Yarbrough 33). As Yarbrough explains, in order to interpret a 
speaker’s words, the listener must possess a theory that also addresses the speaker’s 
intentions and beliefs. Rather than relying on the notion of shared convention, which 
separates language from reality (it becomes a “system” of “signs”), and which implies 
that our different languages and cultures constitute different, incommensurable worlds, 
Davidson claims “there is at most one world” (Qtd. in Yarbrough 36). To communicate 
with anyone, for the world to make sense, we have to assume that “knowledge is a 
question of the coherence of belief” (Yarbrough 36). Yarbrough writes: 
 
Yet for both [Augustine and Davidson], the first principle is that one must 
believe that everything can hang together, that everything ultimately can connect 
with everything else. In Davidson’s version, if there is but one world, for anything 
to make sense, it will make sense in terms of other things that make sense. This is 
epistemological holism. (36) 
 
 
Essentially, epistemological holism relies on a formation of language as causal: “to mean 
is to cause something to happen, something that one intended to have happen as a result 
of one’s speaking” (Yarbrough 37). An interpreter can only understand the speaker if he 
160 
can predict what the speaker will do next in order to achieve her communicative aim; to 
do this, he must understand what caused her to speak as she did, or, put another way, 
what she intends and believes (Yarbrough 37). 
 The connection between meaning, intention, and belief relies on what Davidson 
calls the rule of charity. To believe communication is possible, we must believe that all 
things will cohere; “we cannot understand anyone we do not, at least initially believe” 
(Yarbrough 41). And, importantly for Ingelow’s novel, not only is this belief necessary to 
understand a particular speaker, but it is also necessary to understand reality. When we 
extend charity to a speaker, “we are presuming that what they say, if we were to 
understand it, could be as true for us as it is for them...” (Yarbrough 42). Ultimately, for 
Davidson and for Yarbrough, “words cannot be separated from the world they describe,” 
because a person’s choice of words is linked to her intentions to affect reality (42). When 
we interpret with charity, believing, even when we initially do not understand, that a 
speaker attempts to communicate with truth, we must also believe that “everything 
coheres with everything within the world” that the speaker and listener share (Yarbrough 
44). 
 Within these terms Davidson’s theory of charity evokes Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief,” a Romantic, and for Ingelow a more 
contemporary, philosopher who explored how texts and readers interact. Throughout this 
project I have argued that literary fantasies engage a tension Coleridge identified as 
central to the fantastic – how authors depict the unreal but still ask readers to have 
momentary belief in the events in order to understand the story. Sara Coleridge and 
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MacDonald both imagine the fantastic as a place in which this problem of belief coheres 
with an imaginative project of waking a reader’s moral consciousness through aesthetic 
effect, much like S.T. Coleridge. Ingelow, however, anticipates a more Davidson-ian 
theory when she conceives of Fairyland, material reality, history, myth, and religious 
story as “one world,” where everything will cohere if an interpreter believes in the unity 
of this perspective. Throughout Mopsa, the Fairy, Ingelow depicts a unified world in 
which fantasy and reality combine. She also envisions a world in which communication 
has causal power and discursive agency; the Fairy Queens are known for their 
storytelling ability, which literally affect characters’ actions. Jack, however, cannot 
interpret the communicative actions of characters in Fairyland, and he fails to interpret 
his experiences with “charity.” Ingelow reinforces her philosophy about the agency of 
storytelling and the unification of the fantastic and the material through Jack’s failure to 
acknowledge “one world.” Through this lesson Ingelow asks readers to extend charity to 
her own novel as they begin to interpret their world beyond the text with a unified 
perspective. 
Interestingly, though Ingelow does not draw on S. T. Coleridge’s philosophy in 
quite the same way that Sara Coleridge or George MacDonald did, she initially positions 
her fantasy novel in relationship to his most famous poem. Peters explains that Ingelow 
had read widely, including Shakespeare, Sir Walter Scott, her future friend Tennyson, 
and, importantly, the Romantic poets (23). In fact, we can begin to decipher the novel’s 
philosophy by examining Ingelow’s allusions to “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” in 
its opening. After Coleridge’s use of the albatross in his poem, Ingelow could expect the 
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image to resonate with readers. Through obvious allusions to Coleridge’s poem, a tale in 
which the Mariner asks for belief in the fantastic, Ingelow links these two works inter-
textually and marks the novel as an heir to the literary fantasy, a genre thoroughly 
engaged in the problems of belief. The presence of fantastic experiences foregrounds the 
problem of belief and communication, and Mopsa, the Fairy has a pervasive emphasis on 
storytelling and belief that aligns it with this tradition. 
Ingelow’s use of Jenny the albatross, who introduces Jack to Fairyland, invokes 
“The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” through Coleridge’s famous bird. Then, after Jack 
and Jenny arrive in Fairyland, she takes him to a sea “covered with ships” (Ingelow 15). 
But, as Jack notices, the ships have “all their sails set, but they cannot sail because there 
is no wind” (Ingelow 15). Jenny explains that their becalming is a punishment for ships 
and men who went out on evil errands; this allusion to the punishment endured by the 
crew of the Mariner’s vessel after he kills the albatross continues to link the novel to 
Coleridge’s poem, and it also allows Ingelow to introduce a moment in the text where 
Jack’s characterization becomes key to the novel’s overall philosophy about the fantastic 
and belief. 
Ingelow characterizes Jack as very inattentive to his experiences in Fairyland and 
as a poor interpreter of the stories he hears. I read Jack’s inability to interpret as 
Ingelow’s reversal of the active reader needed to believe and subsequently to perceive in 
Fairyland. For example, just after the scene above, Jenny instructs Jack about how to call 
for her when he needs help, but the narrator notes, “but he was not attending, because 
there was so much to be seen” (Ingelow 12). After Jenny chooses a boat to carry Jack up 
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the river to the center of Fairyland, she asks him again if he remembers her name, which 
is the only way he can find his way home. “‘Oh yes,’ he says,” but the narrator makes 
sure to point out that “he was not attending – he was thinking what a fine thing it was to 
have such a curious boat all to himself” (Ingelow 17). The repetition of Jack’s 
inattentiveness ironically points to the importance of perception, and, later, belief.  
Throughout most of the novel Ingelow demonstrates the “one world” of fantasy 
and reality through the irony of Jack’s inability to interpret his experiences. Jack’s 
inattentiveness does not occur only when he receives directions, but most of his 
adventures in Fairyland involve the power of storytelling – a type of discourse that asks 
him to interpret with charity and attempt belief. Jack’s visit to the marketplace, for 
example, recalls Christina Rossetti’s “Goblin Market” and provides another inter-textual 
moment for Ingelow’s novel.112  The gypsy fairy tries to cloud his mind by singing a 
song much reminiscent of Rossetti’s poem, but the potential implications for gender
economics are relatively absent. The gypsy obscures Jack’s mind and makes him feel “as 
if he was covered all over with cobwebs” (Ingelow 64). This scene foreshadows the Fairy 
Queen’s storytelling and its potentially dangerous consequences. Unlike Rossetti’s poem, 
in which commodities play a central role, Ingelow uses this market scene to emphasize 
the power of story within Fairyland. The gypsy sings a song that supernaturally affects 
Jack’s perception, an event that indicates storytelling’s nature as a discourse that affects 
reality. This vision of communication as causal anticipates Davidson’s theory that there is 
no separation between the speaker’s beliefs and the words she chooses to use to affect her 
 and 
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listener. Ingelow’s depiction makes this a literal problem, where one’s words have grave 
implications. 
Later, in the same way, but with far more seriousness, the Fairy Queen tells 
stories as if she were in a trance: “Jack looked, and saw the Queen coming slowly 
towards them, with her hands held out before her, as if it was dark. She felt her way, yet 
her eyes were wide open, and she was telling her stories all the time” (Ingelow 130). The 
apple-woman explains how these stories are powerful and tries to keep Jack from hearing 
them, yet when he does overhear some, she encourages him as he tries to interpret them.  
Significantly, she tells Jack to discount parts of the stories he has heard, saying “I 
don’t think much of that part of the story,” simply because its descriptions (of “reeds and 
rushes”) do not match up to her knowledge of Fairyland (Ingelow 133). We later learn 
these stories foreshadow Mopsa’s development into a rival Fairy Queen and Jack’s 
return, and the reeds and rushes are indeed part of Fairyland, even though the apple-
woman had never seen them before. The apple-woman does not interpret the story with 
charity, assuming that what is communicated could be true, if she only understood it. 
This scene demonstrates the way listeners can misunderstand a truth about the world 
when they do not interpret with charity and belief. Importantly, the apple-woman 
foreshadows Jack’s ultimate “Failure” at the novel’s end. 
This scene, then, also reinforces the novel’s argument about the power of 
storytelling. The Fairy Queen’s trance-like state, and the powerful affect of her stories on 
listeners, recalls Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner again, though in a context that emphasizes 
the casual nature of language. Yet Ingelow allusion is not analogous, for she meta-
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textually proposes that a unified world between fantasy and reality apply both to her 
characters and to her readers. The inter-textual allusions function to draw readers’ 
attention to a tradition of literary history with which she aligns her novel. Invoking the 
figure of the Ancient Mariner through the Fairy Queen, for example, asks readers to 
consider the similarity between these characters – particularly their use of language. If, as 
the novel shows, storytelling has an active power over listeners, and if our reality and this 
fantasy are the same world (see below), then the implications for storytelling in Fairyland 
also apply to our own world (material reality, beyond the book we read). The novel meta-
textually suggests that our own stories contain provocative and potentially life-changing 
powers should we listen carefully to them and interpret them with charity. 
When we read Jack’s adventures in Fairyland, then, we should pay close attention 
to what the novel says about our own world and about our stories. One of the most 
important sections addressing these topics occurs in the center of the book, just after Jack 
frees the Fairy Queen and enters her kingdom. At this point, Mopsa begins to grow, and 
she steadily does so, both in stature and in importance in the novel. As noted above, 
critics tend to see this as evidence that Mopsa, the Fairy is primarily concerned with 
gender, especially the female imagination and feminine development (Auerbach and 
Knoepflmacher 208), but I believe Ingelow also addresses philosophical concerns. 
Though Mopsa’s story does structure the remainder of the novel, the narrator continually 
emphasizes Jack’s perspective. Jack, however, does not stand merely for the male child-
hero, but for the reader, either male or female, who encounters stories and must interpret 
them.  
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 As Mopsa grows, she becomes the oracle through which Ingelow addresses her 
readers. For example, the chapter “Mopsa Learns Her Letters” ostensibly refers to sJack’s 
desire to teach Mopsa, but Mopsa actually does most of the instructing. Ingelow’s 
reversal of the typical teacher-student paradigm, in which the older, male student 
instructs the younger, innocent (female) child, should signal to us that her entire 
philosophy will be more subversive than a cursory reading may reveal. Here, the child 
instructs both Jack and the reader about the origins of both Fairyland and their own 
reality. Jack tells Mopsa that he has many questions about Fairyland, and she explains, 
“‘It’s the same world you call yours’” (Ingelow 136). When Jack doesn’t understand, she 
explains that he can’t recognize the two worlds as one because, “‘you’ve got something 
in your world that you call TIME’” (Ingelow 136). She continues, “‘your people say there 
was a time when there were none of them in the world – a time before they were made. 
Well, THIS is that time. This is long ago’” (Ingelow 137). At this point, Jack has been 
warned about listening to the Fairy Queen’s stories, because, “if you listen, you’ll be 
obliged to go to sleep, and sleep nobody knows how long” (Ingelow 124). As he listens to 
Mopsa’s explanations, he “felt that a sleep was coming over him, and he could not hold 
up his head” (Ingelow 137-138). His reaction signals Mopsa’s growing power as a future 
Fairy Queen, but the story also moves Jack to yet another fantasy world – that of dreams. 
In keeping with the novel’s emphasis on the unity of fantasy and reality, Jack’s 
dream world mirrors the Fairyland he has just left behind. The only difference – and a 
very significant difference indeed – is that now Jack begins to understand and believe in 
the unity of fantasy and reality. Ingelow writes: “he had this dream. He thought that 
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Mopsa came running up to him, as he stood by the river, and that he said to her, ‘Oh, 
Mopsa, how old we are! We have lived back to the times before Adam and Eve!’” (138). 
Jack dreams of a time of pre-history, in which giant “hairy elephants” roam the banks of 
the river and do battle with “river-horses” (Ingelow 141).  
Here Jack’s dream alludes meta-textually to material reality and recent 
discoveries in Victorian culture about the age of the earth and the limitations of human 
stories about history. Charles Darwin had published The Origin of Species in 1859, and 
Ingelow, an avid reader, knew this work. Peters claims that “[Ingelow’s] own thoughts 
were seriously disturbed by the implications of the theories in The Origin of Species” 
(57). As Peters shows, Ingelow even wrote a poem questioning, if the Garden “must go,” 
and Peters uses this as evidence of Ingelow’s resistance to new scientific theories, going 
so far as to suggest Ingelow had “mental limitations” that caused her to “cling to the 
security of her religious beliefs” (57-58).113  Undoubtedly, Ingelow’s worldview was 
shaped by her Evangelical Christian background, yet this scene in Mopsa offers a stark 
contrast to Peters’s depiction of Ingelow as unable to cope with new ideas. That Jack 
dreams this world into existence may imply a subtle critique of the theories of evolution 
Darwin introduced, but Jack does acknowledge that he and Mopsa have “lived back to 
the times before Adam and Eve.” Peters herself claims Ingelow had a deep sense of 
history, and that “all her life she was to know the exquisite duality of being both part of a 
gigantic human tapestry, and an individual with ideas and emotions unlike anybody else 
on earth” (11). I believe Ingelow incorporates this expansive sense of history into a 
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unified Fairyland that encompasses both Christian tradition and theories of ancient 
history and evolution.  
Indeed, Jack’s dream is consistent with Ingelow’s depiction of Fairyland, in that it 
exists as part of reality. In the same way that Jack cannot interpret events in his “real” 
life, or during his adventures in Fairyland, he also has trouble within his dream. Mopsa 
encourages him to dream of something else, once the creatures “fought with horn and 
tusk, and fell on one another, lashing the water into whirlpools” (Ingelow 141). Things 
become so chaotic that Mopsa decides to rescue them by calling the Craken. Ingelow 
describes the Craken as “an enormous serpent” and says Jack “felt extremely glad that 
this was a dream, and [that the Craken was] only a fabled monster” (142-143). But 
immediately after he thinks this, Mopsa quickly corrects him, saying, “‘No, [the Craken] 
is only a fable to these times’” (Ingelow 143, emphasis mine).  
Ingelow insists that the mythological and prehistoric creatures of which Jack 
dreams actually existed. They have become fables only because Time has passed. Time 
obscures the unity of the prehistoric, the mythic, the fantastic, and even the supernatural, 
making it appear as if those things cannot cohere in one narrative. Ingelow shows that 
stories, like the one that put Jack to sleep so that he could enter the world of dreams, give 
readers access to the fantastic which has been separated from them due to Time. 
 As if to reinforce the fact that Jack’s dream was not an illusion but an actual way 
for him to enter the time of prehistory, the narrator tells us that when Jack woke up, he 
“felt very tired indeed – as much tired as if he had really been out all day on the river, and 
gliding under the soft coils of the Craken” (Ingelow 146). Jack’s dream affects him once 
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he wakes because it provides access to another part of the real; sleep here is no time of 
rest, no escape from the present. Instead, stories put listeners to sleep only to give them 
access to the imagination. 
 The applewoman carefully delays any further storytelling after Jack wakes. Her 
warnings about the power of stories demonstrate the stakes for Ingelow’s characters. 
Stories are provocative; they are dangerous. As Davidson claims, language works 
causally, not separately from reality but as seamlessly interconnected with it. For 
Ingelow, stories have the potential to transport us, not just imaginatively, but in 
Fairyland, literally in Time. The novel contains a unique vision of the unity between the 
fantastic and the material, for it asks readers to interpret with charity in order to test the 
unity of historical and mythical “fables” as part of their own lives. A unified one world 
could be true, it implies, if we only knew how to interpret conflicting ideas within a 
holistic perspective on reality.  
 Perhaps we may think Ingelow uses these scenes as a warning to readers about the 
perils of leaving the confines of our own reality for the world of fantasy. Knoepflmacher, 
in particular, argues that Mopsa acts as a cautionary tale against the world of female 
imagination and fantasy (310-311). Yet Ingelow’s theology supports the affective power 
of storytelling. Time separates followers from Christ’s world, and the Bible, a book of 
fantastic stories, calls for belief from those who have not seen the actual events take 
place. Knoepflmacher’s insistence that Ingelow’s material concerns in the novel 
outweigh the spiritual does not align with the practices he says dictate her skepticism of 
the fantastic.114 If the novel warns against anything, it rather cautions readers about 
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ignoring the stories of fantasy they have received, which Time and skepticism have 
caused them to overlook or to believe only as fables.115 
In Mopsa, the Fairy belief in the power of story becomes a hope for 
communication. Though there continue to be inter-textual allusions throughout the rest of 
the novel (especially to “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner,”)116 I want to turn my 
discussion to irony, Ingelow’s other interpretive strategy. Jack’s example, I will argue, 
ironically works as a lesson in “what not to do.” The heroes of Coleridge’s Phantasmion: 
Prince of Palmland and MacDonald’s Phantastes acted as guides for readers through an 
aesthetically disruptive text. In Mopsa, however, Jack functions as an anti-hero, as a 
model for readers to avoid since he does not keep belief in fantasy and focuses only on 
the material world. Instead, as the final chapter implies, we as readers should learn from 
Jack’s “Failure” and use his example in order to avoid a failure to interpret the 
communication between stories and our reality. 
 As Davidson shows, to enter the world of communication at all, we must suspend 
our disbelief and act with charity toward the speaker as we attempt to interpret her words. 
In entering story, we must also silence those objectionable voices in our conscience that 
would tell us that what we read could not or would not really happen. We must, as 
Coleridge said, willingly suspend our disbelief for the moment. As I have mentioned in 
previous chapters, suspended disbelief in the fantastic, or in Ingelow’s vision of a 
unification of fantasy and the material, need not be maintained beyond interpretive 
inquiry. For Coleridge as for Davidson, suspended disbelief works, for the moment, in 
order to extend charity to a speaker (or story). Belief does not mean acceptance of 
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ideology – of Ingelow’s Evangelicalism or of her fantasy theory – but an attempt to 
understand the speaker in a world in which language affects reality.117 
 As I have argued throughout this project, the author helps us suspend disbelief by 
creating a world with its own logic, and we enter the world of fantasy, in particular, with 
the belief of a child. When we read with charity, we agree to interpret an author’s fantasy 
tale not as something “other,” separated from the material world and irreconcilable with 
actual experiences. Instead, we read with a holistic perspective that asks us to transcend 
the material world and take part in the world of imagination, to be transformed by the 
power of the stories we read. Belief can be exhilarating, but when we fail to believe, we 
no longer perceive the unity of the material and the fantastic. We return to the material, as 
Jack does. For Ingelow, this return is Failure itself.  
The novel’s conclusion foregrounds this failure of belief in the final chapters. 
Mopsa tells her last story as she searches for the kingdom’s banished men, who have 
been hidden in a cave until the Queen comes to free them. The narrator notes, “Mopsa, 
after the manner of fairy queens…was beginning to tell a story….It did not begin at the 
beginning: their stories never do” (Ingelow 214). Her story begins by repeating her origin 
– Jack’s kiss transformed her from an ordinary fairy into one who could think. She tells 
of Jenny’s promise to come rescue Jack when he needs to go home, and of how “‘Over 
the highest of the birds is the place where angels float and gather the children’s souls as 
they are set free’” (Ingelow 215). After this vision of heaven, she tells the story of her 
new kingdom’s curse, how the people were selfish and wasteful and turned out fairy after 
fairy that came to offer them guidance. Finally, the fairies cursed them and transformed 
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them into deer until that time when a new Queen would come to them against her will. 
Mopsa’s flight from Mother Fate brought her to these people against her will, even 
though Mother Fate had already destined her to set them free. Mopsa’s disobedience 
actually fulfilled the divine will, and with Jack’s help, she quickly frees the rest of her 
subjects.  
 However, Ingelow calls the novel’s final chapter “Failure,” for the story, so full of 
Mopsa’s development, still rests on Jack’s ultimate failure. Mopsa now reigns in a happy 
new kingdom, yet she is filled with sadness because she knows Jack must depart. Though 
Ingelow does not explicitly explain what the “Failure” is, the final chapter opens with a 
poem that offers significant commentary on the novel’s whole philosophy. Ingelow 
writes: 
  
We are much bound to them that do succeed; 
 But, in a more pathetic sense, are bound 
 To such as fail. They all our loss expound; 
 They comfort us for work that will not speed, 
 And life – itself a failure. Ay, his deed, 
 Sweetest in story, who the dusk profound 
 Of Hades flooded with entrancing sound, 
 Music’s own tears, was failure. Doth it read 
 Therefore the worse? Ah, no! So much to dare, 
 He fronts the regnant Darkness on its throne. –  
 So much to do; impetuous even there, 
 He pours out love’s disconsolate sweet moan –  
 He wins; but few for that his deed recall: 
 Its power is in the look which costs him all. (222)118 
 
 
Ingelow uses the classical story of Eurydice and Orpheus to explain how failure often 
provides a better story than success does. Those who fail, she explains, “all our loss 
expound”; those failures provide examples for us so that we can sympathize with the 
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failure but also learn from it. Ingelow calls “life – itself a failure,” a rather dark line to 
open a chapter that should end a happy fairy tale. Why would she propose that life is a 
failure? Perhaps here her Evangelical beliefs also come into play, for she may have 
alluded to teachings in which Christians view life as temporary, a striving after, but an 
inevitable failure, especially without God’s grace. But, she implies, those very failures 
that separate us from God – or, in Jack’s case, from Fairyland and his desires – those 
failures do have elements of beauty, and we remember them because they instruct us. 
The author of Some Recollections explains that Ingelow’s philosophy of life was 
one of optimism, even in the midst of failure. Interestingly, her poetry reinforces the 
perspective put forth at the conclusion of Mopsa. In “Consolation,” for example, she 
writes: 
 
One launched a ship, but she was wrecked at sea; 
He built a bridge, but floods have bourne it down; 
He meant much good; none came, strange destiny! 
His corn lies sunk; his bridge bears none to town, 
Yet good he had not meant became his crown, 
For once, at work, when even as Nature was free 
From thought of good he was, or of renown, 
God took the work for good, and let good be. (Poems 637-638) 
 
 
The author of Some Recollections interprets this stanza as an example of Ingelow’s 
philosophy, one embodied by her life and literature: “While our conscious efforts to do 
great things or good things so often end in piteous failure or disappointment, yet God 
gives our existence its due value and purpose in ways of which we do not dream, and 
possibly just because we cannot dream them” (67). This poem and its commentary have 
interesting parallels for Mopsa’s conclusion, for if the author was right, if Ingelow saw 
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failure as instructive, then Jack’s return to the material world may be her way to show 
readers that more exists, even if they cannot dream it. 
Significantly, Ingelow’s poetic example of failure in Mopsa involves a failure of 
belief. Orpheus traveled to the Underworld and successfully won Eurydice’s freedom, but 
his failure to believe that she was behind him, or to believe that he could wait to see her 
until they left, destroyed his success and his happiness. Had he been steadfast in his 
belief, they would have escaped together. This poem instructs readers on how to interpret 
Jack’s failure at the novel’s end. His failure, though, should not be forgotten, just as 
Orpheus’s has not been. Instead, readers should remember it as a lesson about the 
importance of belief and how it will help overcome the separation of the material and the 
fantastic. 
 In the novel’s final chapter, then, Jack demonstrates this failure of belief. After 
Mopsa becomes a new Fairy Queen, Jack calls to Jenny and asks to be taken home again. 
The further he gets from Fairyland, the more Jack feels “as if this had all happened a 
good while ago” (Ingelow 241). As Jack returns to his own yard and his own home, he 
looks in his window and watches his mother reading to his father. He thinks “that this 
was not in the least like anything that he had seen in Fairyland, nor the reading like 
anything that he had heard,” and he begins “to forget the boy-king, and the applewoman, 
and even his little Mopsa” (Ingelow 243). Jack’s return to the material world causes him 
to forget about the reality of his experiences in Fairyland. Jack did, after all, actually go 
to Fairyland. Unlike Alice, he does not dream his adventures, and Ingelow repeatedly 
emphasizes how Jack has traveled in time, not between worlds. Jack’s lack of belief, 
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then, is his failure. He may think that the material world has no connection to what he 
saw in Fairyland, but the novel proposes that he is mistaken.  
 As Jack enters his home, he curls up on his father’s lap and begins (in a very adult 
manner) to rationalize how silly his experiences in Fairyland must seem if he were to tell 
them: he “wondered what he would think if he should be told about the fairies in 
somebody else’s waistcoat pocket” (Ingelow 243). Jack’s growing disbelief in his 
experiences allows him to rationalize the failure of his care of the fairies (he allows one 
of them to be killed before Mopsa begins to grow). Next he comforts himself with 
thinking of “what a great thing a man was; he had never seen anything so large in 
Fairyland, nor so important” (Ingelow 244). By giving his father, and by extension 
himself, priority over Fairyland’s inhabitants, he relieves himself of his feelings of shame 
and failure.119 
 Ingelow, however, is not content to let Jack’s failure go so easily. The remaining 
three pages of the chapter demonstrate a subversive thrust to the novel, one in which 
Ingelow challenges readers to avoid Jack’s failure and interpret her novel with charity. 
This challenge comes in the form of yet another story. Jack’s mother, who has been 
reading since his entrance, looks up from her reading and does not seem “in the least 
surprised; or more glad to see him than usual” (Ingelow 244). She turns the pages of her 
book and begins to read a poem on The Shepherd Lady. Ingelow’s poem, written in three 
parts, charts the changing position of a “dear white lady in yon high tower,” who begins 
the poem asleep (Ingelow 244). The shepherd plays his pipes and tends the sheep, and he 
sends out his thoughts to the lady, asking her to come down. She does, and immediately 
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asks him what she can do for him (Ingelow 244-245). The shepherd here is obviously a 
Christ figure, the first and only one the novel proposes. The lady’s move from sleeping to 
waking enacts a conversion scene in which she both becomes aware of the shepherd and 
seeks to do his will.  
In the poem’s second part, the shepherd answers the lady’s question by charging 
her with the care of the sheep, invoking Jack’s own earlier failure to care for the fairies. 
In part three of the poem, the lady becomes The Shepherd Lady through this command, 
and she tends the flock, looking ever for the shepherd’s return. The Shepherd Lady’s 
faithfulness that the shepherd will return also ironically points to Jack’s failure to believe 
in the experiences he had in Fairyland; he does not remain steadfast in belief. 
 Where Jack sees no connection between this domestic scene of storytelling and 
the events of Fairyland, readers should recognize the obvious link of the importance of 
stories in both places. Stories in Fairyland were provocative and often dangerous, telling 
the future, and powerfully putting listeners to sleep and releasing their imaginations. 
Whatever the effect, storytelling meant transformation and knowledge. Stories were real, 
and as Mopsa told Jack, stories often were true in a way people in the material world no 
longer recognized due to their own separation from the circumstances of the story. 
 The novel’s final chapter proposes that the story of Christ, in particular, has 
become just that – only a bedtime story for those who eschew the fantastic and fail to 
believe in the unity of the fantastic and the material. Jack’s failure to interpret this unity, 
Ingelow implies, is analogous to the way in which readers may view a religious story (or 
even a mythological one, in the case of the Craken) as separate from reality. The unity of 
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Fairyland and the material world reflects the unity of a Christian history with a growing 
secular world, and Ingelow demonstrates this by uniting the two worlds through their 
reliance on story. Belief in the fantastic depends on the belief in received stories, and 
during a time in which belief in religious stories was waning, Ingelow’s novel critiques 
readers’ failure to recognize truth in stories, their failure to believe that stories can cohere 
with the modern world if readers would willingly read with charity.  
 The end of the novel, then, becomes much more subversive than one might 
expect. Jack, still expecting some kind of admonition from his parents, finds only comfort 
and a bedtime snack. He runs to his room, says his prayers, and “comfortably fell asleep. 
That’s all” (Ingelow 248). As I mentioned above, I do not believe Ingelow expects that 
we will be content with a “That’s all” so neatly concluded. Instead, I think the novel asks, 
“That’s [not] all, [is it]?” Jack’s failure to understand the story of the Shepherd Lady and 
his own connection to it further demonstrates the novel’s challenge to readers. Will they 
too fail to believe? Will they too comfortably fall “asleep” and consider stories of the 
fantastic and supernatural only stories? Will that be all? The novel suggests that we 
should read stories charitably, even those that seem more and more like fables to the 
modern world, because they can contain truth that has only been separated from us by 
time. Jack’s failure distinguishes his story, because we can learn from him. His failure 
instructs us in the unity of fantasy and reality through Ingelow’s vision of “one world” 
bound together by belief. 
Mopsa, the Fairy, then, does not tell a simple escapist fairy tale. It proposes a 
rather radical vision of storytelling and a philosophy of belief that confronts a growing 
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secular Victorian world. Ingelow asks readers to consider their origins and proposes a 
worldview in which stories must be privileged. In doing so, she claims a place for her 
own story as one of truth and revelation, for her novel suggests that the fantastic text can 
contain as much truth as one that focuses on the material world should readers learn to 
read with charity and recognize the unity of these two perspectives.  
Ingelow’s novel brings my project full circle by ironizing Coleridge’s Wedding 
Guest through Jack. Where the Ancient Mariner changes the Wedding Guest through the 
fantastic, Jack remains unaffected. Where the Guest submits to the power of storytelling 
and perceives (some kind) of truth through his encounter with the fantastic, Jack the child 
remains inattentive and fails to believe. In both cases, as well as in Phantasmion and 
Phantastes, the literary fantasy privileges the problems of the unreal, interpretation, and 
literary belief. And in all cases fantasy works to affect readers, asking them to consider 
the implications of reading and storytelling after the tales conclude. Through a variety of 
rhetorical techniques, experimental Victorian fantasists explored the power of fantasy to 
wake readers’ moral consciousnesses. These unique interpretive experiments allow us to 
observe how writers used the fantastic to explore philosophy, theology, and rhetoric just 
as fantasy entered its Golden Age. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
ON FAIRY STORIES 
 
 
The close of the nineteenth century signaled another shift in taste for fantasy. 
Separated from adult audiences as the “inverse” of realism, fantasy was written primarily 
for children even though “explicit moral lessons were rapidly becoming outmoded and 
the insistent moralizing of Victorian fiction for children had…become a standing joke 
and an obvious target for parody” (Briggs 172). The cultural attitude about the 
importance of imaginative play for children meant that fantasy addressed to them would 
celebrate pleasure and lightness rather than teaching moral lessons (Briggs 173). This 
difference led to the further separation of fantasy from the adult domain of reading, 
turning it into something “other” as “childhood came to be seen as a state distinct from 
and potentially opposed to being ‘grown up’” (Briggs 168). Fantasy tales took on a 
nostalgic tone as their writers looked back to childhood as something distant and 
irrecoverable. For example, Julia Briggs explains how Kenneth Grahame (The Golden 
Age 1895; The Wind in the Willows 1908) was “painfully aware of the distance between 
himself as a child and adult,” a stance that makes itself felt on the narrative level of his 
fantasies (174).   
Not all fantasy authors wrote directly to children, however, even when they 
emphasized childlike imagination. E. Nesbit, for example, used a “double point of view” 
in her narratives (Nine Unlikely Tales for Children 1901) that addressed both children
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and adult readers through the use of implied and omniscient narration (Briggs 175). As 
Briggs explains, “the more sophisticated reader can distinguish different landscapes [in 
Nesbit’s work], and this double point of view…adds richly ironic depths” (175). The use 
of parody, nostalgia, and irony, however, eventually moved fantasy from a mode that 
could open inquiry for readers to one that provided an idealistic retreat from encroaching 
modernism. Twentieth-century fantasy, in particular, became a “place of retreat for adults 
and of protection for children” as “war, change, and the threat of war and change made 
nostalgia and retreat even more attractive and urgent than before” (Hunt 195). Yet, the 
early experiments of the Victorian literary fantasists would not be lost permanently. In 
the twentieth century literary belief as a theory of both reading and writing fantasy 
returned in the work of J.R.R. Tolkien. In “On Fairy Stories” (1938-39) Tolkien re-
examined the purpose of writing fantasy by theorizing about how an author writes the 
fantastic in order to elicit literary belief in readers that creates desire.  
Tolkien and his friend and contemporary C.S. Lewis both explored fantasy’s 
theory through their writing, though in different ways. Lewis relied more on allegory in 
most of his work (The Chronicles of Narnia, 1950-56, and The Pilgrim’s Regress, 1933, 
for example), and he experimented with the science-fiction genre in his space trilogy (Out 
of the Silent Planet, Perelandra, That Hideous Strength, 1938-1945). Allegory had not 
completely disappeared in fantasy, even if it had a more minor role than during the 
nineteenth century, and Lewis’s use of it in his own texts demonstrates a re-engagement 
with early interpretive strategies for structuring fantasy that he expected to affect his 
readers’ moral consciousness. Though Lewis did not practice the more experimental 
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interpretive strategies I have described in this project, he certainly felt their effects. 
Famously, he read MacDonald’s Phantastes while an atheist and claimed it “fills for me 
the place of a devotional book” (Lewis 179).120 Lewis, who would go on to become most 
well-known as a Christian apologist, recognized MacDonald as one of his primary 
influences later in his career. His response to MacDonald’s fantasy was one he hoped to 
reproduce through his own work, though he chose more conventional interpretive 
strategies that eventually garnered him more criticism than praise due to changes in 
reading tastes; twentieth-century readers did not always appreciate obvious religious 
allegories. 
 Tolkien also saw the potential of fantasy to affect readers, though in a less 
obvious manner, much like the Victorian literary fantasists I have discussed in this 
project. He describes the process in detail in “On Fairy Stories,” and this essay marks the 
conclusion of my examination of the theory of literary belief in the fantastic and the 
interpretive experiments authors employed in order to elicit this belief. I believe Tolkien 
demonstrates the way in which fantasy authors were quite conscious of the sophisticated 
interpretive strategies they used in order to affect readers. Additionally, his argument 
about the devaluing of the fantastic becomes especially important to my claim for a re-
examination of texts marginalized by traditional criticism. 
First, Tolkien distinguishes between two types of fantasies: those that need belief 
and those that do not. “It is at any rate essential,” he writes, “to a genuine fairy-story as 
distinct from the employment of this form for lesser or debased purposes, that it should 
be presented as ‘true’” (14). The best type of fairy-story must not end with the idea that 
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all has been an illusion or a dream, he claims, citing Lewis Carroll’s Alice stories as an 
example of what not to do when writing this type of fantasy (14-15). Yet Tolkien 
explains that the belief needed by readers does not mean credulity, but rather a literary 
belief in the world presented (37).  
 As I have claimed throughout this project, Victorian fantasists drew on Romantic 
philosophy articulated by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in order to create experimental 
fantasies that engaged the problem of novelty and literary belief. I traced different 
interpretive strategies through Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief” in order to 
test this theory as a viable reading and writing strategy as it manifests in experimental 
Victorian novels. Tolkien, however, further expands on Coleridge’s definition of the 
“suspension of disbelief” to redefine fantasy’s purpose within a more explicitly religious 
context.  
While the writers I examined shared a common concern for waking their readers’ 
moral consciousness through fantasy, Tolkien imagines this process as specifically 
related to the connection between Story (myth) and the creative act facilitated by the 
author’s relationship to God. Rather than create a “willing suspension of disbelief,” then, 
the author instead becomes a “sub-creator,” one that reenacts God’s original creativity by 
inventing a fantasy world: “[The author] makes a Secondary World which your mind can 
enter. Inside it, what he relates is ‘true’: it accords with the laws of that world. You 
therefore believe it, while you are, as it were, inside” (37). Tolkien describes the need for 
internal truth and probability, or coherence and unity, for which Coleridge also argued 
(and which I discussed at length in Chapter Three). Through internal coherence, the 
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author makes possible a reader’s literary belief in order for her to participate 
imaginatively in the fantasy he creates. For Tolkien, this occurs because the author 
participates in a divine act where he emulates God’s creative impulse. 
 The author’s spiritual role directly influences the way in which the fantastic 
affects readers. Tolkien explains how literary belief in the fantastic initiates a reader’s 
desire for spiritual joy. “Fairy-stories were plainly not primarily concerned with 
possibility,” he writes, “but with desirability. If they awakened desire, satisfying it while 
often whetting it unbearably, they succeeded” (40-41, emphasis his). For Tolkien, this 
desire occurs as an author makes possible a combination of escape, consolation, and 
hope. He claims fantasy may restore hope to readers through the moment of 
eucatastrophe – the pivotal turn in the narrative where the reader realizes that the hope he 
thought was lost has been restored (68-69). He practices this philosophy in his The Lord 
of the Rings trilogy (1937-1949), in minor moments like when Strider is revealed as heir 
to Gondor’s throne; and in more explicit turns for the better, such as the destruction of the 
ring in the midst of great suffering. These moments are not directly allegorical, but they 
contain the eucatastrophe, in which the narrative “turn” provides hope for readers, which 
should, ideally, awaken joy and desire. 
Like his Victorian predecessors, Tolkien imagines fantasy as affecting the reader 
spiritually through her encounter with the unreal. Tolkien does not explicitly discuss how 
the author makes this joy possible, other than in terms of the eucatastrophe. As I have 
shown throughout this project, Victorian fantasists employed a variety of experimental 
interpretive strategies in order affect their readers, much in the way Tolkien describes. 
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These authors composed their texts aesthetically and structurally to initiate desire within 
readers, and this desire should transcend the text, affecting readers’ moral consciousness.  
For Tolkien, this encounter has a specifically Christian parallel, as a narrative that 
elicits hope and desire in readers does so because it mirrors the “Story” of creation and 
Christ’s own eucatastrophe, the Resurrection (72-73). Fantasy, then, does not depart 
from realism if the real contains the supernatural already. In this way, Tolkien argues that 
fantasy will affect readers’ moral consciousness, for the joy they experience at the story’s 
eucatastrophe should cause them to seek this joy in the material world. Victorian writers 
also imagined this type of important moral work for their fantasy novels, though their 
narrative experiments often made them less coherent, and less successful, than Tolkien’s 
own fantasies. Additionally, they often welcomed interpretive pluralism in their stories, 
even when drawing on personal Christian philosophy in their writing. For these Victorian 
writers, it mattered less what meaning the text produced than that it initiated inquiry. Any 
spiritual work begun by the text would not be completed by the author. Victorian 
fantasists would agree with Tolkien that the fantastic had a moral use, even if they valued 
pluralism in a way that he would later eliminate through an allegorical philosophy of 
writing. 
 In addition to articulating a philosophy for fantasy, Tolkien also includes an 
argument against what was already becoming a critical trend – the devaluing of fantastic 
literature as less serious, and therefore less important, than realism. “Many people dislike 
meddling with the Primary World,” he claims, because readers prefer a recognizable 
depiction of the world due to its comforting stability (48). Those that align the fantastic 
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with irrationality, with madness, with dreaming, or with nonsense do not recognize its 
difficulty and its artistic qualities, he says (48). Tolkien argues for fantasy’s importance 
on an artistic level, explaining that fantasy’s “inner consistency of reality is more difficult 
to produce” than that of realism (48). Because fantasy has been misdirected to children, 
written poorly or “only half-seriously,” he says, it has gained a reputation as being sub-
par, when, in fact, it complements the real and reveals another dimension to human 
imagination (49). He concludes:  
 
Fantasy is a natural human activity. It certainly does not destroy or even insult 
Reason; and it does not either blunt the appetite for, nor obscure the perception of, 
scientific verity. On the contrary. The keener and the clearer is the reason, the 
better fantasy will make it. (55) 
 
 
Like Tolkien, I believe fantasy has been devalued by readers that have a critical 
preference for Enlightenment-influenced texts, especially the mimetic, which leads to 
misreading of experimental fantasy work. These reading biases also influence the type of 
texts that are valued within the canon and determine what texts should be studied and 
how they should be read. Tolkien’s conclusions about the importance of fantasy – and its 
difficulty – echo the concerns of experimental Victorian writers who imagined the 
fantastic as a place of important moral work much in the same way that their realist 
counterparts did, and recognition of their texts complicates our understanding of 
categories like “Romanticism,” “Victorian,” “realist” and “fantasy.” 
Throughout this project I have argued for a re-examination of experimental 
Victorian fantasy novels in order to demonstrate the way in which reading expectations 
have structured audience response, leading to a devaluing of texts that do not meet 
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predetermined criteria about what texts should do and how they should speak to readers. I 
believe texts like Sara Coleridge’s Phantasmion: Prince of Palmland; George 
MacDonald’s Phantastes; and Jean Ingelow’s Mopsa, the Fairy have been overlooked by 
critics and marginalized within canonical studies simply because their authors decided to 
eschew traditional interpretive strategies and experiment with the way language could 
affect readers.  Nevertheless, these texts can inform mainstream literary studies because 
they provide an alternate history to Victorian literature, one in which the realist tradition 
was not the only way that authors chose to show readers what was “real” about their 
world. Rather than view realism and fantasy as separate, or as opposite, literary modes, 
like Tolkien I find they function as complements to one another, as authors pursue similar 
goals of persuasion and belief through different interpretive strategies. 
 Victorian literary criticism traditionally focuses on realist texts, following a 
lineage established during the nineteenth century, when critics and readers aligned the 
use of fantasy with escapism and nonsense. Yet, as this project has shown, authors’ 
choice to employ the fantastic as mode did not mean they assumed their texts would not 
remain philosophical or sophisticated. Rather, these authors imagined that the fantastic 
would expose textual artifice, guiding the reader toward a moral encounter that 
transcended the reading experience, leading to inquiry about the material world, even if 
this inquiry was produced through fantasy.  
  As the nineteenth century came to an end, realism itself gave way to an aesthetic 
movement that rejected conventional claims to knowable truth. Authors like Walter Pater 
and Oscar Wilde introduced readers to books without morals, philosophizing about texts 
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that would provide pleasure for readers, without the constraints of moralism or 
convention. If realists tried to establish a knowable, familiar world for readers, 
aestheticists removed the guiding moral action of this world in order to indulge the 
readers’ desire for pleasure. Though realism and aestheticism often share the solidity of 
the “real” in their depiction of the world, their aims drastically differ.  
 Experimental Victorian fantasy bridges the gap between these two movements. 
Victorian literary fantasies of the kind this project describes use a different mode to 
awaken readers’ moral consciousnesses; in doing so, they remain concerned with their 
readers’ attitudes about the world, even though they choose to remove the reader from the 
real in order to more fully instruct her in how to perceive it. In this way, fantasists and 
realists share a common goal. They both recognize the problems inherent in 
communicating “truth” to readers through a subjective text. They differ in method, but 
they agree in aim.  
Fantasists and aestheticists, though, also find points of agreement. Both use the 
aesthetic experience of reading (through pleasure or through discomfort) to affect their 
audiences. Fantasists recognize the way reading, on a structural level, can be manipulated 
to produce an aesthetic that destabilizes the text in order to produce the moral work they 
desire. While aestheticists would relinquish this moral drive, they shared with fantasists 
an interest in the way reading affects an audience. 
 A study of the way Victorian literary fantasies intersect with the more well-known 
realist and aesthetic traditions enriches our understanding of literary history. It also 
exposes the way in which fantasy texts have become devalued due to their mode. Fantasy 
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literature is drastically underrepresented within canonical literary studies, a point easily 
seen when examining standard anthologies. The absence of fantastic texts, or, the 
inclusion of texts that represent fantasy as nonsense or suitable only for children, 
obscures important experimental literary work that complicates our understanding of 
more canonical literary traditions, especially the way in which the distinction between the 
Romantic’s focus on the imagination and the Victorian’s sense of duty breaks down in 
the world of fantasy.  
 We can still observe the fantastic impulse in the detective novels of Wilkie 
Collins, in Charles Dickens’s fairy tale A Christmas Carol (1843), in Charlotte Brontë’s 
Villette (1854) or in Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890). These works all draw on 
a tradition of suspended disbelief used to create reader participation in the text, a 
structural element explored by Coleridge, MacDonald, and Ingelow. Scrooge’s discussion 
with Marlow, for example, about whether or not the ghost is real or “just a bit of 
mustard” evokes the problems of belief and communication with the unreal, though in a 
more traditional (less experimental) narrative framework. Dickens’s tone, his stable 
narrative, and his incredible commercial success in both fantasy and realism make his 
story more acceptable for canonical studies, but this story employs the fantastic emphasis 
on belief, resulting in both Scrooge’s – and, ostensibly, the reader’s – moral 
development. In this way, the text echoes fantastic theory developed by its predecessors. 
By recognizing how central belief is to fantastic stories, we may re-examine more 
canonical texts like Dickens’s in order to expose the way discourse about belief in the 
fantastic becomes central to the progress of story. 
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 Yet experimental fantasies do not speak only to the tradition of literary criticism. 
Rhetorical philosophy can also benefit from an examination of how these authors imagine 
the way that language functions. In depicting and privileging the unreal, these texts 
emphasize the problems of communication between speaker and listener. The structural 
“flaws” of Phantasmion, the confessional mode of Phantastes, and the depiction of the 
need for charity in communication in Mopsa all prefigure contemporary rhetorical 
theories. The experimental nature of these texts, in fact, allows authors to use the world 
of fantasy to explore the problems of language well before contemporary post-modern 
theorists would articulate them. 
The interpretive experiments of Victorian literary fantasists, then, do not exist as a 
separate tradition of Victorian literature. They are not the “underside,” the “repressed,” or 
the “other” world of Victorian experience. Rather, they are evidence of sophisticated 
experiments by authors that used their texts as a place to explore the ways in which an 
author might communicate the Victorian concern with the reader’s moral duty through a 
subjective, pluralistic mode. They understood that reading could affect readers, 
transforming them through an aesthetic encounter in which meaning within the text 
eluded them. Rather than despair at language’s plurality, at fantasy’s subjectivity, or at 
the failure of audiences to understand their interpretive experiments, these authors instead 
believed that the multiplicity of individual responses to their novels enhanced the readers’ 
literary experience. While they hoped for a moral response to the aesthetic encounter, 
these authors left the interpretive experience of reading up to the individual, and in doing 
so, they enriched the literary tradition by providing evidence of experimental work that 
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links Romantic, Victorian, Aesthetic, and even post-modern philosophies. It is my hope 
that situating these experimental literary fantasies as part of the conversation on the 
intersection of literature and theory may lead to other like studies, where experimental 
works may be re-examined in an interpretive context that redefines their value. 
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NOTES 
 
 
 
1 See Davidson, Donald. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. His argument is about language and 
communication in general, not about fantasy texts or fantasy criticism. 
 
2 See also Armitt, Theorising the Fantastic, page 3: “Any reader who makes even the most tentative of 
inroads into the vast body of critical material on fantasy literature will discover that, at least historically, by 
far the majority of this work concerns itself solely with issues of classification and categorization and the 
manner in which the generic limits which define and confine texts can be continually tightened and made 
ever more absolute." 
 
3 I will say more about the connection between Victorian fantasy and children’s literature below. 
 
4 Of course, texts that do not use the fantastic also employ textual ambiguity to great effect. Henry James’s 
The Turn of the Screw is one of the most well-known examples. Christine Brooke-Rose argues that 
ambiguity of this sort is still connected to Todorov’s fantastique and claims that the absence of clear 
fantastic elements results in displaced instances of the fantastique within more traditionally realist texts. 
See Brooke-Rose pages 63-65 for a discussion of how this occurs structurally, and see my Chapter Three 
for a discussion of my disagreement with Brooke-Rose about textual ambiguity and the production of 
textual meaning. 
 
5 Armitt also notes this emphasis on boundaries. See Fantasy Fiction pages 51-52. I will also discuss this 
emphasis on internal unity in Chapter Three, in connection to Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s theory of 
dramatic probability. 
 
6 I want to be clear that Furst thoroughly complicates this claim by examining the fissures in the realist 
project. My explanation focuses on realists’ goals in the historical moment of textual construction, rather 
than current critical analysis of the genre. For more information on how realists made persuasive claims to 
truth about reality, see George Levine’s The Realistic Imagination, where he argues that the realists viewed 
reality in different ways as the nineteenth century progressed. 
 
7 See also Sandner’s “Theorizing the Fantastic”: “Plato banishes poetry from his ideal Republic and 
dismisses anything resembling the fantastic as the worst sort of poetry, both unimportant and absurd, 
setting the tone for mainstream literary criticism ever after” (285). 
 
8 This paragraph relies heavily on Hume’s argument on pgs. 32-37. 
 
9 She continues, “In its most crudely scientific formation, the [mimetic] novel is a social experiment; the 
author sets up a situation and lets his characters develop logically, and we watch their responses [as in 
scientific observation]” (38). 
 
10 I admire Prickett’s book, and I follow much of his work, especially on George MacDonald. I differ with 
him here on how he applies the terms “fantasy” and “imagination” more so than on his theories as a whole. 
 
11 Prickett argues that Gothicism and Romanticism influenced late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
culture so much that fantasy became internalized and gave rise to a literary counter-tradition to realism. 
 
12 Avery does not emphasize Locke’s influence but disputes that he was seminal in childhood theory, 
arguing instead that he was only a “reflection of changing attitudes” (12). She locates changing attitudes in 
children’s education as early as the 1670s. 
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13 Eleanor Sleath’s novel Glenowen or the Fairy Palace, published in 1815, is considered the first sustained 
fantasy narrative according to Dennis Butts. I have been unable to obtain a copy of this novel at this point, 
since it is out of print and few copies exist in the United States. Those libraries that carry the novel do not 
let it circulate. 
 
14 Butts does not mention Ingelow, but I add her to his list of those influenced by Romantic philosophy 
based on the argument of my project. 
 
15 See also J.R.R. Tolkien’s argument against the Alice books as “true” fantasy, in “On Fairy Stories.” 
 
16 See Mailloux 71. 
 
17 I have not taken up the difference between Fish’s “informed” reader vs. Iser’s “implied” reader as 
Mailloux examines these closely. Readers who wish a further treatment of the differences in reader-
response theory should read all of Mailloux’s excellent overview. 
 
18 Mailloux points out that Iser’s theory relies on the notion of an independent text, much like New 
Criticism, even though his emphasis is ultimately on the reader’s response to this text, and not on the text 
itself. See page 55. 
 
19 In this project I will discuss narrative change in terms of how an author may use the fantastic to affect 
readers’ moral consciousness. Doing so invokes narrative theories of ethics like those of James Phelan. I 
will not discuss Phelan’s work in this project, primarily because Phelan focuses on realist literature, and he 
also claims that unstable narratives (like those I will examine) are limited in how they can convey an 
ethical perspective (see page 155). Importantly, he claims a “…narrative’s capacity to explore the realm of 
ethics depends on its concrete particularity,” which he aligns with realism (155). There are, however, 
interesting implications for ethical narrative theory that could be applied to fantasy theory, though this is 
beyond the scope of my present project, especially when he notes that open-ended narratives leave room for 
ethical choice, though, again, he focuses on realist texts (60). 
 
20 This theory of reading can be compared to Roland Barthes “expectation-disappointment” structure, also 
shared by Fish and Iser. In this structure, the author is assumed to “encourage expectations in his reader so 
that he can later disappoint them and use that disappointment to educate the reader’s perceptions” 
(Mailloux 70). I believe the literary fantasy differs because the use of the fantastic in nineteenth-century 
literature was unprecedented, and therefore readers could have no expectations that the author could hope 
to disappoint.  
 
21 See Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Vol. II, p. 6. 
 
22 All further references from Sander come from The Fantastic Sublime. 
 
23 All Coleridge quotations are from the poem unless otherwise noted. 
 
24 Netland also notes the submissive position the reader inhabits, though he does not connect it to the child-
like. He says “the suspension of disbelief involves a submission to the text, yet this submission is not 
absolute, nor does it demand complete acquiescence to textual ideology. Rather, it demonstrates a 
willingness to engage with the text, to encounter the human presence in the narrative, to share in the 
dramatic experience though not necessarily to endorse everything in the text” (47). He is primarily arguing 
against Jerome McGann’s claim that to believe in the poem implies complicity with its Christian ideology. 
See also McGann’s “The Meaning of the Ancient Mariner.” Critical Inquiry 8 (1981): 35-67. 
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25 Quoted by Coleridge from his The Friend. 
 
26 Further Coleridge quotations are from Biographia Literaria unless otherwise noted. 
 
27 See also Vol. II, pgs. 133-134. 
 
28 J.L. Austin sees no paradox in the moment of performance, because, he argues, we only suspend our 
disbelief about the causal nature of language while viewing a play. We do not believe in the play’s actual 
events, but we do not react to them as if they were real, because the only belief we have suspended is that 
the language enacted on the stage is being used to affect our reality. See Austin’s How to Do Things With 
Words, pg. 22. My thanks to Stephen Yarbrough for directing me to Austin’s work. 
  
29 Dorothy Morrill explains that this theory combines “…the idea that the mind may become so completely 
absorbed in the objects working upon it that the powers of comparison and subsequent judgment are 
suspended” with “…the idea that we are brought into this condition of mind by an act of the will” (Morrill 
443). We should also not mistake Coleridge’s emphasis on textual unity for a type of formalism. The author 
should aim for unity, but the text’s success depends on the audience’s perception of it – so this interaction 
is intersubjective, not objective. 
 
30 Before fully discussing the model Coleridge uses, I want to provide an interesting side-note by 
mentioning research done by Norman Holland, as he provides a neuro-psychological explanation for what 
occurs as readers experience a text. In “The Willing Suspension of Disbelief: A Neuro-Psychoanalytic 
View,” Holland explains how the effect Coleridge describes actually occurs because of the way the brain 
functions when reading or watching a film. He divides our aesthetic reaction into four parts, all of which 
occur when we suspend disbelief in a literary text: 
1. We no longer perceive our bodies; 
2. We no longer perceive our environment; 
3. We no longer judge probability or reality-test; 
4. We respond emotionally to the fiction as though it were real. (2) 
Holland goes on to explain in great detail how the different parts of the brain function during this process of 
suspending disbelief. First, and most importantly for the purposes of my thesis, he notes that our 
descriptions of this feeling of total immersion in an artwork signal “…a regression to the stage in infancy 
when, according to psychoanalytic theory, the child feels the boundaries between itself and mother as 
blurred, uncertain, and permeable” (2). In addition to this psychological regression, we also experience 
what Holland calls “habituation.” His example is precise and worth quoting in full. He writes: 
When you put your shoes on, they are a novel stimulus, and the neurons that carry information 
about the state of your feet up your spinal cord start firing rapidly: “Something new is happening 
down here.” But as the stimulus continues unchanged, the neurons slow down to their normal 
firing rate, and no new information goes up to the brain. You simply become unaware of your 
shoes unless and until something new happens. 
In the same way, when you sit in your armchair reading or in a theater seat watching, your body is 
giving you no new signals. All the novel stimuli are coming from the page or stage or screen in 
front of you. You therefore pay attention to the literary work, and you cease to be aware of your 
body. (3) 
Your brain, in effect, shuts down that part of itself that is disposed to act in the real world. Holland 
believes, “We don't act as a result of art….We don't plan to do anything in the world as a result of what we 
are reading or watching” (3). He argues that the brain’s primary purpose is “to move a body” (3), and the 
artistic experience asks us to remain physically still. When we do so, our concentration on the literary work 
allows us to become immersed in it as we forget our physical bodies in the act of perceiving. We suspend 
disbelief, however, only until we plan to move again. For, “as soon as we do plan to move…we lose our 
concentration. We are no longer at one with the book or drama….We have broken the willing suspension of 
disbelief” (Holland 3).  
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Because using our judgment in reality also involves moving our physical bodies through our 
environment, Holland believes that our lack of movement also suspends our need to test the reality of what 
we see. Therefore, we can enter the fictional world of the artistic work readily, as our brain does not engage 
that portion of itself that tests reality (4). Finally, he explains how we have real emotions for fictional 
characters and situations by noting that our brain works with two different systems, each one independent 
of the other. Although the “reality-testing” portion of the brain is at rest, the “emotion” portion remains 
responsive; the combination allows us to react emotionally to something we consciously understand to be 
fiction (4-5). 
Significantly, Holland calls our reaction to art a regression. “The willing suspension of disbelief,” 
he explains, “takes us back to a time when our limbic [emotional] systems had begun to function, infancy, 
but our prefrontal cortices [reality-testing] had not…” (5). Suspension of disbelief may effectively and 
literally turn us into children again on a neuro-psychological level. 
Holland, quoting Immanuel Kant’s theory of Interesselosigkeit, or “disinterestedness,” insists, 
“We may cry or laugh in response to what we are reading or watching, but we don't plan to act on the world 
outside the work of art” (3). Yet, and this is key, Coleridge, Wordsworth, and their Romantic 
contemporaries staunchly declared that literature, poetry, in particular, had the power to transform readers’ 
souls. As audience members, we may not plan to act when we initially encounter an artwork, yet artists like 
Coleridge often created works intending that we would do just that. 
 
31 See also Schulz, Max. “Samuel Taylor Coleridge,” listed in the Works Cited, which provides a 
bibliography of criticism on Coleridge. 
 
32 McGann 35. 
 
33 Davies’s argument seems to rely on Wolgang Iser’s reader-response theory, in which he claims the 
reader must navigate shifting perspectives in the text in order to create meaning, though she does not refer 
to Iser in her article. 
 
34 She also cites Lawrence Lipking’s essay “The Marginal Gloss” to explain how the gloss acts as 
interpreter of the poem. Following his work, she claims, “The gloss frequently makes explicit what the 
narrative of the poem only infers” (262). 
 
35 She claims that through re-writing the text – in Roland Barthes’s terms of “writerly texts,” we become 
critics that can transform the text by creating meaning from it through our own interpretive activity. 
 
36 See Netland, for example: “we often forget that the poem is, at least on one level, about understanding – 
and responding to – an extraordinary tale” (39). 
 
37 He relies on Huntington Brown’s article in which he introduced the idea that there was a “gloss-writer,” a 
type of scholarly editor. See Brown, Huntington. “The Gloss of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner.” Modern 
Language Quarterly 6 (1945): 319-24. See also Vincent Newy’s claim that “The gloss offers, in other 
words, a grounded perspective, favoring conceptual explanation and design – and also, in spite of the 
appeal to the supernatural, rationalization, for the supernatural agents are seen, not as the inexplicable, but 
as components of a knowable system…” (168) and K.M. Wheeler, who argues that the gloss is an ironic 
example of a bad reader. I will discuss Wheeler in more depth below. 
 
38 Netland claims that Coleridge’s own response to texts show a “vigorous engagement with the text” and 
that Coleridge’s lectures on literature emphasized “the affective power of literature (both as written 
discourse and dramatic performance), [and] anticipate some contemporary trends in reader-oriented 
hermeneutics.” His discussion of Coleridge’s own hermeneutical strategies aligns well with the role of the 
fantastic in literature, though Netland does not note this connection. 
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39 He goes on to describe how these different readers model Coleridge’s theory of Biblical hermeneutics, a 
persuasive argument.  
 
40 Perhaps we could also question if fantasy is therefore more hierarchal a mode than realism, if readers 
must “submit” to the author’s storytelling authority in order to experience the tale. As mentioned above, I 
agree with Netland that submission to storytelling authority should not be equated with submission to 
ideology. As I have argued, the suspension of disbelief relies on returning to the perspective of the child – 
for the moment. We are always free to reject the fantastic should it ever lack psychological truth and 
probability; or should we ever feel that the author’s own agenda destroys the unity of the fantasy. I view the 
power relations between author and reader as more benign, especially (as I will argue throughout this 
project) because many fantasy authors did not try to control textual meaning in a way that would imply 
control of the reader. 
 
41 Anna Barbauld famously critiqued the poem for its lack of moral, and Coleridge responded that he felt 
the moral protruded too much. See Coleridge “May 31, 1830” in Table Talk of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
and the Rime of the Ancient Mariner. London: Routledge and Sons, 1884. 91. 
 
42 She goes on to argue that the gloss represents a bad type of reader, one that undermines the aesthetic 
experience of art by reducing it to “happenings” and “things.” See pgs. 51-64. 
 
43 The gloss, by contrast, tries to draw conclusions and present information about the poem’s meaning, 
“thereby stripping the sensuous imagery of its mysterious power of arousing the mind.” 
 
44 See Todorov 41. 
 
45 She also discusses M.M. Bahktin, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida in her description of how texts 
become ambiguous for readers. Citing Bahktin’s research, she writes, “The diological text is essentially an 
ambiguous text, leaving characters and their ideologies open-ended. The monological novel, on the other 
hand, however complex…is essentially delimited by the author’s controlling power…giving the reader a 
finished picture, letting him absorb it passively” (44).  She notes how Lacan and Derrida focus on the way 
language produces the illusion of meaning. Since language is only a system of signs, in which meaning is 
constantly delayed, we can find no authority for interpretation. This introduces the problems of 
indeterminacy and pluralism. Ultimately, Brooke-Rose agrees with these theories, because she argues that 
the meaninglessness of the real is the reason why we use fantasy; it is another system, like language, that 
we use to try to create meaning. See pgs. 44-48. Since I believe that language does change readers and/or 
listeners, I disagree with Brooke-Rose (and these theorists) at a fundamental level that excludes their 
theories from my discussion, though I will address this problem of language as “separate” from reality in 
Chapter Six. 
 
46 She goes on to critique Todorov’s pure fantastique because she claims the presence of the supernatural 
cannot be its primary quality. Instead, she suggests that an author produces textual ambiguity through the 
hermeneutic code, and he can do so in texts that do not contain the supernatural. Brooke-Rose argues that 
modernist texts (she focuses on Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw) often do not contain explicitly 
supernatural occurrences, but the ambiguity they create is the same as the fantastique Todorov describes. I 
will dispute this claim in the following paragraph. 
 
47I think my difference with Brooke-Rose arises since I focus on fantasy texts while she uses Todorov’s 
theories to discover displaced instances of the fantastique in non-fantasy texts See Brooke-Rose 65. 
 
48 “New Books Received” 559. See also the Preface to the 1874 edition, in which Henry Coleridge 
introduces the novel by describing it as “a kind of composition old-fashioned, out of date, and entirely at 
odds with the spirit and temper of the time we live in” (iv). 
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49 See also “Phantasmion” in Quarterly Review.  
 
50 See, for example, an article called “Novelists as Poets” in The Academy:  “…the best of [Sara 
Coleridge’s] poetic outcome is embedded in her romance, Phantasmion, where one alights unawares upon 
some really graceful numbers” (640). 
 
51 Examiner, April 11, 1874. 
 
52 See also Zipes’s “Spells of Enchantment: An Overview of the History of Fairy Tales” in When Dreams 
Came True for a complete treatment of the evolution of the oral fairy tale into published collections. 
 
53 See also Zipes When Dreams Came True 116. 
 
54 For a discussion of the political and ideological implications of fairy tales, see Zipes’s When Dreams 
Came True. 
 
55 See also Lynette Hunter’s discussion of how allegory functions in Modern Allegory and Fantasy. 
 
56 See Zipes’s “The Flowering of the Fairy Tale in Victorian England” in When Dreams Came True. 
 
57 Of course we cannot equate allegory or the appended morals with complete sincerity. Readers may find 
satire within some fairy tales (though “Puss in Boots,” while humorous, is not satirical). But overall the 
conventions of the genre were solidified in such a way that readers knew exactly what to expect, and some 
reviewers even remarked on the interchangeability of their plots and characters. See “Fairy Tales as 
Literature” pgs. 48-49. 
 
58 See my Chapter Two, Of Other Worlds, for more information on the changing definitions of childhood 
that influence the development of fantasy and its audience. 
 
59 See also Zipes, “Catherine Sinclair,” 559. Catherine Sinclair used fantasy within a more realistic frame 
story in Holiday House, published two years after Phantasmion in 1839. Even though the fantasy she 
includes may be read more ironically than didactically, she still uses clear allegorical structures for readers, 
including character names like “Master No-book” and “Fairy Do-nothing.” 
 
60 “To Miss Arabella Brooke, July 29, 1837.” 
 
61 See Mudge 14; 78, for example. This is one of Mudge’s general arguments that runs throughout his book. 
 
62 ST Coleridge’s Notebook, No. 42, 4 September 1829. 
 
63 “16 August 1837.” 
 
64 “29 September 1837.” 
 
65 All references to Coleridge from here on are to Sara, unless otherwise noted, and all references to 
Phantasmion are from the 1837 edition. 
 
66 Though I do not use the psychoanalytic perspective, many critics like Lucie Armitt and Rosemary 
Jackson focus on how literary fantasies construct desire and how this demonstrates the author’s and/or 
reader’s encounter with desire and expression of it through the use of fantasy. 
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67 We might also note the connection between the Fairy Potentilla’s name and that which she reveals in 
Phantasmion: his use of fantasy helps him recognize his Potential. 
 
68 “May 31, 1830.” 
 
69 “May 31, 1830.” 
 
70 “May 31, 1830.” As I explained in Chapter Three, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” lacks the typical 
closure found in truly didactic or moralizing tales. Even if S.T. Coleridge found the moral too obvious, the 
variety of criticism on the poem suggests that it resists closure and instead provokes interpretation. 
 
71 “16 August 1837.” 
 
72 “To Miss Morris, 1848.” 
 
73 “To Miss Morris, 1848.” 
 
74 See, for example, where ST Coleridge writes “Evidences of Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a 
man feel the want of it; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of the need of it, and you may safely 
trust it to its own evidence…”(272). Aids to Reflection, London: George Bell, 1884. 
 
75 “To Edward Quillinan, Esq.” Sept. 10, 1850. 
 
76 “To Edward Quillinan, Esq.” Sept. 10, 1850. 
 
77 “To Mr. Ellis Yarnall.” August 28, 1851. See also, “To Aubrey de Vere, Esq.” October 19, 1851: “But I 
do not pretend to maintain any particular reformed system as the very truth. I believe we have but 
approximations to absolute truth” (526). 
 
78 See Todorov 41. 
 
79 Dickens writes, “In an utilitarian age, of all other times, it is a matter of grave importance that Fairy tales 
should be respected….To preserve them in their usefulness, they must be as much preserved in their 
simplicity, and purity, and innocent extravagance, as if they were actual fact” (57). The essay is concerned 
with critiquing Cruikshank for adding in his own version of obvious didacticism to the classical tales, 
destroying (in Dickens’s view) the original story. The very fact that Dickens was concerned with 
eliminating overt moralism signals a shift in reading taste. 
 
80 John Ruskin’s essay “Fairy Stories” (1868) demonstrates the Romantic influence on Victorian 
perceptions of childhood. Ruskin writes, “A child should not need to choose between right and wrong. It 
should not be capable of wrong; it should not conceive of wrong….Children so trained have no need of 
moral fairy tales” (61). 
 
81 All references by Raeper are to George MacDonald unless otherwise noted. 
 
82 See Athenaeum where the editors claim MacDonald “seems to have lost hold of all reality” and that “One 
mistake is said to be permitted to every writer of books: Mr. MacDonald has made his.” They also spend a 
long time explaining how allegory works and why MacDonald’s work fails because it does not follow the 
rules of this mode.  
 
83 All MacDonald references are to Phantastes unless otherwise noted. 
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84 The following summary draws on parts of Raeper’s summary in his chapter on Phantastes. 
 
85 See MacDonald’s “The Fantastic Imagination,” which I will discuss below. I will also explain 
MacDonald’s connection to Romanticism below. 
 
86 See MacDonald Phantastes 32. 
 
87 All quotes in this sentence are from this page, though they are taken from two different paragraphs. 
 
88 See Raeper’s chapter on Phantastes in George MacDonald, in which MacDonald’s wife tells an admirer 
of the novel that MacDonald “bade me tell you that he has no key to his little work but he is sure that in 
your appreciation of it, you must have felt some meaning and he has always told his friends to take any 
meaning they themselves see in it” (Qtd. in Raeper 145-146). 
 
89 Raeper describes how MacDonald “immersed himself both in the English and the German romantics – in 
Wordsworth and in Coleridge, in Goethe and in Schiller – and in Novalis who, above all, was his 
touchstone” (107). 
 
90 Raeper explains that MacDonald learned these philosophies through his own studies of the Romantics 
but also through his mentor F.D. Maurice. See pg. 240. 
 
91 Francis R. Hart also defines confession as “personal history that seeks to communicate or express the 
essential nature, the truth, of the self” (491). 
 
92 Though Doody argues that confession does not depend on the speaker’s guilt, his insistence on the 
speaker’s overwhelming need to be accepted by the community to which he speaks limits the types of 
confessional narratives that he examines. I believe a narrator can make use of this confessional mode, as 
MacDonald does, but without the expectation that the listener must accept him in a communal relationship. 
Instead, because the confession is made through language, the speaker can recognize the possibility of 
being misunderstood while still attempting to induce belief in his listeners. Doody does acknowledge that 
the medium of language is “the common ground of confessions,” but his focus is not on the problem of 
belief, but on the construction of the speaker in relationship to the listener. See page 13. He does also 
explain that the speaker may be unsuccessful in communicating with the listener. See pg. 36-37. 
 
93 Foster does not divide the confessional narrative arc into stages. These are my own divisions made for 
the ease of providing parallels to Phantastes. 
 
94 Prickett convincingly argues that MacDonald presents “a whole way of structuring experience, part 
fantasy, part realism, which go to make up the origins of the German Bildungsroman” (“Fictions and 
Metafictions” 117). He explains that one typically defines the Bildungsroman as “the novel of self-
cultivation,” one that depicts a hero who undergoes formative experiences that result in his maturity and 
(conventionally) his submission to a place within an established order (“Fictions and Metafictions” 117). 
Interestingly, Prickett notes that the original definition of the genre, proposed in the 1820s, “had been more 
subtly reflexive….the term should apply not merely to the Bildung of the hero, but also to that of the 
reader, whose personal ‘formation’ and self-development is fostered through involvement with the text” 
(“Fictions and Metafictions” 117, italics mine). Prickett, however, does not take up the development of the 
reader extensively and examines how MacDonald’s novel fits within the more realistic Bildungsroman 
tradition. He also does not discussion confession.  
 
95 These epigraphs could also be read as a type of gloss on the novel’s action, since many of them comment 
on the action in the chapters that follow. In Chapter Three I argued that the gloss in “The Rime of the 
Ancient Mariner” provides a model of the rational reader, compared to the Wedding Guest as a reader that 
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has suspended disbelief in the fantastic. In Phantastes the epigraphs do not cohere into a narrative 
perspective (or persona) that directly corresponds to that of the gloss in Coleridge’s poem; however, they 
do invoke a larger inter-textual perspective for readers, who are asked to compare Anodos’s experiences to 
a broader literary tradition. In this case, the epigraphs reinforce the artifice of the text, which asks readers 
who try to interpret his story to do so with wonder at the fantastic, but also to move beyond the text (as 
text) and into more personal self-examination (i.e. non-literary). See Prickett’s “Fictions and Meta-fictions” 
for a longer treatment of the importance of the epigraphs. 
 
96 See Rabkin 32-33 and 54-55. 
 
97 Gunther emphasizes how the meta-textual references of the narrative enable its transcendent quality, but I 
find the confessional mode reinforces this drive toward textual transcendence.  See page 58 and Gunther’s 
“The Multiple Realms,” where he discusses the purpose of Anodos’s experiences: “The purpose is always 
the same: to gain understanding of present experiences, an understanding which then gives direction to the 
transcendence of those experiences” (183). 
 
98 For more on the spiritual longing produced by the text, see Manlove’s Modern Fantasy. Manlove 
discusses Sehnsucht in “The Circle of Imagination,” and Modern Fantasy. Also, Gunther does mention 
Anodos’s shifting role from narrator to author to character in a story, but he does not discuss how Anodos 
may be a model for readers. See Gunther’s “The Multiple Realms” 187. 
 
99 Again, we should note that one of his main activities in the Palace was to spend days in the library 
reading – an unlikely activity for a traditional protagonist. 
 
100 Manlove in “The Circle of Imagination,” also notes the connection between Anodos and the childlike 
perspective, but he argues that Anodos must “learn how to unite childlikeness with true consciousness,” 
and he does not discuss the implications for readers in Anodos’s childlike construction of himself. See pg. 
61. 
 
101 MacDonald 5, 14, 34, and 59, respectively, though there are many examples. Manlove’s “The Circle of 
Imagination” also points out that Anodos’s childlike position is emphasized by his dependence on “mother-
figures.” Where Manlove argues that Anodos must move away from this position, I would argue that 
continuing in this childlike position is essential in depicting a model for readers to follow as they attempt to 
understand and participate in his experiences. See pg. 65-67 for Manlove’s argument about maternity and 
maturity, and pgs. 67-68 for his argument that MacDonald’s narrative structure is, like Blake’s, a spiral 
form: “one must move from innocence to experience…but thence to a higher innocence which is a return at 
a different level to the childlike state.” 
 
102 He goes on to argue that, unlike many Romantics, MacDonald believed in the importance of the 
imagination because he saw it as “the dwelling-place of God in men, and hence the fount of absolute rather 
than possibly subjective truth.” See pg. 56. 
 
103 Gunther also discusses this scene in “The Structure,” but his focus is on how the discussion of fairy tales 
marks the text as generically self-conscious. He does note: “In fact whether we inhabit Fairy Land or 
‘normal reality’ depends on what we are….This is as true for us the readers as it is for Anodos on his 
journey. The reading of the text can open us to sacred energy or function on the level of gross materialism.” 
See pgs. 48-49. Gunther’s focus is on explicating the underlying narrative structure of the novel, so this 
comment, central to my argument, is only an aside in his larger discussion of the blending of fantasy and 
‘reality’ in the novel. 
 
104 Aligning himself with deconstructionist criticism, Foster reads confession as primarily a reaction to the 
alienation we may experience when attempting to express the self in language. He believes, “the act of 
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confession provides a compensation in the power it establishes over another” (11). Writers who use a 
confessional mode expose a reader’s ignorance in order to induce a desire for truth. In doing so, they gain 
the reader’s complicity in the drive toward Truth in the text. Foster explains: 
 
In the activity of interpretation, a reader will almost inevitably find the text to be a confirmation of 
his own thoughts, both happy and fearful (or an almost personal attack on him, which amounts to 
the same thing). If the activity of the writer is motivated by a desire to confess his own sense of 
loss and desire, the reader will find himself engaged in the same motivations, though he may not 
recognize that the history he strives to comprehend becomes increasingly his own, not the writer’s. 
The writer’s work, in short, becomes the field on which the reader attempts to realize himself; or, 
as Hegel writes, ‘to obtain through their action the consciousness of their unity with reality.’ (12-
13; Hegel 234) 
 
Foster goes on to make fascinating claims about the resistance readers have to finding themselves already 
in texts, a threat that he claims “requires readers to become complicit with the motivations of the writer” 
(13). His argument has interesting implications for MacDonald’s project that are beyond my current 
project. 
 
105 See Raeper 321: Diamond, from At the Back of the North Wind, “emerges as a stained-glass Victorian 
emblem of perfection.” 
 
106 The article is on American children’s literature, but MacLeod explains: “Children’s books were always a 
reliable source of income for publishers, the more so as fiction became increasingly acceptable in the 
children’s markets” (129). 
 
107 See Knoepflmacher, in particular.  
 
108 See also Jennifer Greer. 
 
109 U. C. Knoepflmacher also notes this difference in “Sundering Women from Boys: Ingleow’s Mopsa the 
Fairy” in Ventures into Childland: Victorians, Fairy Tales, and Femininity.” See page 293. 
 
110 Knoepflmacher comes closest to understanding Ingelow when he notes that she “…prefers to recombine 
opposites” and “…she can simultaneously identify herself with both fantasy and anti-fantasy…” (301), 
though he insists on her division of the two worlds. 
 
111 Greer also notes that the poem indicates the fantastic’s familiarity. See page 176. 
 
112 Ingelow and Rossetti were friends during their lifetime and Ingelow certainly knew Rossetti’s poem. See 
Peters 67. 
 
113 Readers interested in the ways Ingelow made light, somewhat, of her Evangelical beliefs can also look 
at Peters’s description of Ingelow’s reaction to a “friend’s strict Puritanism [which she found] slightly 
ridiculous” (26). Likewise, the writer of Some Recollections of Jean Ingelow mentions that though Ingelow 
followed her strict Christian upbringing, she had many friendships with people who did not share her 
views, including John Ruskin, Christiana Rossetti, and Alfred Tennyson (74). I mention these in order to 
show that Ingelow’s views should not be used as evidence of a limitation in her writing, and that Mopsa, in 
particular, depicts a writer willing to explore new ideas, rather than retreat from them. 
 
114 See his discussion of Jack’s need for the stability of the material world, pgs. 303-304. 
 
115 See, for example, the apple-woman’s comment that “humans call their history fable” (133). 
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116 See, for example, Jack’s encounter with the Ravens and water snakes on page 46. The water snakes also 
reappear at times during Jack’s journey with Mopsa to her new kingdom. 
 
117 For more on the difference between the “willing suspension of disbelief” versus submission to ideology, 
see my Chapter Three: Only Not to Disbelieve, especially the discussion of John T. Netland’s article. 
 
118 The use of poems to open all the chapters, much like those in Phantastes, could be read as a type of 
gloss on the narrative, acting as yet another meta-textual allusion to Coleridge’s poem, though, as in 
Phantastes, the epigraphs do not cohere into a narrative persona as Coleridge’s gloss does. 
 
119 See Ingelow 242: After Jenny leaves Jack outside his home, Ingelow describes how Jack feels “shy and 
ashamed.” I would argue this is because he does not understand how to interpret the two seemingly 
disparate “worlds” of the fantastic and material into one world in which each makes sense together.  
 
120 Diary Entry dated 11 January 1923.  
